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The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed,
and risk imports relation;it is risk to another or to others within
the range of apprehension.'
Principles of foreseeability, however, are inapposite where a third
party affirmatively abuses a product by consciously bypassing
built-in safety features. While it may be foreseeable that an employer will abuse a product to meet its own self-imposed production needs, responsibilityfor that willful choice may not fall on
the manufacturer.2
INTRODUCTION

One of the most difficult issues to arise in products liability litigation is the extent to which a manufacturer may be held liable for
accidents arising out of the subsequent material alteration of its
product by a third party.3 Cases involving the issue of product alteration typically involve a manufacturer who designs and distributes
its product into the stream of commerce with certain safety features
which are removed, bypassed, or otherwise altered by the subsequent
act of a third party. The product, as altered, becomes qualitatively
different, and the plaintiff that interacts with it suffers injuries that
would not have been caused by the product in its original, unaltered
condition.
In a strict products liability action against the manufacturer,
the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective when it left
the manufacturer's hands; i.e., in its condition as originally designed
and sold.' In subsequent alteration cases, the plaintiff will allege that
the product was defective as originally designed in that (1) the design had the capability of being altered by a third party, which alter1.

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) (Cardozo,

C.J.).
2.

Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 480, 403

N.E.2d 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1980).

3. See generally Note, Product Modification: The Effect of Foreseeability, 42 U. PiTT.
L. REV. 431 (1981); Comment, Substantial Change: Alteration of a Product as a Bar to a
Manufacturer's Strict Liability, 80 DICK. L. REv. 245 (1976).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965), stating that:

The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed. The
burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the
hands of the particularseller is upon the injured plaintiff ....
Id. (emphasis added); see also Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 450

N.E.2d 204, 207, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401-02 (1983); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 710 (1980).
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ation should have been foreseen and prevented by the manufacturer,5
or (2) the design was otherwise defective and the intervening alteration should not sever that original design from being the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.' The manufacturer, on the other
hand, will move for summary judgment or directed verdict on the
ground that the subsequent material alteration of its product should
fully absolve it of any liability for the plaintiff's injuries.7 In ruling
on these motions, courts have been plagued with the question of
whether the material alteration scenario can fit within traditional notions of duty, defect and proximate cause.
The advent of strict products liability has marked a shift in focus from the conduct of the manufacturer (negligence) to the condition of the product itself (defect). 8 Courts have placed a duty upon
manufacturers to design products that are reasonably safe not only
for their intended uses, but for uses that are unintended, yet reasona5. See, e.g, Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that a
manufacturer may be held liable where it could have foreseen the likelihood of danger resulting from a subsequent alteration of its product); Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42,
45 (3d Cir. 1980) (declaring that "[t]he test in such a situation is whether the manufacturer
could have reasonably expected or foreseen such an alteration"); see also Young v. E.W. Bliss
Co., 130 Mich. App. 363, 343 N.W.2d 553, 557 (1983) (holding that the question of whether
the modification to defendant's product was reasonably foreseeable is one for the jury). One of
the leading cases involving a duty to prevent foreseeable product alteration is Brown v. United
States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes
149-84.
6. See, e.g., McGuire v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 151 Ariz. 420, 422-23, 728 P.2d 290,
292-93 (1986); Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 74 111.App. 3d 818, 823-24, 393 N.E.2d
598, 603 (1979); Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 415-16, 475 A.2d 1243,
1246-47 (1984); Thompson v. Motch & Merryweather Mach. Co., 358 Pa. Super. 149, 152,
516 A.2d 1226, 1228 (1986). The leading case utilizing an intervening/superseding proximate
cause approach in the context of subsequent product alteration is Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of
H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225 (1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes
59-149.
7. See cases cited supra note 6; see also Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package
Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
8. See Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Mo. 1986); Voss
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 450 N.E.2d 204, 207, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398,
402 (1983); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1986); see generally
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict
Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980); Fischer, Products Liability - The
Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974); Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products
Liability Law, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579 (1980); Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor
Products,44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, On Product "'DesignDefects" and their ActionabilIty, 33 VAND L. REv. 551 (1980); see also W. PROSSER & W. KEEroN, THE LAW OF TORTS §
99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984) ("In strict liability, the plaintiff is not required to impugn the conduct of the maker or other seller but he is required to impugn the product.").
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bly foreseeable." Even under this standard, however, it is fundamental that a manufacturer is not to be held as an insurer of its product
against all injuries that may occur once the product leaves its control. 10 In actions involving a materially altered product, plaintiffs
strenuously attempt to avoid judgment as a matter of law by creating "factual issues" as to whether the manufacturer should have
designed an "alter-proof" or "accident-proof" product.11 Juries are
then instructed that the manufacturer may be strictly liable if it
should somehow have foreseen that someone would materially alter
its product. 2 The jury is asked to evaluate the safety of the product's original design by analyzing its dangers as materially altered.
With the "deep-pocket" manufacturer often the sole defendant, the
outcome is almost inevitable. What should be a rational limitation
on the manufacturer's duty has developed into absolute liability. It is
in this context that one is most "fearfully reminded of Dean Prosser's military description of the fall of 'the citadel of privity' and the
imagined bloody results of that victory: 'The rest is the story of sack
and slaughter, of riot, rape and rapine .

'

"13

This problem intensifies when it arises in the context of a workplace accident. Such cases usually involve injuries sustained by a
9. See, e.g., Daberko v. Heil Co., 681 F.2d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 1982); Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979); Lancaster v. Jeffrey Gallon, Inc., 77 Il1. App.
3d 819, 825, 396 N.E.2d 648, 653 (1979); Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 688

(Mo. App. 1980); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577, 384
N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976); see also cases cited infra note 226.

10.

Briney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 782 F.2d 585, 587 (6th Cir. 1986); Lenoir v. C.O.

Porter Machinery Co., 672 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1982); Adroit Supply Co. v. Electric

Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 112 Ariz. 385, 390, 542 P.2d 810, 815 (1975); Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (1978); Shultz v.
Linden-Alimak, Inc., 734 P.2d 146, 148 (Colo. App. 1986); Hunt v. Blasius, 74 III. 2d 203,

211, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1978); Brawner v. Liberty Industries, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 376, 377
(Mo. App. 1978); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981);

Featherall v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 963, 252 S.E.2d 358, 367 (1979);
Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 672, 681, 280 N.W.2d 226, 231 (1979); see also
Trayner, The Ways and Meaning of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv.
363, 366-67 (1965).

11.
12.

See infra notes 59-223 and accompanying text.
See Vanskike v. ACF Indus., 665 F.2d 188, 203-04 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,

455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1980); Aller

v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 837-38 (Iowa 1978); Banks v. Iron Hustler
Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 432, 475 A.2d 1243, 1255 (1984); Young v. E.W. Bliss Co., 130

Mich. App. 363, 371, 343 N.W.2d 553, 557-58 (1983); Thompson v. Motch & Merriweather
Mach. Co., 358 Pa. Super. 149, 155, 516 A.2d 1226, 1229 (1986).
13. Hoenig, Product Designs And Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8
Sw. U.L. REv. 109, 111 (1976) (quoting Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (StrictLiability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv.791, 791 (1966)).
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worker while using a product which had been materially altered by
his employer subsequent to the time that it left the manufacturer's
control. 4 The drafters of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act
(MUPLA) noted that "[the largest number of... product modifications result from the conduct of employers.""u It is ironic, however,
that while the employer who materially alters a product is the primarily culpable party,'" workmen's compensation laws afford it a
shield of immunity against personal injury actions brought by employees.' 7 Thus, in actions arising out of workplace accidents, the
manufacturer becomes the plaintiff's sole source of recovery. As
such, courts are extremely hesitant to adjudicate the questions of
duty, defect and proximate cause as a matter of law, deciding instead to submit these issues to the jury as questions of fact."
Even in those few states that allow a manufacturer to implead
an employer as a third party defendant,' 9 courts have been hesitant
14. Id.
15. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, Analysis of § 112(D) (1979).
Thirty-nine percent of product alterations result from the conduct of employers. Id.
16. Id.; see also Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471,
481, 403 N.E.2d 440, 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 721-22 (1980).
17. Robinson, 49 N.Y.2d at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721-22 (acknowledging that a culpable employer cannot be held liable in a personal injury suit brought by an
employee because of the exclusivity of worker's compensation). For a comprehensive analysis
of workmen's compensation law, see 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

(1983 & Supp. 1985).
18. See infra note 132 and accompanying text; see also Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618
F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that Workmen's Compensation barred plaintiff from recovery against his employer, and declining to absolve the manufacturer of liability for injuries
arising out of a subsequent alteration since the "foreseeability" of the alteration created a jury
issue); Young v. E.W. Bliss Co., 130 Mich. App. 363, 370, 343 N.W.2d 553, 557 (1983)
("Whether the intervening negligence on the part of plaintiff's employer in modifying the original design . . . acted to shield defendant from liability was a question for jury determination."); cf. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 481, 403
N.E.2d 440, 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 722 (1980) ("[T]hat an employee may have no remedy
in tort against his employer gives the courts no license to thrust upon a ...manufacturer a
duty to insure that its product will not be abused or that its safety features will be callously
altered.").
19. Only Illinois, Minnesota and New York allow a culpable employer to be impleaded
by a defendant in a personal injury action brought by an employee. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 70
(Smith-Hurd 1979); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374
N.E.2d 437 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d
41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1977); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977);
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). For
an in-depth discussion of the impact of Workmen's Compensation upon products liability law,
see Butler, The Worker, A Defective Product, An Injury: Who Pays and Why, A Solution for
Ohio, 50 CINN. L. Rav. 31 (1981); Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers' Compensation Employer, 1982 DUKE L.J. 483. It should be noted that some states which refuse to
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to grant summary judgment or directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer.2 0 This occurs notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's
injuries arose not out of the product as originally designed and sold,
but out of the product as materially altered by the employer. Interestingly, cases in which a culpable employer is a third party defendant may present even greater problems to the manufacturer. In these
cases, the liability of the immune employer, as third-party defendant, is contingent upon liability being assessed against the manufacturer as primary defendant.2 Courts, and especially juries, are extremely reluctant to absolve the manufacturer of liability under
these circumstances, knowing that if the plaintiff recovers his damages from the manufacturer, the manufacturer can then, in turn, attempt to recoup the employer's proportionate share of the "fault"
under rules of contribution and indemnity.22 Thus, in an attempt to
ensure recovery, plaintiffs have focused upon the manufacturer as
the primary target. This places the manufacturer in the position of
having to defend the integrity of its design before a jury as the plaintiff's sole source of recovery, despite the fact that its product was
materially altered by an immune party.2"
This Article critically analyzes the burden facing such a manufacturer and the existing approaches utilized by courts in an attempt
to resolve it. An analysis of some statutes and leading judicial decisions will reveal the inadequacies of the existing approaches. Finally,
this Article proposes a workable solution which can effectively allow
courts to adjudicate more of these cases as a matter of law, without
circumventing the policies underlying products liability law.
allow third-party claims against a culpable employer do, at the very least, allow manufacturers

to deduct the plaintiff's workmen's compensation benefits from the total amount of a judgment. See, e.g., Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961); see
also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572r (West Supp. 1982).
20. See Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 818, 393 N.E.2d 598 (1979);
Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986) (en banc); Miller v.
Anetsberger Bros., 124 A.D.2d 1057, 508 N.Y.S.2d 954 (4th Dep't 1986).
21. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975);
see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, § 50, at 336-41.
22. Id.
23. See Comment, The Expanding Scope of Products Liability: New Jersey Extends a
Manufacturer's Responsibility to Include Injuries Caused After a Substantial Alteration of
its Product, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 722, 741 (1981). The author asserts that it is unfair to

hold manufacturers responsible for injuries arising out of an immune employer's material alteration. See id. "If liability should be imposed in accordance with fairness, then the employee
should not be limited to suing the manufacturer of the product, nor should the employer be
shielded from liability by statute." Id.
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE DILEMMA

The American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A 24 attempted to alleviate the material alteration problem
by limiting the imposition of strict products liability to cases where
the product "is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.""5
This language has had the practical effect of producing significant
disagreement among courts as to the scope of a manufacturer's duty.
Some courts have construed the language of section 402A to
limit a manufacturer's duty where the condition of its product at the
time of the accident was substantially different from its condition at
the time of sale.2" For example, in Bishop v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 27 the Seventh Circuit construed the language of section
402A to absolve a manufacturer of a duty where the plaintiff was
unable to prove that, at the time the accident occurred, the product
was in substantially the same condition as when it was originally
manufactured and sold.2 The court, applying Indiana law, focused
only upon the change in the condition itself, and not upon whether
that change was caused by a third party's alteration.29 Under the
Bishop rule, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the condition of the product did not substantially change. Any substantial
change in the condition of a product, such as normal wear and tear,
24. This Section provides:
§402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Atlas Constr. Co., 368 So. 2d 1247, 1249
(La. Ct. App. 1979).
27. 814 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1987).
28. Id. at 443.
29. Id. The court reasoned that " 'any change which increases the likelihood of a malfunction ... is a substantialchange.'" Id. (quoting Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prods., 147
Ind. App. 46, 54, 258 N.E.2d 652, 657 (1970)) (emphasis in original).
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can absolve the manufacturer of a duty with respect to accidents

causally related to the product in its "changed" condition.30
Most courts, however, have construed the "without substantial

change" language of section 402A to apply only in cases where the
product had undergone a subsequent alteration at the hands of a
third party.31 These courts differ in their approaches to the material
alteration scenario.
The majority of courts that have adjudicated the material alteration question have done so on the basis of defect and proximate
cause.3 2 This approach, referred to as "defect-proximate cause," focuses on the product's original design and whether or not the intervening alteration is so material that it should be deemed the sole

proximate cause of the accident.33 These courts appear to bypass the
threshold issue of "duty," reasoning that under strict products liability, every manufacturer has a duty to design non-defective products. 3 4 Thus, notwithstanding the materiality of the third party's alteration, a duty on the part of the manufacturer always exists.3 5 It is
30. 814 F.2d at 443; see also Insurance Co. of North America v. Atlas Constr. Co., 368
So. 2d 1247, 1249 (holding that "a manufacturer cannot be expected to design products whose
parts do not wear out.").
31. See sources cited infra notes 32, 44 and accompanying text. Some state products
liability statutes have either expressly or impliedly declined to adopt the Bishop approach. See
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-116-106 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572p(b) (Supp. 1988); IDAHO
CODE § 6-1405(4)(a) (Supp. 1987) ("alteration" includes improper maintenance and servicing, but does not include ordinary "wear and tear"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3(2)(b) (Supp.
1987) ("alteration" or "modification" does not include ordinary "wear and tear"); cf. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (Supp. 1988). The Kansas statute absolves a manufacturer of liability
for accidents arising out of its product after its "useful safe life" has expired. Among the types
of evidence "especially probative" in determining the expiration of a product's useful safe life
is the amount of ordinary wear and tear to which the product was subject. Id. § 603303(a)(1)(A).
32. See, e.g., Vanskike v. ACF Industries, Inc., 665 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Pike v. Benchmaster Mfg. Co., 696 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1983);
Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1980); McGuire v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
151 Ariz. 420, 728 P.2d 290 (1986); Verson Allsteel Press Co. v. Garner, 261 Ark. 133, 547
S.W.2d 411 (1977); Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981);
Augenstine v. Dico Co., 135 I1. App. 3d 273, 481 N.E.2d 1225 (1985); Rios v. Niagara Mach.
& Tool Works, 59 IIl. 2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268
N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243
(1984); Young v. E.W. Bliss Co., 130 Mich. App. 363, 343 N.W.2d 553 (1983); Duke v. Gulf
& Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. App. 1983); Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98
N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984); Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 484
A.2d 1225 (1984).
33. See cases cited supra note 32; infra text accompanying notes 59-184.
34. See cases cited supra note 32. But see supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the Bishop rule).
35. See cases cited supra note 32.
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therefore the function of the jury to determine whether the manufacturer had, in any way, breached this open-ended duty to design nondefective products.36 If the jury finds that the product was somehow
defective as originally designed and sold, it will then focus upon
whether that defect was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries
when taking into account the material alteration. a In so doing, the
jury is, in essence, adjudicating the "duty" question in a retrospective fashion.
The problem with the defect-proximate cause approach is that
emphasis is placed on the product as originally designed despite the
fact that the accident was caused by the product in its condition as
materially altered.38 Furthermore, the questions of defect in original
36. See cases cited supra note 32.
37. See cases cited supra note 32.
38. Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984), illustrates
this problem with the defect-proximate cause approach. The product involved in Banks was a
conveyor belt system, which was purchased by plaintiff's employer 13 years prior to the accident date. See id. at 412, 475 A.2d at 1244. The conveyor was set up on an incline, and used
to transport scrap from a low processing table up into railroad cars. Id. at 412, 475 A.2d at
1244-45. As originally designed, the 44-foot long conveyor was comprised of a three-foot wide
rubber belt supported by four segments of metal. Id. at 412, 475 A.2d at 1245. When each of
the metal parts met, they created a "nip" or "pinch" point; the conveyor had four such "nip"
points. Id.
Subsequent to its sale, plaintiff's employer altered the conveyor by removing the four flat
metal supports and replacing them with 14 rollers. This alteration created 14 "nip" points, 10
more than existed in its condition as originally designed. Id. Plaintiff inadvertently caught his
hand in one of the "nip" points made by the rollers and commenced an action against the
manufacturer sounding in negligence and strict products liability. Id. at 414, 475 A.2d at
1246. At trial, plaintiff's expert testified that the conveyor was defective as originally designed
because it lacked a guard over the underside of the conveyor, thereby exposing the dangerous
"nip" points. Id. Plaintiff's expert asserted that because the conveyor was unguarded, whether
there are four metal strips or 14 rollers (with 10 additional "nip" points) was immaterial. Id.
at 414-15, 475 A.2d at 1247.
The manufacturer asserted that the employer materially altered the conveyor, increasing
the risk of injury by approximately 250%. Id. at 429, 475 A.2d at 1253. Furthermore, plaintiff's hand was caught in the roller "nip" point, which was not on the machine when it was sold
to his employer. Id. Thus, the manufacturer argued that plaintiff would not have been injured
"but-for" the employer's material alteration. Id.
The court relied on plaintiff's theory of defect, and evaluated the product by analyzing it
in its materially altered condition. Id. at 433, 475 A.2d at 1255. In fact, the court even went so
far as to state that the material alteration was "immaterial," notwithstanding that the accident
would not have occured had the product remained in its condition as designed and sold. See id.
Thus, the court concluded that a jury could properly find that the product was defective as
originally designed, and that the employer's alterations did not suffice as a superseding cause.
Id. This decision was not only incorrect, but it was unduly oppressive to manufacturers. It is
inconceivable that the employer's removal of the product's four metal plates, and their replacement by 14 rollers, creating ten additional "nip" points, did not absolve the manufacturer of
liability. A manufacturer simply cannot owe a duty where a subsequent alteration renders its
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design and proximate cause are given to the jury under a "foreseeability" standard.39 Juries can, therefore, find that the subsequent
material alteration of the product was somehow "foreseeable," 40 and
that the manufacturer should have designed the product to be either
"unalterable," or to be safe in any materially altered condition.41
When a court focuses upon the product as originally designed, while
utilizing principles of foreseeability, it is extremely difficult for a
manufacturer to obtain a summary judgment or directed verdict.42
Plaintiffs will argue that factual issues as to defect in original design
and proximate cause always exist, irrespective of the extent to which
the product may have been altered. 43 The manufacturer is, in effect,
deemed an insurer of its products as against all product-related
injuries.
Some courts and state legislatures have recognized these
problems, as well as the need to adjudicate the manufacturer's
"duty" as a matter of law.44 These courts and statutes have declined
to adopt the defect-proximate cause approach, opting instead to adjudicate the manufacturer's duty under the "foreseeability" standard. 45 Their rationale has been that a manufacturer should have a
duty to foresee some types of alterations to its product, but not
others.46
product 250% more dangerous, and where plaintiff's injury arose out of the alteration.
39. See cases cited supra note 32.

40. See, e.g., Brown v United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 149-84; see also Wheeler v. Andrew Jergens Co., 696
S.W.2d 326 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 212-23. The court

in Wheeler went so far as to hold that a manufacturer can be responsible for a third party's
intervening criminal alteration, Wheeler, 696 S.W.2d at 328.
41.

See Wheeler, 696 S.W.2d at 328.

42. See, e.g., Young v. E.W. Bliss Co., 130 Mich. App. 363, 371-72, 343 N.W.2d 553,
557-58 (1983) (denying the manufacturer's directed verdict motion since the foreseeability

and causation questions presented issues of fact for jury resolution); see also Brown, 98 N.J.
155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes 149-88; Soler, 98 N.J.

137, 484 A.2d 1225 (1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes 59-147.
43. See cases cited supra note 42; see also Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App.
408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984).

44. See, e.g., Daberko v. Heil Co., 681 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1982); Merriweather v. E.W.
Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1980); Stevens v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 349 So. 2d 948 (La. Ct.
App. 1977); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986) (en bane);
Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d 312 (1967); CONN. GEN. STAT.
2 5 2
ANN. § 5 - 7 p (West 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-10 (1980); TENN. CODE § 2928-108 (1980). For a comprehensive discussion of the duty-foreseeability approach, see infra

notes 334-462 and accompanying text.
45.

See sources cited supra note 44.

46. See sources cited supra note 44.
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This "duty-foreseeability" approach is problematic as well. In
essence, the only real question of law for the court to adjudicate is
whether or not a particular alteration should be deemed "foreseeable."' 47 Courts that have adopted this approach are, therefore,
merely adjudicating the principle of foreseeability, rather than duty.
If the court determines that the manufacturer should have foreseen
that its product may be subsequently altered in the manner by which
it occurred, then it will have bridged the duty threshold. 8 The case
will then proceed to the jury on the issues of defect and proximate
causation.4 9 As a practical matter, however, once the court adjudges
that a manufacturer had the duty to foresee and prevent a particular
alteration, a jury would be hardpressed to find that the breach of
this duty, that is, the defect, was not a proximate cause of the accident. This approach is, therefore, only a slight variant of the defectproximate cause approach.
The "defect-proximate cause" and "duty-foreseeability" approaches have failed to provide a workable solution whereby courts
can rationally and consistently adjudicate material alteration cases
as a matter of law. The realities of modern products liability litigation are such that manufacturers are, all too often, placed unnecessarily at the mercy of juries which retroactively redesign their product
to conveniently fit the fact patterns of a particular case.50 This system of "negative standard setting" 51 has brought forth the need to
establish affirmative standards to guide manufacturers. Courts can
set such standards by adjudicating more complex products liability
cases as a matter of law. 2 This is especially needed in alteration
cases, where the manufacturer is simply not in a superior position to
47. See, e.g., Stevens v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 349 So. 2d 948, 949 (La. Ct.,App. 1977)

(finding employer's subsequent alteration unforeseeable as a matter of law, thereby absolving
the manufacturer of liability); cf. Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir.
1980) (allowing the foreseeability question to proceed to the jury since the manufacturer
should be liable for subsequent alterations found to be reasonably foreseeable).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 342-43.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 342-43.
50. See generally, Hoenig, supra note 13, at 109; Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground
Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982); see also infra note 276 (discussing
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981)).

5 1. See Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in ProductsLiability - Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 527 (1976); Twerski, Weinstein,
Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to Process
Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347, 355 & n.21 (1980).

52. See generally infra notes 263-333 and accompanying text (discussing the adjudication of the manufacturer's duty as a matter of law, Step One of the three-step approach).
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eliminate the possibility that third parties will consciously and materially alter its product to fit their own subjective needs. By allowing
these cases to proceed to the jury, courts have, in effect, reinforced
the notion of the "accident-proof' product whereby manufacturers

are held to the level of an insurer. This is contrary to the policies
underlying strict products liability.a
The misplaced focus on the "forseeability" concept has prevented courts utilizing either approach from properly adjudicating
alteration cases. In applying foreseeability, these courts have incorrectly equated an "alteration"with a "misuse."" It may be rational
to utilize a standard of reasonable foreseeability to define the parameters of a manufacturer's duty with respect to the way that its
product may be used.55 A manufacturer's duty is gauged as of the
time the product, as designed, leaves its possession and control.56 A
foreseeable "misuse" may fall within the scope of that duty because
it is but an improper use of the product in its condition as originally
53. Even the most liberal courts recognize that strict products liability was never intended to render the manufacturer an insurer of its products. See cases cited supra note 10.
54. All of the statutes and decisions applying the defect-proximate cause or duty-foreseeability approaches either expressly or impliedly equate the concept of product "alteration"
with product "misuse." See sources cited supra notes 32, 44. In General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), for example, the court analyzed product alteration as a
category of "misuse." Id. at 349. Similarly, in Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 98
N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225 (1984), the court stated that "[floreseable misuse or abnormal use
can be extended by analogy to foreseeable substantial change of the product from its original
design." Id. at 151, 484 A.2d 1232.
55. See Daberko v. Heil Co., 681 F.2d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 1982); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 131 Ariz. 344, 348, 641 P.2d 258, 262 (1982); Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723
P.2d 1322, 1325 (Colo. 1986); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d
571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976). The New York Court of Appeals in Micallef held
that under a "negligence" standard:
a manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his plan or design so
as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to
the danger when the product is used in the manner for which the product was intended ... as well as unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use.
Id.; see also Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981) (adopting the
New York approach that the manufacturer has a duty to foresee accidents in designing its
vehicles to avoid an unreasonable risk of "second-collision" injury). For an in-depth discussion
of the duty to foresee certain misuses, see infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
56. Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 450 N.E.2d 204, 207, 463
N.Y.S.2d 398, 401-02 (1983); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49
N.Y.2d 471, 479, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965), set forth supra note 4; see also Duggan v. Hallmark Pool Mfg. Co., 398 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa 1986) ("The rule is that strict liability in
tort should not extend to injuries which cannot be traced to the product 'as it reached the
market.' ") (citations omitted).
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designed and sold.57 It is patently unfair, however, to apply this
standard where the product has been altered. An alteration involves
a qualitative change in the product itself, differentiating it in composition from the state in which it had been as originally designed and
sold. 8 A manufacturer should never have a duty to foresee material
alterations in its products. The imposition of such a duty by both
approaches yields unfair and irrational results.
II.

THE DEFECT-PROXIMATE CAUSE APPROACH: AN ISSUE OF
LAW BECOMES FOUR QUESTIONS OF FACT

A. Anatomy of the Approach
One of the leading alteration cases adopting the defect-proximate cause approach is Soler v. Castmaster,Div. of H.P.M. Corp.59
In Soler, the New Jersey Supreme Court bypassed the threshold
question of duty,60 holding that a manufacturer's potential responsibility for injuries to a user of its product, which was altered after it
left that manufacturer's control, is dependent upon a resolution of
four questions of fact:
(1) whether the product, as originally designed, was "defective;"
(2) whether the subsequent alteration of the product was
"material;"
(3) whether the subsequent alteration was "foreseeable;" and
(4) whether the original design defect was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries when taking into account the subsequent alteration, or, in the alternative, whether the subsequent alteration should
be deemed the sole proximate cause of the injury.6"
57. See infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 238-51 and accompanying text.
59. 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225 (1984). For a discussion of Soler, see Fischer, An Analysis of the Effect of Subsequent Alteration Upon Manufacturers' Products Liability, 1987 S.
MErHODIST U. PRODS. LIAB. INST. §§ 8.01, 8.03; see also Comment, supra note 23, at 727-32.
60. 98 N.J. at 145-46, 484 A.2d at 1227, 1229.
61. Id. at 141, 484 A.2d at 1227. Almost all defect-proximate cause cases impliedly
utilize these four questions of fact. See, e.g., Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408,
475 A.2d 1243 (1984) (jury could rationally have found that the product was defective as
originally designed and that the alterations were not substantial or did not supersede the defect
as the sole proximate cause); Young v. E.W. Bliss Co., 130 Mich. App. 363, 343 N.W.2d 553
(1983) (jury must resolve the questions of whether the product was defective as designed,
whether the alteration was material and reasonably foreseeable, and whether the subsequent
intervening alteration was a superseding proximate cause); Thompson v. Motch & Merryweather Mach. Co., 358 Pa. Super. 146, 516 A.2d 1226 (1986) (finding that if the product
was defective as originally designed, the jury is to evaluate whether the subsequent material
alteration was "foreseeable" and whether it was a superseding cause of the accident). Since
the Soler court systematically analyzes each of these questions, that decision represents the
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Implicit in this approach is that in every strict products liability
action, the manufacturer has a duty to design its product to be "suitably safe for its intended or anticipated purposes by foreseeable
users under the risk-utility standard." 62 It is therefore the function
of the jury to determine whether this duty has been breached under
the unique facts of a particular case. 3 In the alteration scenario, this
is to be achieved by a consideration of the above questions of fact. A
manufacturer may be held strictly liable, notwithstanding that the
accident would not have occurred but for a third party's material
alteration, so long as the original design is found by a jury to be
defective and a contributing proximate cause of the accident."
The plaintiff in Soler was seriously injured during the scope of
his employment when the moving parts of a dye-casting machine
closed on his hand.6" The machine, as manufactured by the defendant, included a mold that contained two parts - one metal piece
remained stationary while the other piece moved until the two pieces
met.6 This machine operated manually in two separate cycles. 67 The
first cycle commenced when the operator pressed an electrical pushbutton which caused the moving metal part to meet the stationary
part, thereby creating the mold into which molten metal could be
injected. 8 Once the first cycle was complete, the machine would not
continue to operate until the operator pressed another button, which
would start the second cycle. 9 This cycle permitted the molten
metal to cool, after which the two parts of the mold would separate,
freeing the completed cast and allowing it to drop.70
As originally manufactured and sold, the machine was designed
without a safety device that would prevent the operator's hands from
coming into contact with the machine's point of operation. 71 The machine was also designed without a safety interlock system that would
cut off power to the machine while the operator's hands were dislodging a jammed part from the point of operation. 2
best illustration of the actual mechanics of the approach.
62. 98 N.J. at 153, 484 A.2d at 1233.
63. Id; see also cases cited supra note 32.
64. 98 N.J. at 149, 484 A.2d at 1231; see also cases cited supra note 32.
65. 98 N.J. at 142, 484 A.2d at 1227.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.

69. Id.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 143, 484 A.2d at 1228.
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After the defendant relinquished control of the machine, however, the plaintiff's employer circumvented the manual dual-cycle
starting mode by installing a "trip wire.""3 This electrical trip wire
allowed the cycles to operate continuously.74 As a result of the employer's alteration, the second cycle was completed when the cast
separated from the mold, thereby striking the trip wire, which would
automatically reactivate the first cycle.7 5 In addition to the trip wire,
the plaintiff's employer installed a safety gate which, when opened,
was designed to prevent the parts of the mold from opening and
closing.76
The accident allegedly occurred at the completion of the machine's second cycle when the plaintiff was attempting to dislodge a
finished cast which had been jammed inside the mold." Plaintiff
claimed that he opened the employer's safety gate and reached into
the point of operation. 8 After dislodging the cast, however, the machine began to repeat its first cycle and the plaintiff's hand was
crushed between the moving parts of the mold.7 9 The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant-manufacturer under theories
of strict products liability, negligence and intentional tort.80 Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the machine was defective as originally designed in that it lacked (1) a safety guard, which would have
prevented his hand from reaching the point of operation, and (2) a
safety interlock that would have cut off all power to the machine
while the guard was raised."1 The plaintiff's expert asserted that the
defendant's failure to equip the machine with the safety interlock
was crucial, due to the possibility that even a manual starting mechanism can malfunction. For example, an unexpected surge of electricity could override the system, causing the cycle to accidentally
repeat while plaintiff's hands were in contact with the mold.8 2 The
plaintiff's expert concluded that these safety features were feasible at
the time the product was designed and could have been installed at a
73,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141, 484 A.2d at 1227.
Id. at 143-44, 484 A.2d at 1228.
Id. at 144, 484 A.2d at 1228.
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modest cost without impairing the usefulness of the machine.8 3
The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that:
[T]he accidental injury occurred when the completed molded piece
struck the trip wire, which was part of the automatic system installed by the employer, reactivating the machine and causing the
mold to close on plaintiff's hand. Consequently

. .

. the trip wire

alteration could be found by a factfinder to be the sole proximate
cause of the accident, independent of the alleged design defect
the absence of a safety gate and interlock. 4
-

The trial court agreed, and at the close of the plaintiff's case, entered
a judgment dismissing the action.8 5 The court ruled that there was
no dispute that the defendant's machine had been subsequently altered, and that, in its altered condition "was an entirely different
functional machine."8' 6 The court further found that there was "no
evidence from which a jury could find that the machine as designed
and sold by the defendant had in it the elements which were the
proximate cause of this accident. 8 7 The appellate court reversed,
however, and remanded the case for trial, holding that the issues of
defect, alteration, and proximate cause presented questions of fact
for the jury.88
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed,89 and in a complex
opinion, held that the evidence presented by plaintiff raised a jury
question as to whether the original design defect was either the sole,
independent cause of the accident, or a concurrent or contributing
proximate cause. 90 The court's reasoning epitomizes the inequities of
the defect-proximate cause approach.
The court abstained from deciding the duty question as a matter of law, reasoning that the scope of a manufacturer's duty, as well
as the factors that constitute its breach, are determined by the
factfinder. 91 The plaintiff must, therefore, make a prima facie showing that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's
control, and that the defect proximately caused the accident.9 2 In
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

144, 484 A.2d at 1228.
150-51, 484 A.2d at 1232.
141, 484 A.2d at 1227.
142-43, 484 A.2d at 1227.
143, 484 A.2d at 1227.
152, 484 A.2d at 1233.
153-54, 484 A.2d at 1233.
146, 484 A.2d at 1230.
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cases involving a subsequent alteration, the plaintiff's prima facie
case must focus upon the four questions of fact discussed above.9 a
The court systematically addressed these questions and found
that a jury would be justified in finding that (1) the dye-casting machine was defective as originally designed and sold, 94 (2) the employer's subsequent alteration was material, 95 (3) the material alteration was foreseeable," and (4) the original design defect was either
a contributing, concurrent or the sole proximate cause of the acci97
dent when taking into account the intervening material alteration.
The court stated that the question of whether the manufacturer's product was defective as originally designed is resolved
through use of the risk-utility test.98 A product will not be deemed
defective in design where its utility outweighs its inherent risks, and
where the design minimizes these risks "'to the greatest extent possible consistent with the product's continued utility.' "91To establish
93. See id. at 153, 484 A.2d at 1233. The court reasoned that "each of the issues addressed in our opinion, upon a sufficient evidential showing ... is properly to be considered a
jury question rather than a matter of law to be decided solely by the court." Id. Under the
defect-proximate cause approach as expressed in Soler, none of these issues "calls for the
creation, recognition and imposition of a basic duty as a matter of public policy." Id. at 154,
484 A.2d at 1234; cf. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn.
1986) (en banc) (utilizing the "duty-foreseeability" approach and stating that a manufacturer's duty with respect to subsequent product alteration is appropriately a question of law for
the court), discussed infra notes 389-93 and accompanying text; Robinson v. Reed-Prentice
Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 475, 403 N.E.2d 440, 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717,
718 (1980) (holding that a manufacturer has no duty to foresee subsequent material alterations of a third party), discussed infra notes 473-509 and accompanying text.
94. 98 N.J. at 146, 484 A.2d at 1230.
95. Id. at 148, 484 A.2d at 1231; see also Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App.
408, 432, 475 A.2d 1243, 1255 (1984) (noting that the "common thread" among alteration
cases is that "in most cases, the substantiality of the change is a question of fact .... ); cf.
Lovelace v. Ametek, Inc., 111 A.D.2d 953, 955, 490 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (3d Dep't 1985) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that defendant was jury bound to make a "fail-safe" machine),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986), discussed infra text accompanying notes 555-68. Interestingly, even courts utilizing the defect-proximate cause approach have, where appropriate, decided the "materiality" question as a matter of law. See infra note 135 and accompanying
text.
96. 98 N.J. at 149-52, 484 A.2d at 1231-33.
97. Id. at 152, 484 A.2d at 1232-33. In Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408,
475 A.2d 1243 (1984), the court noted that "'[t]he connection between a defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury may be broken by an intervening cause.'" Id. at 429, 475 A.2d
at 1254 (quoting State v. Hecht Co., 165 Md. 415, 421, 169 A. 311, 313 (1933)); cf. Young v.
E.W. Bliss Co., 130 Mich. App. 363, 371-72, 343 N.W.2d 553, 557-58 (1983) (ruling that
whether an intervening negligent act of third party supersedes a proximate cause is a jury
question).
98. 98 N.J. at 145, 484 A.2d at 1229.
99. Id. (quoting Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d
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a prima facie case that a product's design is defective under riskutility, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by use of expert evidence, that an alternative design was feasible at the time of manufacture and that the alternative design would have minimized or prevented the risk of accident without impairing the product's utility as
a whole.100 On the evidence presented, the court reasoned that a jury
could find that the risk of harm in designing the dye-casting machine
without a safety gate and interlock outweighed its utility. 10 1 The
court further found that these safety features could have been added
at the time of manufacture "without appreciable cost and without
impairing [the product's] function" as a whole. 2 The court therefore concluded that there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of
fact such that the jury could find the machine to be defective at the
time it left the defendant's control.10 3
Once the defect issue was addressed, the court then focused
upon the second question, namely, the "materiality" of the employer's alteration. The court stated that a material alteration connotes a material change in the design or function of the product
itself, which affects the attendant risks of danger in its use. °4 As
designed and sold, the defendant's dye-casting machine had to be
manually operated, and functioned in two separate cycles.10 5 The
employer's subsequent installation of the trip wire, however, allowed
the machine to be operated automatically rather than manually, and
925, 930 n.l (1981)); see also Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172, 386 A.2d

816, 826 (1978) (finding that the question for the jury is "whether the magnitude of the risk
created... was outweighed by the social utility attained .... "); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 450 N.E.2d 204, 208, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1983) (finding that
the question for the jury "is whether after weighing the evidence and balancing the product's

risks against its utility and cost, it can be concluded that the product is not reasonably safe.")
100.
101.
102.

98 N.J. at 145-46, 484 A.2d at 1229.
Id. at 146, 484 A.2d at 1230.
Id.

103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 148, 484 A.2d at 1230-31. The court reasoned that a manufacturer cannot be

absolved of liability with respect to a subsequent alteration unless the alteration was "substan-

tial in terms of the essential features of the product." Id. at 147, 484 A.2d at 1230. Thus,
"'[s]ubstantial change' has been characterized as 'deal[ing] principally with material changes

in the state of the product' linked to the accident as opposed to '[c]hanges to other features
[that] had no material effect upon [the machine's] potential for dangers.'" Id. (quoting Ortiz
v. Farrell Co., 171 N.J. Super. 109, 117, 407 A.2d 1290, 1294 (Law Div. 1979)) (emphasis
added); see also McDermott v. Tendun Constructors, 211 N.J. Super. 196, 210, 511 A.2d 690,
698 (App. Div. 1986) (concluding that "[w]hile a change in any product may be viewed as

material or significant from a design or operational standpoint, it is not deemed to be 'substantial' for strict liability purposes unless the change is related to the safety of the product.").
105. 98 N.J. at 148, 484 A.2d at 1231.
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the machine thus functioned in continuous cycles.106 The court concluded that this alteration constituted a qualitative and material
change in the machine itself, as well as in the risks attendant to its
use.10 7 Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to justify a jury
finding that the employer's subsequent alteration was material. 10 8
With the initial two questions resolved, the court stated that
"[tihe critical question then is whether the original defect in the design of the machine - the absence of a safety gate with interlock constitutes a proximate cause of the accident, notwithstanding the
subsequent substantial [material] alteration."' 109 This approach is an
amalgam of the remaining two questions of foreseeability and proximate causation. As stated earlier, the general issue of proximate
cause is inextricably linked to the foreseeability concept and is, in all
but the clearest of cases, a question of fact for the jury."l0 Soler,
however, was not the clearest of cases.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the employer's installation of the trip wire should supersede the original design as the sole proximate cause, reasoning that this argument failed
to properly utilize the foreseeability concept."' In so reasoning, the
court equated an "alteration" with a "misuse."112 The court ruled
that an intervening alteration, however material, shall not prevent
the original design defect from being deemed a proximate cause so
long as the material alteration was foreseeable and could have been
prevented or minimized."13 On the basis of the evidence presented,
106. Id.
107. Id. The court reasoned that "[tihe operational risk of danger in using the machine
as originally designed with manual buttons to start each cycle was qualitatively and materially different from the risks of danger in the automatic operation of the machine in its altered
state." Id. at 148-49, 484 A.2d at 1231 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 149, 484 A.2d at 1231.
109. Id.
110. See Mack v. Altmans Stage Lighting Co., 98 A.D.2d 468, 471, 470 N.Y.S.2d 664,
667 (2d Dep't 1984); see also Zacker v. Budd Co., 396 N.W.2d 122, 125 (S.D. 1986).
111. 98 N.J. at 151, 484 A.2d at 1232; see infra text accompanying note 138.
112. Id. The court stated that "[floreseeable misuse or abnormal use can be extended by
analogy to foreseeable substantial change of the product from its original design." Id.; see also
Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that appellants cannot
escape liability "[b]ecause [they] could foresee the likelihood of unreasonable dangers resulting from the misuse or alterationof the machine .... ) (emphasis added); Young v. E.W.
Bliss Co., 130 Mich. App, 363, 371-72, 343 N.W.2d 553, 557-58 (1983) (regarding product
"alteration" as a category of "misuse").
113. 98 N.J. at 151, 484 A.2d at 1231; see also Vanskike v. ACF Indus., 665 F.2d 188,
195 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding that "subsequent changes or alterations in the product do not
relieve the manufacturer of strict liability if the changes were foreseeable and the changes did
not unforeseeably render the product unsafe."); Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App.
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the court concluded that the jury could properly find that the employer's material alteration was foreseeable. 114 Based on this conclusion, a jury could further find that the defect in the product's original design was either a contributing, concurrent or sole proximate
cause of the accident, notwithstanding the material alteration.11 5
B. A Critique of the Approach
Soler is a case that should proceed to the jury, albeit for one
reason alone: the evidence of a causal connection between the material alteration (installation of the trip wire) and the accident was not
sufficient for the court to adjudicate the causation issue as a matter
of law. 16 While the Soler court correctly allowed the case to proceed to the jury, its reasoning reveals the shortcomings of the defectproximate cause approach. Rather than properly adjudicating the
material alteration question as a matter of law, the court created
four unwarranted questions of fact, much to the detriment of defendants in any products liability action. On the basis of the evidence
presented in Soler, the court erred in allowing the first three questions of defect, materiality, and foreseeability to proceed to the jury.
The court also erred in the manner by which it phrased the causation question. A careful dissection of the court's analysis is therefore
warranted.
Question No. 1: Was the Product "Defective" as Originally
Designed?
A fatal flaw in the court's reasoning arises out of a misplaced
focus on the question of whether the product was defective as originally designed. Courts should never focus on the product as originally designed where the product has undergone a subsequent material alteration, and where the accident would not have occurred
"but-for" that alteration. 17
In Soler, the defendant's dye-casting machine was designed
without a safety guard and interlock system. 11 8 Notwithstanding the
absence of these features, the machine, as designed, required a man408, 433-34, 475 A.2d 1243, 1255-56 (1984) (reversing the trial court's granting of a directed
verdict in favor of the manufacturer on the grounds that the jury could have found the altera-

tion foreseeable, and that the manufacturer could have designed its product in such a way as
to prevent
114.
115.
116.

it).
98 N.J. at 153-54, 484 A.2d at 1233-34.
Id. at 152, 484 A.2d at 1233.
See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.

117. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
118.

98 N.J. at 142-44, 484 A.2d at 1227-28.
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ual operation and functioned in two separate cycles. 11 9 The machine
could not repeat cycles or progress from the first cycle to the second
unless the operator pressed the appropriate start button. 120 As altered, however, this manual mode was circumvented, and the machine operated continuously, allowing the first cycle to automatically
repeat itself once the second cycle was completed. 121 This alteration
entailed an actual rewiring of the electrical system by installing the
trip wire; 2 2 it is clear that the employer consciously altered the machine to increase its productivity. It is also clear that the employer
would have circumvented the manual starting mode regardless of
whether the product was designed with a safety guard and interlock.
In fact, the employer installed its own safety guard with what appeared to be an interlock system.' 25 These employer-installed safety
features did not prevent the machine from functioning, however, as
evidenced by the occurrence of the accident itself.12 4 Thus, even if
the dye-casting machine was dangerous in its original condition, it
was qualitatively different and far more dangerous in its altered condition. The court itself acknowledged that the employer's alteration
constituted a qualitative and material change in the machine, as
well as in the risk of injury to the operator. 2 5
Based on the foregoing, it should have been unnecessary to consider the question of "defect" in the original design if the material
alteration was causally related to the occurrence of the accident. Regardless of the absence of the safety features, the machine, as origi119.
120.
121.

Id. at 148, 484 A.2d at 1231.
Id.
Id.

122. Id. at 143, 484 A.2d at 1228.
123.

Id.

124. See id.
125. Id. at 148-49, 484 A.2d at 1231. The court properly made this finding notwithstanding testimony of plaintiff's expert "that although the machine was altered in some respects, 'the original machine was still there.'" Id. at 143-44, 484 A.2d at 1228. Apparently,
plaintiff was asserting that a subsequent alteration cannot be "substantial" or "material" unless it is so severe that the original design ceased to exist. While such an alteration would

clearly absolve the manufacturer of liability, see, e.g., Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App.
130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981), the Soler court reasoned that the employer's alteration met the

"materiality" test. 98 N.J. at 148-49, 484 A.2d at 1231; see also Augustine v. Dico Co., 135

Ill. App. 3d 273, 278, 481 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (1985) (finding that the employer's substitution

of a conductive remote control unit for a non-conductive unit on a boom-type crane "constituted a substantial change in the condition of the truck/crane beyond defendant's control
."); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 481, 403
N.E.2d 440, 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 722 (1980) (concluding that the employer's cutting of a

6 by 14 inch hole in the safety guard of a plastic injection molding machine was a "material"
alteration).
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nally designed, could not have repeated its first cycle unless the operator, or someone else, manually pressed the button. Hence, had the
product remained in its original unaltered condition, this accident
would not have occurred. Whether the original design may be
deemed "defective" is of no consequence with respect to the occurrence in Soler. If it could have been established with any degree of
certainty that the accident occurred when the unjammed cast struck
the trip wire, then it would have been clear that the material alteration transformed what would otherwise have been a dead machine

into a live one.12 Furthermore, given the employer's rewiring of the
machine's electrical system to circumvent its manual starting mode,
it is unclear as to whether the alteration would have circumvented
any guard or interlock that would have been installed by the manufacturer. This is true especially when considering that the accident
occurred despite the fact that the employer had installed its own
similar safety features. 27 Thus, where a product is so materially al126. Professor Fischer notes that Soler involved "the situation in which the original defect is unrelated to the injury." Fischer, supra note 59, § 8.03[3][a], at 8-11. As Professor
Fischer reasoned:
[T]he alteration [in Soler] greatly multiplied the risk of malfunction. The original
defect created a risk of injury only if a large surge of electricity entered the line at
the exact moment that the plaintiff's hand was between the two halves of the mold.
The chances of this happening were obviously not very high. The altered product
was much more dangerous. The altered product ran continuously. The gate was
inadequate to keep the worker's hand out of the die area and the trip wire was
dangerously exposed.
Id. § 8.03[3] [a], at 8-12. It is, therefore, most likely that the accident would not have occurred
had the product remained in its condition as originally designed, even if that design was somehow "defective."
A similar scenario was present in Coleman v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 64 I11.App. 3d
974, 382 N.E.2d 36 (1978). The plaintiff in Coleman was an operator of a press brake manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 976, 382 N.E.2d at 38. As originally designed and sold, the
machine's starting mechanism consisted of six "shoulder-high" control buttons. While the first
five buttons could be locked in a "run" position, the sixth button had to be held down for the
press to operate. Id. If the operator discontinued his application of pressure on the button, the
machine would immediately stop its descent, so long as it had not traveled more than one-third
of the way through its cycle. Id. After purchasing the press, plaintiff's employer removed the
control panel and replaced it with a two "palm-button" panel, mounted directly adjacent to
the loading area. Id. One of these buttons was taped down while the other could activate a
complete cycle upon one quick push, rather than constant pressure. Id. Plaintiff was seriously
injured when he inadvertently brushed against the button, causing the press to descend on his
hand. Id. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, reasoning that
the employer's alteration constituted "a substantial change in the condition of the machine
beyond the defendant's control." Id. at 979, 382 N.E.2d at 40. The plaintiff would not have
been injured by the product in its condition as designed and sold, and the employer's alteration, in effect, transformed what would have been a dead product into a live one. See id.
127. See Fischer, supra note 59, § 8.03[3][a], at 8-11.
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tered, it is patently unfair to allow a jury to engage in such a guessing game and to perform the risk-utility test by analyzing the original design in a vacuum.128 A subsequent material alteration that
causally contributes to an accident must absolve the manufacturer of
a duty with respect to that accident.12 9
Once the court submits to the jury the question of whether the
product was defective as originally designed, the jury is invited to
view the entire accident from the standpoint of the original design,
with little or no emphasis on the material alteration. 3 0 With the aid
of the foreseeability standard, the jury is further invited to evaluate
the safety of the original design by analyzing the product in its materially altered condition.'3 ' A plaintiff's verdict is therefore impliedly encouraged, especially when the employer is an immune
2
3

party.1

128. See, e.g., Stevens v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 349 So. 2d 948, 949 (La. Ct. App. 1977)
(refusing to evaluate the safety of the product in its altered condition, deciding instead to
evaluate its condition as of the time it left the manufacturer's hands); Lovelace v. Ametek,
Inc., Ill A.D.2d 953, 490 N.Y.S.2d 49 (3d Dep't 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 555-68. The court in Lovelace refused to evaluate the
original design under risk-utility where three of its safety devices were subsequently removed.
The court reasoned that "[e]ven if such tampering and defeat of the extractor's protective
devices was foreseeable ... the responsibility for injuries therefrom would not fall on defendant." I II A.D.2d at 954-55, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51. Hence, a manufacturer should not be "duty
bound" to make its product safe as altered. Id.
129. Id.; see also Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 343-44, 474 N.E.2d
286, 290 (1984) (applying Kentucky law). For a comprehensive analysis of this proposition,
see infra notes 510-17, 609-55 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Merriweather v. E. W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, 45-46 (3d Cir. 1980)
(applying Pennsylvania law). The Merriweather court actually went so far as to state that
"[i]f the manufacturer is to effectively act as the guarantor of his product's safety, then he
should be held responsible for all dangers which result from foreseeable modifications of that
product." Id. at 46. New Jersey courts have traditionally taken the same approach. See, e.g.,
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Co., 91 N.J. 386, 400, 451 A.2d 179, 186 (1982) (stating
that even the most "significant subsequent alteration" will not absolve a manufacturer of liability unless the alteration "itself creates the defect that constitutes the proximate cause of the
injury"); see also Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1237 (1984),
discussed infra text accompanying note 176.
131. See, e.g., Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1986)
(en banc), discussed infra notes 370-93 and accompanying text. The Germann court held that
a product could be defective due to a failure to warn of the dangers attendant to the product in
a materially altered condition. 395 N.W.2d at 925.
132. One commentator has stated that:
Probably one of the unspoken reasons for allowing the imposition of liability in
a case such as Soler is that the plaintiff is usually prohibited by state workers'
compensation statutes from suing the real wrongdoer - the employer who has
taken a relatively safe product and substantially altered it by removing its safety
devices. Because the workers' compensation statutes provide limited awards, the
only way that an injured worker can recover adequately in many cases is by suing
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Question No. 2: Was the Subsequent Alteration Material?
The Soler court found that there was ample evidence to enable
the jury to find that the dye-casting machine had been materially
altered after it left the defendant's control.13 3 One becomes hardpressed, therefore, to attempt to ascertain why the court allowed the
materiality question to proceed to the jury. The evidence was more
than sufficient to enable it to adjudicate the question as a matter of
often renders the
law. The defect-proximate cause approach all too
"materiality" question an automatic jury issue.13 4
Question No. 3: Was the Alteration Foreseeable?
The defect-proximate cause approach is also fatally flawed in its
reliance on the foreseeability concept by allowing the jury to perform
the risk-utility test on the original design. 135 The Soler court mistakenly equated an alteration with a misuse, and reasoned that:
The defendant's argument that in this case third persons responsible for the subsequent alteration of the machine should properly be held liable for plaintiff's accidental injury does not fully
take into account the appropriate applications of the principle of
foreseeability. When it is foreseeable that a substantial change will
create a risk of injury, the manufacturer can be held liable under
strict liability principles for injuries proximately caused by such
136

change.

the manufacturer - a remedy that the Soler court permits by its expansive approach to a manufacturer's liability. This, of course, is a classic "deep pocket"
approach.
It is not the most equitable approach, however.
Comment, supra note 23, at 740-41 (footnotes omitted); accord Robinson v. Reed-Prentice
Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 481, 403 N.E.2d 440, 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717,
721-22 (1980) (finding that the fact that plaintiff cannot recover directly from his employer,
who is the real culpable party, does not justify the imposition of liability upon the
manufacturer).
133. 98 N.J. at 148-49, 484 A.2d at 1231.
134. See, e.g., Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 432, 475 A.2d 1243, 1255
(1984); Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 345-46 (Wyo. 1986) (finding that
"[m]aterial alterations, like other issues of proximate cause, are ordinarily 'left to the jury for
its factual determination'" (quoting McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo.
1983))). While the question of "materiality" may present a jury issue where there is insufficient evidence or a factual dispute, see McGavin v. Herrick & Cowell Co., 118 A.D.2d 982,
982-83, 500 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86-87 (3d Dep't 1986), even those courts utilizing the defect-proximate cause approach should adjudicate it as a question of law upon a sufficient evidentiary
App. 3d 974, 382 N.E.2d 36
basis. See, e.g., Coleman v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 64 I11.
(1978); Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264 (1981).
135. For a discussion of some of the factors affecting a court's finding of "foreseeability"
in'the alteration context, see Fischer, supra note 59, at § 8.0312], at 8-8 to -10.
136. 98 N.J. at 151, 484 A.2d at 1232.
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The court's reliance on foreseeability allows the jury to view the
original design with clear hindsight as if the machine had not been
materially altered. In addition to placing minimum emphasis on the
alteration, the court allowed the jury to evaluate the original design
137
by analyzing the dangers of the product in its altered condition.
While it may be one thing to design a dye-casting machine without a
safety guard and interlock where that machine is designed to be
manually operated with a two-step process, it is quite another to do
so where the machine functions automatically with continuous operation. One would be hard-pressed to fairly evaluate the original design in cases where the product has been materially altered and
where the particular accident would not have occurred had the product remained in its original condition. Furthermore, while foreseeability may be relevant in defining the manufacturer's duty with respect to the use or misuse of the product as originally designed, it
should not come into play where the product itself is materially altered from its original condition. 38
Question No. 4: Was the Defect in the Product's Original Design a Contributing, Concurrent, or Sole Proximate Cause When
Taking into Account the Material Alteration?
As stated, this question answers itself. If the jury is instructed
that the original design may be found to be defective, with the material alteration foreseeable, then it would be hard-pressed to find that
the material alteration should supersede that design defect as the
sole proximate cause of the accident. This is because under the defect-proximate cause approach, the duty to foresee alterations has
been built into the tests for both design defect and proximate
139

cause.

Rather than focusing upon the question of whether the product
was defective as originally designed, a better approach would be to
focus on the employer's alteration. Principles of foreseeability should
play no role in cases where a manufacturer's product is materially
137. By sustaining plaintiff's design defect claim, the court opened the door for the jury
to hold the manufacturer responsible for the risks attendant to the machine as altered, that is,
as operated automatically, rather than manually.
138. See infra notes 224-52 and accompanying text.
139. See Vanskike v. ACF Indus., 665 F.2d 188, 195 (8th Cir. 1981); Hales v. Green
Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d 1015, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 1974); DeArmond v. Hoover Ball & Bearing,
86 III. App. 3d 1066, 1070-71, 408 N.E.2d 771, 774 (1980); Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press
Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 818, 825-26, 393 N.E.2d 598, 604 (1979); see also infra text accompanying notes 549-52 (discussing this proposition).
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altered. 40 If the court finds the alteration to be material, then the
defendant should be absolved of a duty so long as the material alteration is proven to be a proximate cause of the accident.14 1 Once this
causal connection is established, the connection between the original
design and the accident should be severed as a matter of law. If
there is no longer a connection between the original design and the
accident from a "duty" standpoint, there is no longer any reason to
1 42
evaluate the original design under risk-utility.
This analysis is not the equivalent of concluding that the material alteration was the sole proximate cause of the accident. What it
does conclude is that (1) the product had been materially altered
from its condition as originally designed and sold, (2) the material
alteration was a cause-in-fact and a proximate cause of the accident,
and therefore (3) the manufacturer is not responsible for accidents
arising out of the product in its materially altered condition.
The evidence presented in Soler was more than sufficient for the
court to have established that the alteration was material as a matter
of law. It was not sufficient, however, to establish that the material
alteration was, in any way, causally connected to the occurrence of
the accident. 143 The plaintiff offered conflicting evidence as to
whether the employer's trip wire was involved in the accident. At his
deposition, the plaintiff testified that as he dislodged the jammed
cast, the cast fell from the mold and struck the trip wire, thereby
reactivating the machine cycle.14 4 At trial, however, "plaintiff did
not offer an explanation as to how the machine recycled when he
attempted to dislodge the part." 145 Additionally, plaintiff's expert
stated that it was possible that an unexpected surge of electricity
may have caused the machine to recycle. 14 Thus, a legitimate question of fact existed with respect to the causal connection between the
140.

See infra notes 224-52, 463-67 and accompanying text.

141.

See infra note 553 and accompanying text.

142. See, e.g., Kimbar v. Estis, 1 N.Y.2d 399, 405, 135 N.E.2d 708, 711, 153 N.Y.S.2d
197, 201 (1956) (holding that absent a duty owed by defendant, "there can be no breach of

duty, and without breach of duty there can be no liability.") (citation omitted); Beasock v.
Dioguardi Enters., 130 Misc. 2d 25, 31, 494 N.Y.S.2d 974, 979 (Sup. Ct. 1985), aff'd in part,

rev'd in part, 117 A.D.2d 1015 (4th Dep't 1986) (concluding that "[a]bsent a duty, there can
be no breach and, thus, no liability." (citing Kimbar v. Estis, 1 N.Y.2d at 405, 135 N.E.2d at
711)).
143.
144.

98 N.J. at 148-51, 484 A.2d at 1231-32.
Id. at 143, 484 A.2d at 1228.

145. Id.
146.

Id. at 143-44, 484 A.2d at 1228.
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trip wire and the occurrence of the accident. 147
The Soler court should have submitted to the jury only the
question of whether the material alteration (the employer's trip
wire) was a proximate cause of the accident. Since the issues of
"duty" and "materiality" should have been adjudicated by the court
as questions of law, the jury should have been instructed to return a
defense verdict if the trip wire was found to be a proximate cause of
the accident. Such a finding would have severed any connection, by
way of duty, between the original design and the accident. The original design should not, as a matter of law, be connected to the accident if it was materially altered and if the material alteration was a
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Thus, because the manufacturer
did not owe a duty with respect to this occurrence, there would no
longer be any reason to even consider the original design under riskutility.
If, however, the trip wire was not found to be a proximate
cause, then the manufacturer would not be absolved of a duty as a
matter of law. Only under such circumstances would there exist a
"legal" connection between the original design and the accident sufficient to justify submission of the defect and proximate cause questions to the jury.
C.

The Misuse of Foreseeability:Should a Product be Deemed
Defective Simply Because it was "Alterable"?

The product in Soler was sold by the manufacturer without certain safety features, and the plaintiff utilized the absence of safety
features as his theory of defect in the product's original design. 48
Conversely, in Brown v. United States Stove Co.,1 49 a companion
case to Soler, the New Jersey Supreme Court was confronted with
an original design that contained numerous safety features which
were subsequently removed by the plaintiff's employer. 150 In the absence of an independent theory of defect, the plaintiff in Brown
asked the court to go a step beyond Soler and decide whether a
product may be deemed defective as originally designed because it
failed to prevent a material alteration that was "foreseeable." '
147. See 1d. at 148-152, 484 A.2d at 1231-33.
148. Id. at 137, 484 A.2d at 1225
149.

98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984). For a discussion of Brown, see Fischer, supra

note 59, § 8.03[5], at 8-19; Comment, supra note 23, at 732-37.
150.
151.

98 N.J. at 161, 484 A.2d at 1237.
See id.
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The plaintiff in Brown sustained severe burn injuries while
standing near a "free standing, unvented space heater."152 The
heater had been used to heat a garage at a salvage yard.1 53 The
heater was originally designed and equipped with a pilot light tube,
thermocouple valve, and a gas safety shut-off valve.154 These safety
features were designed to monitor the pressure of gas flowing
through the heater.1 55 If the pressure of gas was too high, for example, the safety features would automatically stop the inflow of gas
into the heater and would stop the heater from operating. 15 6 Approximately fifteen years before the accident occurred, however, the
plaintiff's employer materially altered the heater by removing these
safety features.57 This material alteration caused the flow of propane gas into the heater to become unregulated.' The accident occurred when excess gas that had flowed into the heater ignited, causing a "sudden flare-up" that set the plaintiff's clothes on fire. 59 The
evidence presented indicated that, at the time the accident occurred,
the gas pressure in the heater was approximately one hundred times
greater than that for which it had been originally designed.16 0
The plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer
grounded in negligence and strict products liability. 61 Plaintiff alleged that the heater was defective as originally designed because
the employer's removal of the safety features was foreseeable and, as
such, the manufacturer should have either prevented the removal or
designed the heater to be reasonably safe in the event that a removal
occurred.0 2 In support of this theory of defect, the plaintiff introduced expert testimony to the effect that the manufacturer should
have reasonably foreseen that (1) the safety devices on a certain percentage of its heaters would be circumvented in some manner' 63 and
152.

Id. at 162, 484 A.2d at 1237.

153. Id.
154.

Id.

155. Id.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 162, 484 A.2d at 1237-38.
Id. at 162, 484 A.2d at 1237.
Id. at 161, 484 A.2d at 1237.

162. Id. at 162-63, 484 A.2d at 1238.
163. Id. Plaintiff's expert testified that "'it [was] reasonably probable to assume that a

percentage of stoves [i.e., heaters] of that type manufactured at any time will be substantially
altered.'" Id. He further tesitified that "'it was common knowledge within the gas industry
that appliances of this type were badly misused and abused since they were often used as
temporary heaters on construction sites.'" Id. at 163, 484 A.2d at 1238.
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(2) without the safety devices, the flow of gas into the heater might
become unregulated, thereby increasing the gas pressure to a level
that was higher than that intended by its original design.""
The plaintiff's expert stated that the removal of the heater's
safety features was common among users.'6 5 Thus, although the
heater was completely safe if operated as originally designed, "it was
defective in that its design rendered it susceptible to the reasonably
foreseeable alterations that were made."' 6 This susceptibility was
due primarily to the fact that the safety'devices were affixed to the
heater by commercial "right-handed threading" which could be easily removed.16 7 Plaintiff's expert further testified that a possible alternative would have been to affix the safety devices to the heater by
using noncommercial left-handed threading and inverted flange connectors."6 This alternative would have rendered the removal of the
safety devices
more difficult, without impairing the overall utility of
69
the heater.1
To rebut the testimony of plaintiff's expert, an employee of the
manufacturer testified that (1) the manufacturer had no reason to
foresee the type of alteration that occurred, (2) the plaintiff's alternative design was not feasible at the time of manufacture, (3) the
manufacturer had no notice of any alterations similar to those performed on the subject heater by plaintiff's employer, and (4) the
heater was not designed to be used on construction sites, as a differ70
ent model heater was manufactured and sold for that purpose.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's strict products liability
claim as a matter of law.' 7 1 The court reasoned that the manufacturer should not have a duty where, after the heater left its control,
"there was 'an absolute and total transformation of a good, safe
product into a completely unsafe product,' the subsequent alteration
of which was not reasonably foreseeable." 17 2 The appellate court re164. Id.
165. See supra note 163.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Plaintiff's expert added that the cost of the alternative would have been only "a
few pennies" more than the cost of right-handed threading." Id. Defendant's employee, however, offered contradictory testimony to the effect that plaintiff's alternative design was not
available at the time of manufacture, and, even it it was, it would significantly increase the
cost, as well as the time, to repair the heater. Id. at 164, 484 A.2d at 1239.
170. Id. at 164, 484 A.2d at 1238-39.
171. Id. at 161, 484 A.2d at 1237.
172. Id. (quoting the trial court) (emphasis added).
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versed and remanded, however, ruling that the foreseeability of the
employer's removal of the safety features presented a legitimate
question of fact for the jury. 173
The New Jersey Supreme Court utilized the four-tier approach,
which it had enunciated in Soler, to determine whether the trial
17 4
court erred in refusing to submit the issue of defect to the jury.
The court proceeded to analyze the issues of defect and foreseeability together, presupposing that the employer's removal of the
heater's safety features constituted a "material" alteration. 75 In so
doing, the court reasoned that:
The concept of a defect-free and properly-designed product extends
to one that is suitably safe after it has been either foreseeably altered or foreseeably misused . . . . The foreseeable misuse of a
product that proximately causes injury is analogous to a foreseeable subsequent alterationof the product, and generates the same
legal consequence in terms of strict products liability. 176

According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, there is no differ173. Id. at 161-62, 484 A.2d at 1237.
174. The first tier of the Soler approach concerned whether the product was defective as
designed. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. The Brown court addressed the issue
when it stated that "[t]he initial inquiry ... must focus upon the evidence relating to whether
the heater as originally designed was defective under the risk-utility standard." Brown, 98 N.J.
at 165, 484 A.2d at 1239. Under the risk-utility test, "a product is defective as designed if, but
only if, the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product." W. PRossER & W.
KEETON, supra note 8, § 99, at 699.
The second tier of the Soler test concerned whether the subsequent alteration was material. See supra notes 134, 136 and accompanying text. The Brown court noted that "a design
defect inherent in a safety feature of a product that foreseeably leads to a substantial alteration and an increased risk of danger can be a basis for strict products liability." Brown, 98
N.J. at 167, 484 A.2d at 1240.
The third level of the Soler approach was to determine whether the alteration was foreseeable. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. The Brown court also focused on this
issue in stating that "(t]he critical factor in determining whether a subsequent substantial
alteration of a product or its misuse can be attributed to a manufacturer as a proximate result
of an original design defect under the risk-utility standard is 'foreseeability.'" Brown, 98 N.J.
at 166, 484 A.2d at 1240.
Soler's final tier posed the question of whether the original design defect was a contributing, concurrent, or sole cause of injury. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text. Again,
the Brown court announced that "[p]roximate cause includes the notion of concurrent cause
when more than one act contributes to the accidental harm . . . . [I]f the original defect,
although not the sole cause of the accident, constituted a contributing or concurrent proximate
cause in conjunction with the subsequent alteration, the defendant manufacturer will remain
liable." Brown, 98 N.J. at 171, 484 A.2d at 1242.
175. Brown, 98 N.J. at 165-68, 484 A.2d at 1239-40.
176. Id. at 169, 484 A.2d at 1241 (emphasis added). This reasoning is utilized by other
defect-proximate cause courts. See cases cite supra note 32.
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ence between the misuse of a product in its condition as originally
designed, and an alterationof the product from that condition. The
foreseeability of a product's alteration is built into the test for defect
in the product's original design. 17 7 A materially altered product may,
therefore, be deemed defective as originallydesigned merely because
the alteration was foreseeable, and the manufacturer failed either to
prevent such alteration or to design its product to be safe as altered. 17'8 Thus, the plaintiff can present a factual question on the issue of defect simply by presenting evidence that the employer's removal of the safety features was somehow "foreseeable", and that
the product was dangerous to operate without those features.1 79
Based on this evidence, the Brown court concluded that the combined issues of foreseeability and defect presented legitimate questions of fact for the jury.18
This reasoning clearly designates the manufacturer as an insurer of its products. To design an "unalterable" product, or a product that is safe as materially altered, is to design an accident-proof
product. The imposition of such a duty upon manufacturers violates
the fundamentals underlying products liability law. 181
177. 98 N.J. at 166-69, 484 A.2d at 1240-41. In fact, the court stated that foreseeability
is the "critical factor." Id. at 166, 484 A.2d at 1240. "[T]he principle of 'objective foreseeability' comports with a basic theme of strict products liability, namely, that the condition of the
product, rather than the conduct of the manufacturer is determinative of ultimate responsibility for product failure causing accidental injuries." Id. at 168, 484 A.2d at 1241 (emphasis in
original). This reasoning is incorrect, because the focus of "objective foreseeability" is upon
what knowledge or information the manufacturer knew or should have known. Such knowledge, be it objective or subjective, impugns the "conduct" of the manufacturer, rather than the
condition of the product itself. A focus on the conduct of the manufacturer, while appropriate
in a negligence action, is inappropriate in an action under strict products liability.
Manufacturers have raised the point that a foreseeability standard is inconsistent with the
policies underlying strict products liability, but have fallen victim to overzealous courts which
designate them as indefinite guarantors of their products. See Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co.,
636 F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that "[i]f the manufacturer is to effectively act as the
ultimate guarantor of his product's safety, then he should be held responsible for all dangers
which result from foreseeable modifications of that product."); Eck v. Powermatic Houdaille,
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 11,440, at 32,147 (Pa. Super. June 1, 1987). For a discussion of
Merriweather and Eck, see infra note 335. The concept of the manufacturer as "ultimate
guarantor" of its product is repugnant to the theory of strict products liability. See supra note
10 and accompanying text.
178. See Brown, 98 N.J. at 166-75, 484 A.2d at 1240-44.
179. Id. at 169, 484 A.2d at 1241.
180. Id. at 170-71, 484 A.2d at 1242.
181. Professor Wade acknowledged that it was never the intent of strict products liability to impose a duty to design accident-proof products. See Wade, A Conspectus of Manufacturers' Liability for Products, 10 IND. L. REv. 755 (1977). In fact, Professor Wade argued
that:
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Interestingly, however, the Brown court dismissed plaintiff's

claim on the proximate cause issue,1 2 thereby achieving the correct
result for the wrong reasons. The court found that while the plaintiff's alternative design would have rendered the product more difficult to alter, "[n]o evidence was proffered to indicate that with a
proper design the removal of the heater's safety features probably
could not have been accomplished or even rendered so substantially
difficult as to be unlikely.' 83 Thus, plaintiff was unable to raise a
factual issue as to whether, but for the potential design defect, the
alterations would not have occurred. 8
Although the court was correct in finding the lack of a causal
connection between the original design and the accident, a determination on this issue was unnecessary. The material alteration was
clearly a proximate cause of the accident, and should have severed
the manufacturer's duty as a matter of law.
In addition to judicial decisions such as Soler and Brown, some
state legislatures have codified the defect-proximate cause approach.
We are never going to reach the point where we say that there is true absolute
liability, the insurer's type of liability. If we did, Ford Motor Company would be
liable for every accident a Ford got into, Diamond Match Company would be liable
for every fire that was started by a Diamond Match, Bayer Aspirin Company would
be liable for every stomach hemorrhage or even stomach upset produced by its aspirin tablets, the dairy farmers would be liable for heart attacks produced by cholesterol and the Indiannapolis Water Company would be liable if someone drank too
much water and died. There is no product that is not dangerous to somebody if it is
used in some particular fashion. Lines have to be drawn and distinctions made.
Id. at 768 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, Professor Wade did not "foresee" such cases as
Soler and Brown, where a manufacturer can be held liable for injuries arising out of its product in a materially altered condition. It is also interesting that Professor Wade's examples
involve products in their original, unaltered condition. A subsequent material alteration of a
product is even more compelling, however, and should further remove the manufacturer from
liablility for accidents arising out of the alteration. See, e.g., Stevens v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc.,
349 So. 2d 948, 949 (La. App. 1977) (holding that manufacturer is not liable for injuries
arising out of subsequent material alterations because "[fQor liability to attach ...it is essential that the defect complained of exist at the time the product left the possession of the manufacturer" (citing Frey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 271 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 1972)); Robinson v.
Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 481, 403 N.E.2d 440, 444, 426
N.Y.S.2d 717, 721-22 (1980), discussed infra text accompanying note 505.
182. In so doing, the court concluded that "the asserted manufacturing design defect in
this case was not a substantial factor in contributing to the accident and hence not a 'legal' or
proximate cause thereof." 98 N.J. at 174, 484 A.2d at 1244.
183. Id. The court added that "the record discloses that the heater was deliberately
altered for the specific purpose of operating it beyond its safe capacity .... Id. While the
Brown court acknowledged that no product is "unalterable," it would have allowed the material alteration question to proceed to the jury as a question of fact. Id.
184. Id.
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Arizona's products liability statute,185 for example, provides that:
In any product liability action, a defendant shall not be liable if the
defendant proves that any of the following apply:
2. The proximate cause of the incident giving rise to the action was an alteration or modification of the product which was
not reasonably foreseeable, made by a person other than the defendant and subsequent to the time the product was first sold by
the defendant. 18 6

Similarly, Indiana's products liability statute8 7 provides that:
It is a defense that a cause of the physical harm is a modification
or alteration of the product made by any person after its delivery to
the initial user or consumer if such modification or alteration is
the proximate cause of physical harm [and] .. .is not reasonably
88
expectable to the seller.1

D. Usurping the Powers of the Legislature: Judicial
Substitutions of Defect-Proximate Cause Rules for Statutory
"No-Duty" Rules

The preceding discussions have illustrated that the defect-proximate cause approach is patently unfair to manufacturers. 189 What is
185. ARZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-681 to -686 (1982).
186. Id. § 12-683 (emphasis added). Arizona courts have construed this provision in
such a way that once a manufacturer comes forward with sufficient evidence that its product
was materially altered, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the alteration was not the
sole proximate cause of the accident. See, e.g., O.S.Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 560,
447 P.2d 248, 252 (1968); McGuire v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 151 Ariz. 420, 422, 728 P.2d
290, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Kuhnke v. Textron, Inc., 140 Ariz. 587, 590, 684 P.2d 159,
162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). Interestingly, however, the statute defines "reasonably foreseeable
alteration" as "an alteration ... of the product which would be expected of an ordinary and
prudent purchaser,user or consumer and which an ordinary and prudent manufacturer should
have anticipated." ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-681(4) (1982) (emphasis added). This definition utilizes a "reasonableness" or "negligence" standard in analyzing both the alteration itself
and the manufacturer's duty to foresee it. Most alterations, if foreseeable to some remote
degree, are not the work of "ordinary and prudent" third parties. Quite the contrary, such
alterations are performed solely for subjective economic or "convenience" purposes, without
regard to safety considerations. If the statute is to be applied in accordance with its plain
meaning, any alteration that renders the product more dangerous should absolve the manufacturer of a duty as a matter of law, if it is at all causally related to the accident. Hence, this
author disagrees with the interpretations of McGuire and Kuhnke to the extent that the courts
refuse to absolve the manufacturer of liability unless the material alteration is the "sole" proximate cause of the accident.
187. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-1.5-1 to -8 (West Supp. 1987-88).
188. Id. § 33-1-1.5-4(b)(3) (emphasis added).
189. One commentator has observed that:
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particularly troubling is that some of these courts have flagrantly
refused to apply state statutes limiting the duty of manufacturers
with respect to product alteration. 190 This is not only a usurpation of
the powers of the legislature, but is proof positive that "defect-proximate cause" courts will go to limitless extremes to insure the liability
of "deep pocket" manufacturers for virtually all product-related
injuries.
1. A Constitutional Right to "Foreseeability"?- Through the
use of a foreseeability standard, "defect-proximate cause" courts
have imposed upon manufacturers the duty to design alter-proof and
accident-proof products. One of the most outrageous results of the
defect-proximate cause approach was achieved by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.191 The court
in Heath actually went so far as to rule that it is unconstitutional for
a state statute to limit the use of foreseeability in alteration cases.1 92
The plaintiffs in Heath challenged the constitutionality of New
Hampshire's products liability statute.19 3 Among the sections challenged was one which provided:
Modification or Alteration of Products. In any product liability
action, the defendant may be held liable only for harm that would
have occurred if the product had been used in its unaltered and
unmodified condition and shall not be held liable for harm arising
in any part from alteration or modification of the product by another .... 194

This "no-duty" provision was an express statutory rejection of
the defect-proximate cause approach as illustrated in Soler and
Brown. The statute was enacted in response to the liability crisis
whereby manufacturers were unable to obtain reasonable insurance
coverage because of their exposure to open-ended liability.1 95 In fact,
"[w]hatever the merits of the particular holdings in Soler and Brown, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, by allowing liability for manufacturers to turn on vague
standards such as foreseeability and proximate cause, has missed an opportunity to
set clear guidelines and has made the need for a legislative response more
imperative."
Comment, supra note 23, at 744.
190. See infra notes 191-223 and accompanying text.
191. 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983).
192. Id. at 528-29, 464 A.2d at 297-98.
193. Id. at 518, 464 A.2d at 291. The statute, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-D (1983),
was struck down in its entirety. For the purposes of this Article, however, only the "alteration"
provision will be discussed.
194. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:3 (1983).
195. The court observed that "in conjunction with the enactment of [section 507-D] ...
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the New Hampshire Supreme Court itself had previously acknowl-

edged that the provision was part of a statutory scheme designed

"not to extinguish existing causes of action, but to set parameters on

the risk of product liability actions by making that risk more ascertainable for insurance underwriting purposes. ' ' 91
In an unprecedented lack of judicial self-restraint, the Heath
court completely disregarded the legislature's expression of public
policy and struck down this provision as unconstitutional. The court
held, inter alia, that the restriction on the use of foreseeability in
alteration cases violated the equal protection provisions of the state
constitution. 9 7 The court reasoned that the statute impermissibly
distinguished an "alteration" from a "misuse," thereby denying persons injured by altered products the same right of recovery (via the
use of foreseeability) as those injured through misuse of the product
as originally designed. 98 The court thus concluded that the statute
must fail because it impermissibly "bars recovery altogether by
plaintiffs whose 'misconduct' takes the form of modification or alteration not in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications or instructions, irrespective of how foreseeable such a modification may
have been."' 9
If such reasoning was correct, then it would be unconstitutional
the New Hampshire Legislature authorized the creation of a fifteen-member Commission to
Study Product Injury Reparations ... for the purpose of evaluating the legislation's effect on
products liability insurance rates." Heath, 123 N.H. at 522, 464 A.2d at 293. The Commission
inquired into whether § 507-D "'improv[ed] the availability and affordability of products liability insurance.'" Id. (quoting 1978 N.H. LAws 31:2).
196. Martin v. Gardner Mach. Works, Inc., 120 N.H. 433, 435, 415 A.2d 878, 880
(1980).
197. Heath, 123 N.H. at 528-29, 464 A.2d at 297-98.
198. Id. at 528, 464 A.2d at 297.
199. Id. at 528, 464 A.2d at 297-98. The court further stated that:
The overall effect of [the statute] is both arbitrary and inequitable. For example,
the statute would totally bar recovery by the plaintiff. . . who was injured when
using a modified Sears tool, simply because a modification contributed to the injury.
Yet if the same plaintiff had received the identical injury as a result of actually
misusing an unmodified wrench, he would be entitled to sue the manufacturer and
have the jury consider the foreseeability of such misuse in the balance of comparative responsibility ....
Id. at 529, 464 A.2d at 298 (emphasis in original). Not only is this reasoning incorrect, but it
evinces an intent to impose liability upon manufacturers on the basis of "identical injury,"
rather than upon the condition of the product. Products liability is predicated upon proof of a
"defect," rather than mere proof of an injury. If a product is materially altered after it leaves
the manufacturer's possession, and that alteration is a "but-for" cause of an injury, the manufacturer must be absolved of liability as a matter of law. It is inconceivable that "misuse" of
an unmodified product could be equated with a third party's subsequent alteration of the product from its condition as designed and sold.
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to deny persons injured by non-defective products the same right of
recovery as those injured by product defects. The Heath court ignored the fact that plaintiff "misuse" and product "alteration" are
completely different concepts.2 00 A manufacturer's duty under strict
products liability is measured by analyzing the product in its condition as originally designed and sold.201 A subsequent alteration represents an actual change in the physical state of the product from
that condition. 202 From a "duty" standpoint, such an alteration transcends plaintiff "misuse," which is an incorrect use of the product in
its original unchanged condition. 20 3 The New Hampshire legislature
recognized this, and rationally limited the duty of manufacturers in
cases where their products have undergone a subsequent alteration
20 4
at the hands of a third party.

200. For a comprehensive discussion of the qualitative and conceptual distinctions between product "alteration" and product "misuse," see infra notes 224-52 and accompanying
text.
201. See supra note 56.
202. See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 232-36, 241-45 and accompanying text.
204. See supra text accompanying note 194 (setting forth the relevant provision of the
New Hampshire statute). By the express terms of the statute, a manufacturer does not owe a
duty with respect to any accident causally related to a material alteration. The manufacturer
would be responsible only for accidents that would have arisen out of the product in its "unaltered" condition as originally designed and sold. Id; see supra text accompanying note 194; see
also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.320(2) (Michie Supp. 1986), discussed infra notes 206-11
and accompanying text; N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-04 (Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-132 (1985). These "no-duty" statutes absolve the manufacturer of liability with respect to subsequent product alteration without regard to "foreseeability."
The Rhode Island statute is particularly interesting, as it provides:
Effect of alterationof product after sale.-(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Product liability damages" means damages because of personal injury,
death, or property damage sustained by reason of an alleged defect in a product, or
an alleged failure to warn or protect against a danger or hazard in the use or misuse
of such product, or an alleged failure to instruct properly in the use of a product.
(2) "Subsequent alteration or modification" means an alteration or modification of a product made subsequent to the manufacture or sale by the manufacturer
or seller which altered, modified, or changed the purpose, use, function, design, or
manner of use of the product from that originally designed, tested or intended by
the manufacturer, or the purpose, use, function, design, or manner of use or intended use for which such product was originally designed, tested or manufactured.
(b) No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be liable for product liability damages where a substantial cause of the injury, death, or damage was a subsequent
alteration or modification.
Id. This appears to be a "no-duty" statute. Under subdivision (a)(l), the statute limits "products liability damages" to damages arising out of a product "defect" or a failure to warn or
instruct of risks attendant to the "use" and/or "misuse" of "such product." See id. § 9-132(a)(1) (emphasis added). In subdivision (a)(2), the statute defines "subsequent alteration",
impliedly differentiating it from the class of product "use or misuse" to which subdivision
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By legislating judicially, the Heath court abolished the "noduty" rule of the legislature and adopted in its place a defect-proximate cause rule akin to that of Soler and Brown. Interestingly,
other state courts have struck down different products liability provisions, such as statutes of repose, as unconstitutional. 0 5 No court has,
however, even remotely approached what the Heath court has done
in holding that the employment of a foreseeability test with respect
to product alteration is constitutionally mandated. This approach illustrates the overzealousness of courts utilizing the defect-proximate
cause approach as a means of imposing absolute liability on product
manufacturers.
2. Kentucky's "No-Duty" Statute Falls Victim.- In 1978, the
Kentucky legislature enacted a products liability statute which rationally limited the liability of manufacturers in products liability
cases.2"' The statute contained a "no-duty" alteration provision
stating:
In any product liability action, a manufacturer shall be liable only
for the personal injury, death or property damage that would have
occurred if the product had been used in its original, unaltered and
unmodified condition .... This section shall apply to alterations or
modifications made by any person or entity, except those made in
accordance with specifications or instructions furnished by the
manufacturer.

20 7

(a)(l) applies. See id. § 9-1-32(a)(2). Finally, the statute states that subsequent alterations
that are a substantial (proximate) cause of the accident are outside the scope of a manufacturer's responsibility. Id. § 9-1-32(b).
205. See Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982) (holding
an Alabama statute barring products liability claims involving products that had been used for
more than 10 years violative of state constitution's guarantee of access to courts); Diamond v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981) (holding 12-year statute of repose for products liability claims violated state constitution's guarantee of access to courts); Kennedy v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) (holding 10-year statute of repose in products liability cases violative of state constitutional provision mandating access to courts since it
completely denied access to courts for the class of plaintiffs injured by products purchased
more that 10 years before the injury); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
1985) (holding 6-year statute of repose in products liability actions violative of the state
constitution).
206, See Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 411.300-.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). For a
case employing strict construction of the statute to limit manufacturer liability, see Reda
Pump Co. v. Finck, 713 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky. 1986), discussed infra note 208-11 and accompanying text.
207. Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.320(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). The "no-duty"
alteration provision further states that:
In any product liability action, if the plaintiff performed an unauthorized alteration
or unauthorized modification, and such alteration or modification was a substantial
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The statute was given a strict construction in cases not involving
the "alteration" provision. For example, the Kentucky Supreme

Court in Reda Pump Co. v. Finck208 upheld the constitutionality of
the statute's contributory negligence provision, despite the fact that

the provision was in derogation of the court's prior holdings.20 9 The
Reda Pump court properly concluded that to strike down the statute
"would constitute the ultimate arrogation of power unto ourselves. '210 The court, therefore, adhered "to the principle that the
establishment of public policy is the prerogative of the
[legislature] .- 211

With respect to product alteration, however, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Wheeler v. Andrew Jergens Co. 2 12 did something radically different. The court completely ignored the legislature's public policy mandate, and refused to apply the statutory "alteration" provision. The court instead substituted its own defectproximate cause rule for the "no-duty"

rule enacted by the

legislature. 1i
The plaintiff in Wheeler purchased a new bottle of shampoo
from a drug store.214 While using the product, she experienced an
immediate burning sensation, and subsequently lost 80% of her hair
cause of the occurrence that caused injury or damage to the plaintiff, the defendant
shall not be liable whether or not said defendant was at fault or the product was
defective.
Id. § 411.320(2) (emphasis added).
208. 713 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1986).
209. Id. at 820-21. The court reasoned that the wording of the statute was not ambiguous, but was "plain and clear on its face." Id. at 819. Thus, the court stated, "[w]e have long
adhered to the rule in this jurisdiction that statutes will be construed according to the plain
meaning of the words contained in the statute." Id. at 819-20; cf. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983), discussed supra notes 191-99 and accompanying
text.
210. 713 S.W.2d at 821.
211. Id. Consequently, the court acknowledged that "[t]he entire tenor of the Products
Liability Act is to restrict and limit actions concerning products liability." Id. at 820; see also
Anderson v. Black & Decker, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1298, 1300 (E.D. Ky. 1984) (finding that
"[tihe intent of the [Kentucky] legislature in enacting [the statute] is clear. Rightly or
wrongly, wisely or unwisely, whether influenced by manufacturers' and insurance lobbies or
not, the clear intent of the legislature was to restrict liability in products cases.").
212. 696 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). For a discussion of Wheeler, see Fischer,
supra note 59, § 8.03[6], at 8-19 to -20.
213. The trial court found that the shampoo was "modified by a third person," and in
accordance with § 411.320(1), (2), imposed no liability on the manufacturer since the product
was altered by another without instructions from the manufacturer. 696 S.W.2d at 327. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's holding. Id. at 328.
214. Id.
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over her entire scalp. 15 Plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the shampoo under theories of negligence, strict products liability and breach
of warranty.2 16 At the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief, the trial court
found that the shampoo had undergone a subsequent alteration at
the hands of a third party.217 Accordingly, the trial court directed a
verdict for the manufacturer, properly applying the statutory "alteration" provision which absolves the manufacturer of a duty where its
21
product is altered or modified by a third party.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that even if
the shampoo was altered after it left the manufacturer's hands, the
manufacturer may nevertheless be liable under negligence or strict
21
products liability for failing to design a "tamper-proof' bottle.
This is a defect-proximate cause rule akin to that of Brown. The
manufacturer was delegated the duty to foresee the criminal conduct
of third parties, and to design its product to be alter-proof and,
220
therefore, accident-proof.
In refusing to adhere to statutory mandates, the Wheeler court
reasoned that the entire risk of product-related injuries should fall
upon the manufacturer, rather than the consumer.2 21 Thus, the court
stated, "'Our expressed public policy will be furthered if we minimize the risk of personal injury or property damage by charging the
cost of injuries against the manufacturer who can procure liability
insurance and distribute its expense among the public as a cost of
doing business[.]' "222 Thus, the Wheeler court utilized the defectproximate cause approach and designated the manufacturer an insurer of its product, in total contravention of Kentucky's statute that
215.
216.

Id.
Id.

217. Id.
218.

Id.

219. Id. at 328. The Court of Appeals stated "[w]hether or not the product was subsequently modified by a third person is a question of fact for the jury." 696 S.W. 2d at 328.
Allowing the jury to resolve the issue subverts the "no-duty" rule enacted by the legislature.
220. Id. The court reasoned that the alteration issue should have been allowed to proceed to the jury as a question of fact. Id. The court held, however, that even if plaintiff proved
that a third party subsequently tampered with the shampoo, the manufacturer should nevertheless be held liable if a jury determines that a reasonable manufacturer would have made it
tamper-proof. Id. Thus, plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of negligence, or design
defect under Kentucky's products liability statute. Id. This contravenes the express language of

the statute. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (setting forth the Kentucky "no-duty"
alteration provision).
221.
222.

See 696 S.W.2d at 328.
Id. (quoting Embs v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1975)).
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sought to avoid such absolute liability. 23
III.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRODUCT "ALTERATION"

AND

PRODUCT "MISUSE"

The defect-proximate cause approach, as exemplified by the decisions of Soler, Brown, Heath, and Wheeler, is fatally flawed in its
reliance on foreseeability principles to govern alteration cases.

Courts utilizing this approach have failed to recognize the qualitative distinction between a "misuse" and an "alteration." The distinction is founded upon sound and fundamental principles of products
liability law.
In strict products liability, the focus is on the condition of the
product itself, not on the conduct of the manufacturer.2 The duty
of the manufacturer is gauged as of the time thb product, as originally designed, leaves its possession and control.225 Courts have utilized the concept of reasonable foreseeability to shape a manufacturer's duty with respect to the manner in which its product may be
used or misused.226 The underlying rationale is that in products lia223. Cf. Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984), where
the Ohio Supreme Court, applying Kentucky law, absolved a manufacturer of liability for an
accident arising out of a subsequent material alteration. The court found that under the Kentucky products liability statute, the plaintiff was precluded from recovery. Id. at 344, 474
N.E.2d at 290.
224. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Gallub, Assessing Culpability in
the Law of Torts: A Call for JudicialScrutiny in Comparing "CulpableConduct" Under New
York's CPLR 1411, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1079, 1102-03 (1987) ("In a products liability
action based upon negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant failed to act reasonably in designing or manufacturing the product . . . . With the doctrine of strict products
liability, the culpability of the defendant shifts from culpable conduct to culpable product ...
and any seller who places a defective product into the stream of commerce is liable, because
that seller has breached a duty to those who will ultimately use or interact with the product."
(footnotes omitted)).
225. See supra note 56.
226. See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 131 Ariz. 344, 348, 641 P.2d 258, 262 (1982)
("The defense of misuse is . . .defined as a use of a product 'for certain purposes or in a
manner not reasonably foreseen by the manufacturer.' "(quoting O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller,
103 Ariz. 556, 561, 447 P.2d 248, 253 (1968))); Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d
1322, 1325 (Colo. 1986) ("Regardless of the defective condition, if any, of a manufacturer's
product, a manufacturer will not be liable if an unforeseeable misuse of the product caused the
injuries."); Norrie v. Heil Co., 203 Conn. 594, 600, 525 A.2d 1332, 1335 (1987) ("'Misuse'
occurs when a product is not used 'in a manner which should have been foreseen by the defendant.' "); see also Lancanster v. Jeffrey Galion, Inc., 77 111.App. 3d 819, 825, 396 N.E.2d
648, 653 (1979); American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 404 N.E.2d 606, 625 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980); Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 206, 527 A.2d 1337, 1341 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1987) (" '[I]f the product is not unreasonably dangerous when used for a purpose
and in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable, it simply is not defective, and the seller will
not be liable.'" (quoting Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 596, 495 A.2d 348,
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bility, the culpability of both the manufacturer's design choice and
the plaintiff's use of that design are mutually dependent. 2 7 Indeed, a
product is labeled "defective" only in relation to its reasonably foreseeable uses. Logically, the user's conduct is labeled "culpable" in
light of its interaction with the product. 2 "
Built into the relationship between product and plaintiff is the
fundamental notion that a manufacturer need not design a product
that is accident-proof.2 2 9 Thus, the concept of "reasonable foreseeability" focuses upon the potential uses of, or interactions with, the
product as designed, rather than the potential for harm itself.2 30 It is
the foreseeability of certain uses that shapes the manufacturer's duty
to design its product in such a way that those uses are safe.2 81
A "misuse" is, by definition, an incorrect or careless use, or use
for an improper purpose.23 2 Thus, to misuse a product is to use that
product incorrectly. A standard of reasonable foreseeablity has been
applied to misuses because a misuse is but a variation in the use of
the product in its condition as originally designed and sold.2"3
355 (1985))); Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Mo. 1986);
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121
(1976); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 56 (Okla. 1976); General Motors
Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 348-49 (Tex. 1977).
227. See Gallub, supra note 224, at 1104 ("In products liability, the culpability underlying both the plaintiff's conduct and the defendant's product is not only qualitatively similar,
but it is mutually dependent. Obviously, even the most dangerous product is completely neutral until it interacts with the conduct of the user."); see also Twerski, supra note 51, at 80405 ("To be sure, there is some deterrence to be accomplished by penalizing plaintiff for his
negligent conduct, but the better argument is that the plaintiff's reactions were, in a sense
built into the product.").
228. See sources cited supra note 227.
229. See case cited supra note 10.
230. See Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 n.4 (Mo. 1986).
231. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
232. WERSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1447 (1986); see also Lancaster v. Jeffrey Galion, Inc., 77 Ill.
App. 3d 819, 823, 396 N.E.2d 648, 652 (1979).
233. See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 131 Ariz. 344, 348, 641 P.2d 258, 262 (1982)
("It is now well settled that one who manufactures or sells a product has a duty not only to
warn of dangers inherent in its intended use but also to warn of dangers involved in a use
which can be reasonably anticipated.") (emphasis added); Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc.,
723 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Colo. 1986) ("The defense of misuse .. .is a particularized defense
requiring that the plaintiff's use of the product be unforeseeable and unintended ....") (emphasis added); Norrie v. Heil Co., 203 Conn. 594, 601, 525 A.2d 1332, 1335 (1987) (jury was
instructed that "[m]isuse of a product has been defined as 'use in a manner not reasonably
foreseen by the manufacturer. A manufacturer or seller is entitled to expect a normal use of
his product. ") (emphasis added); Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371,
375 n.4 (Mo. 1986) (noting that "[fOoreseeability is a determinant of use . . . ."); Fields v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 56 (Okla. 1976) ("Generally, when we speak of
misuse or abnormal use of a product we are referring to cases where the method of using a

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol16/iss2/5

42

Gallub: Limiting the Manufacturer's Duty for Subsequent Product Alteratio

19881

SUBSEQUENT PRODUCT ALTERATION

In most jurisdictions, a plaintiff's misuse of a product is a defense to a strict products liability claim where it is unforeseeable." 4
The defense of product "misuse" focuses upon the manufacturer's
duty to foresee certain variations in the manner by which its product
may be used.235 Thus, from a "duty" standpoint:
Misuse has been defined as: a use not reasonably foreseeable ... a
use of the product in a manner which defendant could not reasonably foresee . . . a use of a product where it is handled in a way
which the manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen or expected in the normal and intended use of the product and the plaintiff could foresee an injury as the result of the unintended use ...a
use or handling so unusual that the average consumer could not
reasonably expect the product to be designed and manufactured to
withstand it - a use which the seller, therefore, need not anticipate and provide for... use of the product which constitutes wilful
'
or reckless misconduct or an invitation of injury."236
It has been said that the use of foreseeability principles with respect
to product misuse "strikes an appropriate balance between the policy
that in strict liability cases the product, not the manufacturer, is on
trial and the recognition that abuse of a product should not be
2'37
encouraged.
A third party's alteration of the product, however, is qualitatively different from a misuse. Unlike product misuse, which involves
the method of using a product in its condition as designed and sold,
an alteration is an actual change in the composition and form of the
product itself.2 3 8 It is, by definition, a qualitative change in an obproduct is not that which the maker intended or is a use that could not reasonably be anticipated by a manufacturer.") (emphasis added).
234. See cases cited supra note 233.
235. See supra note 56.
236. Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 205-206, 527 A.2d 1337,
1341 (Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (quoting Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 594-95,
495 A.2d 348, 354-55 (1985) (citations omitted)).
237. Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Colo. 1986) (emphasis
added).
238. The Connecticut products liability statute, for example, provides that "alteration or
modification includes changes in the design, formula, function or use of the product from that
originally designed, tested or intended by the product seller." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52572p(b) (West Supp. 1988); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3(b) (1985) (adding that such
alteration or modification "includes failure to observe routine care and maintenance, but does
not include ordinary wear and tear").
Similarly, the Illinois products liability statute defines "alteration" to include "an alteration, modification or change that was made in the original makeup characteristics, function or
design of a product or in the original recommendations, instructions and warnings given with
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ject's form, thereby rendering it in a condition that is different from
that in which it had been originally. 239 One court defined it as a
change in the "configuration or operational characteristics of the
240
product.
A third party's alteration of a product seriously interferes with
241
and undermines the "duty" relationship between product and user.
Products are designed and sold to be used, not altered. While a manufacturer must contemplate variations in the use of its product as
designed, it should not be responsible for accidents arising out of an
alteration of the product from that design. 42 The alteration of a
product completely undermines the manufacturer's design choice. It
in effect creates a new product which places the manufacturer at the
respect to a product including the failure properly to maintain and care for a product." ILL.
Rav. STAT. § 13-213(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1984).
The Rhode Island products liability statute defines product alteration as "an alteration or
modification of a product made subsequent to the manufacture or sale by the manufacturer or
seller which altered, modified, or changed the purpose, use, function, design or manner of use
of the product from that originally designed, tested or intended by the manufacturer." R.I.
GEN. LAws § 9-1-32(a)(2) (1985).
239. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 63 (1986).
240. Woods v. Crane Carrier Co., 693 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. 1985) (quoting the trial
court's instructions to the jury).
241. See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., discussed infra notes
466-674 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 253-62, 463-674 and accompanying text. One commentator has
stated that "[t]he foreseeability approach to substantial change is vital in the determination of
design defects that render a product unsafe in normal use." See Comment, supra note 3, at
255 (emphasis added). Under such reasoning, "A manufacturer must design a product so that
foreseeable modifications will not cause product failure." Id. The author's predicate for using a
foreseeability standard in alteration case was, however, premised upon the principle that the
"foreseeability of a product's uses establishes the parameters of its manufacturer's responsibility," Id. at 254 (emphasis added). Like the defect-proximate cause and duty-foreseeability
courts, this author makes a quantum leap from "use/misuse" to "alteration" without regard to
their conceptual and qualitative distinctions.
In addition, while acknowledging that this reasoning designates the manufacturer as an
"insurer" of its product, the author states that such unfairness is mitigated by a proximate
cause test that would absolve a manufacturer of liability for accidents caused solely by an
unforeseeable alteration. Id. at 255-56. This reasoning is flawed, however, for two reasons.
First, if a manufacturer's duty is gauged as of the time of manufacture and sale, then a manufacturer should not be responsible for any accident that would not have occurred in absence of
a post-sale alteration, whether foreseeable or not. Second, even if a foreseeability standard
were to be appropriate, an unforeseeable alteration that is, in any way, causally related to an
accident should sever a manufacturer's duty as a matter of law. See DeArmond v. Hoover Ball
& Bearing, 86 Il1.App. 3d 1066, 408 N.E.2d 771 (1980). The author's proposal is even more
oppressive than the defect-proximate cause approach because it asserts that the manufacturer
should be liable, even if the accident would not have occurred "but-for" an unforeseeable
alteration, so long as the alteration was not the sole proximate cause. See Comment, supra
note 3, at 254-55,
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mercy of the subjective engineering and safety decisions of a third
party. A manufacturer should never have a duty to foresee subsequent alterations of its product, lest it be deemed an insurer against
all product-related injuries.
Some state legislatures, such as North Carolina 43 and North
Dakota,244 have recognized this qualitative "duty" distinction between an alteration and a misuse. The distinction was also recognized by the Kentucky and New Hampshire state legislatures, but
fell victim to the judicial legislation of defect-proximate cause
courts. 45 Other statutes and decisions, while incorrectly utilizing
"foreseeability," recognize at least the conceptual distinction between product alteration and product misuse. 46 Idaho's products liability statute,247 for example, which is fashioned after the Model
Uniform Product Liability Act, differentiates these terms as follows:
(3) Misuse of a product.
(a) "Misuse" occurs when the product user does not act in a
manner that would be expected of an ordinary reasonably prudent
person who is248likely to use the product in the same or similar
circumstances.
(4) Alteration or modification of a product.
(a) "Alteration or modification" occurs when a person or entity other than the product seller changes the design, construction,
or formula of the product, or changes or removes warnings or instructions that accompanied or were displayed on the product.
243.

The North Carolina statute provides:

(a) No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable in any product liability action where a proximate cause of the personal injury, death or damage to prop-

erty was either an alteration or modification of the product by a party other than
the manufacturer or seller, which alteration or modification occurred after the product left the control of such manufacturer or such seller unless:

(1) the alteration or modification was in accordance with the instructions or
specifications of such manufacturer or such seller, or

(2) the alteration or modification was made with the express consent of such
manufacturer or such seller ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3 (1985).

244. See N.D.

CENT. CODE

§ 28-01.1-04 (Supp. 1987) (providing that alteration or

modification is a defense to a strict products liability action, in a manner similar to the North

Carolina statute).
245.

See supra notes 191-223 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges to the

Kentucky and New Hampshire statutes).
246.

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572p(b) (West Supp. 1988), set forth supra note

247.
248.

Id. § 6-1405 (3)(a) (emphasis added).

238.
IDAHO CODE

§ 6-1405 (Supp. 1987).
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"Alteration or modification" of a product includes the failure to
observe routine care and maintenance, but does not include ordinary wear and tear." 9
Similarly, the South Dakota Supreme Court has recently stated
that a "[m]isuse may involve using a product for an unintended
function or using the product for its intended purpose but in an improper manner. 25 ° Conversely, a consumer "alters" a product "by
changing the product from its original form, not by using it
'251
improperly."
Even in the context of product misuse, courts have acknowledged that extreme care must be used in applying foreseeability
principles because, "with the benefit of hindsight, any accident could
be foreseeable. ' 252 By applying foreseeability to product alterations,
courts utilizing the defect-proximate cause approach have completely
failed to exercise such care. These courts have not only failed to recognize the fundamental distinctions between product misuse and
product alteration, but have also engrossed the concept of "the product as chameleon." The product must be designed either to prevent
itself from being altered, or to adapt its safety level to meet any
alterations in its own physical structure and composition. In fact,
while the chameleon internally adapts to changes in its external surroundings, the product must go one step further and contain safety
features that adapt to changes in its own internal structure. From a
safety standpoint, the product must automatically be adaptable to
internal alterations as water adapts to the configuration of the
container in which it is poured.
When foreseeability is given such a role in alteration cases, one
begins to question why a manufacturer has a duty to incorporate
safety features into its design when the product must be made "suitably safe" without these features. One also questions how a product
can be made safe without such safety features when the features are
needed to make the product safe. If it may be foreseeable that a
product may be altered by a removal of its safety features, is it not
foreseeable that it may be further altered by obviating its "back-up"
safety features? To even suggest that back-up safety features are
249. Id. § 6-1405(4)(a) (emphasis added).
250. Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909, 913 (S.D. 1987) (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 914.
252. Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 206, 527 A.2d 1337, 1341
(Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
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required is to concede that the manufacturer must design its product
to be accident-proof.
There is something inherently unfair and theoretically wrong
with the use of the foreseeability standard to define a manufacturer's
duty once its product has been materially altered. The defect-proximate cause approach allows juries to retroactively re-design products
on the basis of the particular alteration at issue in a particular case.
The manufacturer is ultimately held to the level of an insurer, and
must anticipate every conceivable way that its product may be altered. This places the manufacturer at the mercy of third parties
who, with conscious disregard for safety, materially alter the product
to suit their own subjective needs. The manufacturer must ultimately
design an alter-proof product, or one that insures its own safety in
any altered condition.
IV. THREE STEPS TOWARD A RATIONAL APPROACH

Courts can rationally limit the liability of manufacturers in alteration cases without contravening any of the policies underlying
products liability law. A manufacturer should not be held responsible for accidents arising out of its product in a materially altered
condition. 53 Any causal relationship between a material alteration
and the accident should, as a matter of law, sever the legal relationship between the manufacturer's original design choice and the accident.254 The manufacturer should be absolved of a duty under these
circumstances because the accident would clearly not have occurred
"but-for" a material alteration which it should have no duty to
foresee.
In material alteration cases, a legal relationship between the
manufacturer's original design and the accident exists only through
the use of a "foreseeability" standard. 55 Such a standard, while ap253. See infra notes 463-674 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text; see also supra note 204 (discussing
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-32 (1985)).

255. Absent a duty to foresee the alteration, a manufacturer could not be responsible for
the condition of its product after the alteration occurs. As Dean Green has noted, "[t]he scope
of a defendant's duty depends upon how far the law's protection will be extended." Green,
Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L. REV. 42, 45 (1962). Thus, "[i]t is frequently
said that if the defendant as an ordinarily prudent person foresaw or should have foreseen
some harm to the victim or other person so situated, defendant was under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to avoid such harm." Id. (emphasis added); see supra notes 224-37 and accompanying text. This reasoning has been applied by defect-proximate cause courts in the
context of subsequent product alteration. See supra notes 137-40, 175-80 and accompanying
text (discussing Soler and Brown); see also cases cited supra notes 32, 130.
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propriate with respect to product "misuse," is completely inappropriate with respect to product "alteration.12 56 Courts adhering to the
defect-proximate cause approach have refused to recognize this, and
have allowed the legal question of "duty" to proceed to the jury
57
under a foreseeability standard.1
A rational solution to the material alteration dilemma exists,
and can be accomplished in three steps. First, courts must utilize
their policy making functions by adjudicating, as a matter of law,
the manufacturer's duty with respect to product alteration. Second,
courts must set reasonable parameters on that duty by departing
from the use of foreseeability as the standard for imposing liability
in alteration cases. Once these first two steps are taken, a manufacturer cannot owe a duty with respect to any accident causally related
to the material alteration of its product. Thus, courts must take the
third and final step, severing the legal relationship between the manufacturer's original design and the accident, i.e. absolving the manufacturer of liability as a matter of law.
The succeeding sections of this Article discuss these three steps,
and illustrate that each step is essential to the formulation of a rational approach to product alteration. Section V examines the process by which courts can set parameters on the manufacturer's duty
in products liability cases (Step One).25 8 Section VI critically analyzes another approach, referred to as "duty-foreseeability," wherein
courts have adjudicated the "duty" concept (Step One), yet failed to
take the next step and depart from using a foreseeability standard
(Step Two).259 Section VII then examines the New York "Robinson" approach, which takes the first two steps (adjudicating the
manufacturer's "duty" without the use of foreseeability), yet fails to
take the third step, severing the legal relationship between the original design and the accident (Step Three). 2 60 This section also discusses why the third step is essential to the proper adjudication of
alteration cases. 26 ' Finally, this Article concludes by summarizing
the three-step solution and its applicability to future alteration
26 2
cases.
256.
257.

See supra notes 224-52 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 32.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See
See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

263-333 and accompanying text.
334-462 and accompanying text.
463-522 and accompanying text.
510-674 and accompanying text.
675-83 and accompanying text.
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V.

STEP ONE: ADJUDICATING THE MANUFACTURER'S "DUTY"

AS

A MATTER OF LAW
The defect-proximate cause approach has failed to rationally
limit the liability of a manufacturer where its product has undergone
a subsequent alteration. Courts have transformed what should be a
question of law into four questions of fact. 63 This, in effect, delegates to the jury important social policy questions that are the hallmark of a court's lawmaking functions. 6 4 Material alteration cases
involve questions of social policy that transcend the facts of a particular case.265 These questions should be adjudicated by courts as a
matter of law. Defect-proximate cause courts have declined to do so.
They have allowed juries, at the time of trial, to evaluate the product
in its materially altered condition and to retroactively determine
what the duty of the manufacturer was at the time the product was
originally designed and sold.
As Dean Green noted some time ago, "Many judges seem hesitant to come to grips with the duty issue. But the able advocate
should never permit the issue to be slurred over. In most of the erroneous decisions made by courts, the duty issue has either gone by
default or has been misconceived. ' 2 66 If strict liability is to be fairly
imposed upon manufacturers, without subjecting them to the "absolute" liability of an insurer, courts must take a more active role in
limiting the manufacturer's duty as a matter of law.2 6 It is here
where the alteration problem originates, and where the solutions
begin.
263. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the four questions of fact laid
out in Soler).
264. See Green, supra note 255, at 45. Dean Green had stated that "[t]he determination of the issue of duty and whether it includes the particular risk imposed on the victim
ultimately rests upon broad policies which underlie the law." Id. These policies define the
scope of a defendant's duty and "can only be resolved by the learning, experience, good sense
and judgment of the judge - the molding of law in response to the needs of the environment."
Id.; see also Twerski, supra note 50, at 527-35.
265. The New York Court of Appeals recognized this in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div.
of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980), and adjudicated the manufacturer's duty as a matter of law. See infra notes 501-06 and accompanying
text (discussing the Robinson approach). The court's monumental reasoning illustrated the
important social policy issues in material alteration cases that warrant judicial resolution. See
infra notes 501-06 and accompanying text (discussing Robinson).
266. Green, supra note 255, at 45.
267. See Twerski, supra note 50, at 527-35.
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Is the "Duty" Concept Nothing More Than a Question of
Fact?

Many courts encounter difficulties in adjudicating alteration
cases as a matter of law.268 These difficulties stem from traditional
notions of the roles of the judge and the jury in establishing the duty
of the manufacturer under products liability law. As one court has
observed, "[d]uty is essentially a question of whether the relationship
between the actor and the injured person gives rise to any legal obligation on the actor's part for the benefit of the injured person. 269
Theoretically, the duty concept should present a threshold question of law for the trial judge, since there must exist a legal duty
before strict products liability, or negligence, can be assessed against
a defendant.270 Once the existence of a legal duty has been established, the questions of whether a defendant breached that duty and
whether the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, are
most often resolved by the factfinder.27 1 As a practical matter, however, it is extremely difficult for a court to establish a comprehensive
list of specific duties that a manufacturer must follow when design268. See supra note 32-37 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have adjudicated the material alteration question).
269. Trotter v. Hamill Mfg. Co., 143 Mich. App. 593, 599, 372 N.W.2d 622, 625
(1985) (quoting Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 438, 254 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1977)); see
generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984) (defining the
duty issue as "a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of
the particular plaintiff ...[that arises from] the relation between individuals which imposes
upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other ....).
270. Twerski, supra note 50, at 528 ("This initial 'duty' question has traditionally been
within the province of the judge, and thus there existed a neat division of labor between court
and jury."). Chief Judge Cardozo recognized this in the seminal case Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), in which he stated that "[tihe question of liability is
always anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences that go with liability." Id
at 346, 162 N.E.2d at 101; see also Green, supra note 255, at 45 (stating that it is fundamental that "[a]t the base of every tort case in which liability is imposed on a defendant, there
must be a duty.") (emphasis in original). Dean Green was one of the first commentators to
carefully analyze the concept of "duty" and its role in defining the policies underlying tort law.
As Dean Green succinctly noted:
Duty may be explicitly stated or assumed. In most cases the defendant's duty is
assumed - some undisclosed major premise. This is only saying that the liability of
a defendant must rest upon some rule or principle of law which comprehends defendant's conduct and protection of the victim against the risk of injury created by
defendant's conduct .... If it is once stated with clarity, the solution of a case is

not far afield.
Id.
271. See Green, supra note 255, at 45; see also Note, No Duty At Any Speed?: Determining the Responsibility of the Automobile Manufacturer in Speed-Related Accidents, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 405 n.11 (1986).
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ing and selling its products. This stems from the fundamental notion
of products liability that the societal acceptability of a design can be
evaluated only by analyzing the relationship between the product
and its users. 2 Indeed, it is the relationship between manufacturer
and plaintiff that defines the duties to be imposed upon each.27 3
This concept, when taken at face value, appears to be a simple
one. In reality, however, the types of interactions between product
and plaintiff vary innumerably from case to case, and are dependent
upon each jury's findings of the facts. Since the manufacturer's duties are so dependent upon the fact patterns of each specific case,
courts have been unable to affirmatively define the myriad of duties
of a manufacturer as a matter of law.2 7 4 Courts have instead opted
to impose upon manufacturers the general duty to design "non-defective" products and have delegated to the jury the role of determining whether this general duty has been breached, i.e., whether
the product was "defective," under the facts of a particular case. 7 5
272. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
273. Id.; see also Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 391 (Mo.
1986) (Donnelly, J., dissenting) ("The foreseeable use, if present, raises the duty to make the
use safe.").
274. Professor Twerski has observed that "[tihe creation of a general formula governing
the question whether to impose such a duty of care is highly unlikely, according to Dean
Prosser, because 'considerations of social policy vary depending on the precise issue before the
court and social policy questions always underlie the duty issue.'" Twerski, supra note 50, at
528 (quoting W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 405
(6th ed. 1976)).
275. Courts have differed sharply in the tests utilized to determine when this general
duty has been breached. Many courts utilize a sophisticated version of the "risk-utility test"
first enunciated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169
(2d Cir. 1947); see, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Voss v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983). Dean Wade formulated
a seven-factor test to determine whether a product should be deemed defective under the riskutility test. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
837-38 (1973). These factors include:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user and
to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause injury,
and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need
and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
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If the jury concludes that a design is "defective" or "unreasonably dangerous" under the applicable test, it is, in effect, concluding
that the manufacturer had a duty to design its product in such a way
as to avoid the specific accident that occurred. Juries are, at the time

of trial, redesigning the product in a negative/hindsight fashion and
tailoring the defect to the specific facts of the case.27 6 In so doing,
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of
the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. Other commentators have proposed various multi-factor tests for the determination of "defeet." See, e.g., Fischer, Products Liability - The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339,
359 (1974); Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law - A Review of Basic
Principles,45 Mo. L. REv. 579 (1980).
Other courts utilize a "consumer expectation" test derived from the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), afid in part,
rev'd in part, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573
P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020
(1978). Under the Restatement approach, a product is defective if, at the time it leaves the
manufacturer's hands, it is "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment
g (1965). For a comprehensive discussion of the "consumer expectation" test, see Shapo, A
Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liabilityfor
Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1370-71 (1974); Twerski, From Risk-Utility to
Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, II HOFSTRA L. REV. 861 (1983).
276. See. e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981). The Dawson court held, inter alia, that an automobile manufacturer has a
duty to design "crashworthy" vehicles, the scope of that duty being defined by the jury under a
risk-utility analysis. 630 F.2d at 956-59. The court further held that evidence of a manufacturer's compliance with federal safety standards promulgated under the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act is merely a factor to be considered by the jury in determining
"defect," Id. at 957-58.
The court expressed uneasiness, however, "regarding the consequences of [its] decision
and of the decisions of other courts throughout the country in cases of this kind." Id. at 962.
The court reasoned that the "open-ended" duty requirement under New Jersey law fully delegates to the jury the role of determining whether the manufacturer satisfied its duty. Id. As
the court perceptively observed:
The result of such arrangement is that while the jury found [the manufacturer]
liable for not producing a rigid enough vehicular frame, a factfinder in another case
might well hold the manufacturer liable for producing a frame that is too rigid ....
In effect, this permits individual juries applying varying laws in different jurisdictions to set nationwide automobile safety standards and to impose on automobile
manufacturers conflicting requirements. It would be difficult for members of the
industry to alter their design and production behavior in response to jury verdicts in
such cases, because their response might well be at variance with what some other
jury decides is a defective design.
Id. This ad hoe and retrospective system of establishing the manufacturer's duty "implicates
broad national concerns." Id. at 963. While the court was bound to apply the substantive law
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the jury is establishing the manufacturer's duties in a retrospective
fashion. 7 The manufacturer's specific duties at the time of manufacture and sale are not ascertained until the jury concludes that
these "duties" have been breached. One may conclude, therefore,
that the concept of "duty as a question of law for the court" is a
myth. Rather, the duty is often established by the jury as a finding
of fact.
B.

The Emergence of the "No-Duty" Rule

This system of retrospective aad factual standard-setting can
produce unduly harsh results for manufacturers.2 7 This is especially
true in alteration cases, where juries are asked to evaluate a product's original design in the context of an accident arising out of the
product in its condition as materially altered by a third party. Despite the fact that courts may be unable to affirmatively set the specific duties of a manufacturer, courts do possess the judicial capacity
to ascertain when a manufacturer should not owe a duty to the
plaintiff. It is here that the theoretical notion of the duty concept as
a question of law survives. By granting summary judgments or directed verdicts, courts can intervene in the jury's factual standardsetting process by determining, as a matter of law, that the manufacturer should not owe a duty to the plaintiff.2 79 Thus, in the context of
a particular case, the focus of a court's inquiry should be whether
"the defendant's duty, whatever it may be, extend[s] to the specific
injury which the victim has received?" 280
In a noteworthy article, Professor Twerski explained that "[iun
making a determination of no duty... the court performs a distinctive role, grounded in its ability to respond judicially to important
social policy considerations by making law accordingly."2 81 Professor
Twerski characterized this judicial screening as "high level lawmakof New Jersey, its objective was to bring to the attention of the legislature the fact that "it is

not at all clear that the present arrangement of permitting individual juries, under varying
standards of liability, to impose this obligation on manufacturers is fair or efficient." Id.
277.

Id.; see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing "negative standard-

setting" by the jury).
278. In addition to some of the outrageous duty requirements of defect-proximate cause
courts such as Soler, Brown, Heath and Wheeler, other courts have imposed upon manufacturers the duty to design accident-proof products in the non-alteration context. See, e.g., Bigbee v.

Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 665 P.2d 947, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1983); Barker v.
Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal Rptr. 225 (1978).
279. See Twerski, supra note 50, at 527-35.
280. Green, supra note 255, at 45-46.
281. Twerski, supra note 50, at 528.
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ing" because the no-duty rules are premised upon important policies
that transcend the facts of a particular case.282 As such, they may
have significant precedential value.2 8 Unlike the factfinding role of a
jury, when a court formulates a no-duty rule, it is exercising specific
functions that are the hallmark of its lawmaking power.2"4 These
functions include:
(1) the identification of important policy concerns that transcend the resolution of a particular case;
(2) the categorization of certain "suspect cases" which require
a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny before they can proceed to
the jury;
(3) the screening of cases, either at the pleadings stage, where
the issue is removed from litigation entirely, or at the directed verdict state, where the case is removed from the jury's "reasonableness" or risk-utility determination;
(4) the process of rulemaking, where the court considers the
precedential value of a decision and adjudicates the issue as a matter
of law; and
(5) the balancing of important social policies.285
It is these five functions that distinguish judicial decision-making from jury factfinding.28 6 When a jury adjudicates the issues of
duty and defect, it is exercising sensitive factfinding functions which
may "distract[] the court from its more valuable function of identifying the specific policy considerations that should determine the
outcome of the case." 2817 Courts are more than able to exercise their
lawmaking power by formulating no-duty rules where such rules are
appropriate.
C. Application of the "No-Duty" Rule
Courts have utilized the no-duty rule in cases involving automobile speed, failure to warn or inadequate warnings, alcohol-related
injuries, and "how to" books. These cases illustrate the important
policy considerations that underlie a court's decision to screen certain issues from the jury.
1. Automobile "Speed" Cases.-- In the celebrated case of
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

529.
530-32.
531 (emphasis added).
531-32.
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Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 288 the Seventh Circuit exercised
its judicial functions by screening an important design issue from a
jury's consideration. The issue in Schemel was whether an automobile manufacturer may be deemed negligent for designing its vehicles with the capabilitiesof attaining excessive speeds. 289 The court
balanced the underlying policies and answered this question in the
negative.290
The plaintiff in Schemel was a passenger in an automobile
which had been struck by another automobile traveling at 115 miles
per hour. 291 The plaintiff settled his claim against the driver of the
speeding vehicle, and commenced an action against the manufacturer, alleging that it had acted negligently in designing the automo2 92
bile with the capabilities of being driven at such dangerous speeds.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that under risk-utility, the foreseeability of such a speed-related accident, when multiplied by the attendant risks to the public and to innocent bystanders, clearly outweighed any potential utility in the design.293 In fact, the plaintiff
claimed that designing an automobile that could be driven at such
speeds served no useful purpose whatsoever. 294 The defendant moved
to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.295
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss.296 On
appeal, however, plaintiff asserted that the defendant, as manufacturer of the automobile, owed a general duty of reasonable care, the
breach of which must be determined not by the court, but by the
jury.29 7 Plaintiff contended that "once the Court determines that a
relationship exists between the parties giving rise to some duty, the
determination of the nature and extent of that duty becomes a question of fact for the jury." 298 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, and held
that a manufacturer is under no duty to foresee and guard against
288.
discussion
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968). For a detailed
of Schemel, see Note, supra note 271, at 407-20.
384 F.2d at 804-05.
Id.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the wanton and gross misuse of its product by users.29 9 The court

reasoned that to impose such a duty in this case would be the
equivalent of designating the manufacturer an insurer of its
automobiles.300
Schemel was screened from the jury for two principal reasons.
First, the manufacturer is simply not the proper cost-bearer for this
accident.101 The driver in Schemel consciously, and with a reckless
disregard for the safety of others, drove his automobile at a speed of
115 miles per hour. To allow this case to proceed to the jury on riskutility would have been to allow the jury to impose upon manufacturers a duty to design accident-proof products. 302 One can, indeed,
detect a striking parallel between the conduct of the driver in
Schemel and that of the employers in Soler and Brown. The driver
in Schemel grossly misused a vehicle which had the capabilities of
being so misused. The Schemel court recognized, however, that the
costs of such a gross misuse should be borne not by the manufacturer, but by the driver, whose conduct transformed what would
have been a reasonably safe vehicle into an instrument of destruction.30 3 The conduct of the employers in Soler and Brown was even
more egregious than that of the driver in Schemel. The employers in
those cases consciously and materially altered the products, rendering them in a condition that was qualitatively different, and significantly more dangerous, than the condition in which they were originally designed and sold. It is the actual "alteration" of the product
which even further removes the manufacturer from responsibility for
accidents causally related to the alteration itself.
299. Id. at 804-05.
300. Id. at 805. Interestingly, much of the reasoning in Schemel involved the court's
application of the "patent danger" and "intended purpose" rules. See Note, supra note 271, at
415-17. These rules have been subsequently discarded by a majority of courts. See id. at 41719. The Seventh Circuit itself rejected the intended purpose rule and overruled that part of the
Schemel opinion that relied on the rule. Id. at 417-18; see Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565
F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977). On this basis, it has been asserted that the precedential value of
Schemel has diminished. See Note, supra note 271, at 418-19. This assertion is incorrect,
however, as the Schemel court utilized these concepts, which existed at the time, merely to
justify a decision grounded upon sound public policy considerations. See infra text accompanying notes 302-05.
301. Schemel, 384 F.2d at 805.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 804-05. The court stated that "[t]he automobile in question was not dangerous for the use for which it was manufactured by its lawful use in the manner and for the
purpose for which it was supplied." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the manufacturer had no
duty, by way of design or warning, where an accident is caused by "a wantonly negligent
driver." Id. at 805.
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Second, a jury is not the proper decision-making body to establish design criteria relative to an automobile's speed capabilities. 304
With millions of automobiles possessing similar speed capabilities already on the market, a jury's retroactive imposition of a duty to design these vehicles differently would be frightening. The court, therefore, deferred on the issue to the appropriate legislative bodies,
which can properly establish affirmative standards for the design of
speed capabilities of automobiles.30 5
The fundamental rationale of the Schemel opinion has survived
the demise of the patent danger and intended purpose rules. To date,
there is no published opinion in which a duty was imposed upon an
automobile manufacturer to design its automobiles with limited
speed capabilities. In Slatkavitz v. General Motors Corp.,06 the
court utilized the Schemel rationale and held that "it divorces social
policy from practical reality to measure a manufacturer's reasona30 7
bleness by speed capacity alone."
2. Warnings Cases.- The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A sets forth the general rule that "[iun order to prevent the
product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its
use." ' 8 In McKee v. Moore,309 the Oklahoma Supreme Court found
that "[u]nder this principle, even if a product is faultlessly designed
.. . it may be considered unreasonably unsafe or defective if it is
placed in the hands of the ultimate consumer without adequate
warnings of the dangers involved in its use."31 The rule's counterpart in negligence dictates that a manufacturer or seller may be liable when it "fails to exercise reasonable care to inform [potential
users] of [the product's] dangerous condition or of the facts which
make it likely to be dangerous."' 31' As in design defect cases, the
question of whether a manufacturer breached its duty to warn in the
context of a particular case is typically a question for the jury.312
304.

Id.

305. Id.; cf. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981) (illustrating the court's deference to Congress).
306. 523 F.Supp. 383 (D. Mass. 1981); see also Note, supra note 271, at 420 (discussing Slatkavitz).
307. 523 F.Supp. at 385.
308. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
309. 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982).
310. Id. at 23.
311. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388(c) (1965).
312. See Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 276-77, 461 N.E.2d 864, 872, 473 N.Y.S.2d
378, 386 (1984).
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In fairness to manufacturers, however, courts have prevented
the imposition of open-ended liability by recognizing two no-duty exceptions to the general rule. The first exception provides that a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open or obvious dangers in the
product."' 3 Despite the demise of the "patent danger" rule in design
defect cases, 14 courts continue to recognize that a manufacturer
should not owe a duty to warn of dangers that are readily ascertainable upon ordinary inspection. 15 Similarly, the second exception provides that a manufacturer does not owe a duty to warn of dangers
already known to the product's user."' Thus, "'[t] here is no duty to
warn of dangers actually known to the user of a product, regardless
of whether the duty rests in negligence ... or on strict liability.' ",17

3. Alcohol Manufacturing Cases.- A similar no-duty approach
was utilized in Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co.318
Pemberton involved a wrongful death action brought against the
manufacturer and sellers of "Everclear Grain Alcohol," seeking
damages for the decedent's alcohol overdose.319 The court screened
from the jury the question of whether alcohol may be unreasonably
dangerous under the risk-utility test.3 20 The court recognized that
significant policy considerations transcended the facts of the case.
The court reasoned, for example, that "[a]lcohol has been present
and used in society during all recorded history and its characteristics
and qualities have been fully explored and developed and are a part
of the body of common knowledge."'3 ' Thus, in light of the nature,
effect and popularity of alcohol, manufacturers and sellers are enti313. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 736 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1984)
(applying New York law); Belling v. Haugh's Pools, Ltd., 126 A.D.2d 958, 959, 511 N.Y.S.2d

732, 733 (4th Dep't 1987).
314.
315.

See Note, supra note 271, at 418-19.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 313.

316. See, e.g., Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc.,
354 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1984) ("Generally, there is no duty to warn if the user knows or

should know of potential danger."); Landrine v. Mego Corp., 95 A.D.2d 759, 759, 464
N.Y.S.2d 516, 517 (1st Dep't 1983) ("'[Tlhere is no necessity to warn a customer already

aware - through common knowledge or learning - of a specific hazard.'" (quoting Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 65, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009,
1015 (4th Dep't 1980))).

317.

Long v. Deere & Co., 238 Kan. 766, 773, 715 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1986) (quoting

Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 639-40, 549 P.2d 1383, 1395 (1976)) (emphasis in

original),
318.

664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984).

319. Id. at 691-92.
320. Id. at 693-94.
321. Id. at 693.
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rely upon the common sense and good judgment of the
tied to
22
3

user.

4. "How To" Books.- In Lewin v. McCreight,323 the question
before the court was whether the publisher of a "How To" book
would be held liable to an injured plaintiff for failing to warn of
"defective ideas" in the book. 324 The plaintiff sustained injuries while
mixing a mordant in accordance with the instructions in a book entitled "The Complete Metalsmith". Plaintiff sued, inter alia, the publisher of the book under a negligent failure to warn theory.325 The
and sold the book, which was written
publisher had printed, bound
3 26
author.
party
by a third
Rather than allowing the case to proceed to the jury on riskutility, the court focused on the threshold question of whether the
publisher owed a duty to ensure the scientific accuracy of books written by experts. 32 The court carefully evaluated the important policy
issues, and answered this question in the negative, stating that
"given the tremendous burden such a duty would place upon . . .
publishers, the weighty societal interest in free access to ideas, and
potentially unlimited liability, it would be unwise to impose a duty to
warn of 'defective ideas' upon publishers of information supplied by
third party authors.13 2 Thus, the court exercised its lawmaking
functions, and created a "no duty" exception to the general duty to
3 29
warn.
These decisions illustrate the ability of the trial judge to carefully screen cases from the jury's "defect" analysis where the manufacturer should not owe a duty as a matter of law. By utilizing noduty rules when appropriate, courts can make products liability law
by creating exceptions to the manufacturers' "open-ended" duty requirement. This can reverse the trend of negative standard-setting
that is inherent in the unrestrained submission of the "defect" issue
322. Id. Similar reasoning has been utilized in products liability cases involving cigarettes, see, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985),
and handguns, see, e.g., Robertson v. Grogan Inv. Co., 710 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
323. 655 F.Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
324. Id. at 283.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 283-84. The court stated that to recover on a failure to warn theory, the

plaintiff must first prove that the defendant owed him a duty, which is "a question of law to be
determined by the court." Id. at 283.
328. Id. at 284.
329. Id.
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to juries. 330 It also provides manufacturers with the necessary guidance when making a design choice.
The subsequent alteration scenario literally "cries out" for a noduty rule. 31 It is contrary to the policies underlying products liability law to impose liability upon manufacturers for accidents arising
out of material alterations in their products. 3 2 Courts should, therefore, actively adjudicate the "duty" concept and absolve the manufacturer of liability in cases where (1) its product was materially
altered by the subsequent act of a third-party and (2) the accident
would not have occurred but-for the material alteration.
It is important to note, however, that the adjudication of the
"duty" concept (Step One) cannot, in and of itself, solve the material alteration dilemma. Courts must take the next step and abandon
the use of a foreseeability standard. The departure from foreseeability principles is essential to the formulation of a rational no-duty rule
in alteration cases. It is this "duty to foresee" alone that links the
manufacturer, by virtue of its original design choice, to an accident
arising out of its product in a materially altered condition."3 3 As illustrated in the following section of this Article, the adjudication of
the "duty" concept by courts is virtually rendered a nullity if that
adjudication is based on a foreseeability standard.
VI.

ADJUDICATING THE MANUFACTURER'S DUTY UNDER A

FORESEEABILITY STANDARD: THE "DUTY-FORESEEABILITY"
APPROACH

Some courts and legislatures have declined to adopt the defect330. See supra note 276 (discussing Dawson v. Chrysler Corp); see also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 51, at 354-58.
331. One commentator stated that decisions such as Soler and Brown have brought
forth the need to limit a manufacturer's duty via legislative action. See Comment, supra note
23, at 744. Such legislation would "provide clear guidelines at a time when manufacturers are
more uncertain than ever of their potential liability." Id. Furthermore, Professor Twerski
states that "[i]nlight of the distinctive roles of the judge and the jury - that of policy conscious lawmaking as opposed to fact-sensitive risk-utility balancing - and the problems plaguing design defect adjudication, judicial use of no-duty directed verdicts in this area is increasingly appropriate and necessary." Twerski, supra note 50, at 532.
332. In Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403
N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980), the New York Court of Appeals stated that "no manufacturer may be automatically held liable for all accidents caused or occasioned by the use of
its product .... ." Id. at 479, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720. Hence, "[s]ubstantial
modifications of a product from its original condition by a third party which render a safe
product defective are not the responsibility of the manufacturer ...." Id. For a discussion of
the Robinson rule, see infra notes 463-674 and accompanying text.
333. See infra notes 547-53 and accompanying text.
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proximate cause approach, recognizing the need to adjudicate, as a
matter of law, the manufacturer's duty with respect to product alteration.334 Unfortunately, these jurisdictions have failed to take the
necessary Step Two and depart from using a foreseeability standard
in adjudicating that duty.3 3 5 As a result, only certain cases are
screened from the jury under the rationale that a manufacturer has
a duty to foresee some types of alterations but not others. 336 This
"duty-foreseeability" approach is, therefore, only a limited duty
rule, the limitations being dependant upon which types of alterations
the court deems "unforeseeable."
334. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 44.
335. For example, in Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1980), the
plaintiff was seriously injured when the jaws of a 45-ton press he was operating descended on
his hands. Id. at 43. As originally designed and sold, the press lacked point-of-operation
guards, but was operated by means of a mechanical foot treadle. Id. Plaintiffs employer subsequently removed the mechanical foot treadle and replaced it with an electrically operated control. As altered, the press could be activated merely by simultaneously pressing two palm buttons or by pressing an electric foot switch. Id. Plaintiff was injured while attempting to remove
some fabric from the bottom die of the press when his foot inadvertently touched the electric
foot switch, causing the press to descend on his hands. Id.
In a strict products liability action against the manufacturer, the district court judge declined to instruct the jury that the manufacturer had a duty to foresee material alterations. Id.
The jury returned a defense verdict and the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that
the jury charge was inconsistent with Pennsylvania law under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A. Id. at 43-45. In utilizing the duty-foreseeability approach, the court reasoned
that "the notion of reasonable foreseeability has been incorporated into the concept of substantial change .
I..."
Id. at 45. Thus, "'[t]he test . . . is whether the manufacturer could have
reasonably expected or foreseen such an alteration; such determination is for the fact-finder
unless the inferences are so clear that a court can say as a matter of law that a reasonable
manufacturer could not have foreseen the change.'" Id. (quoting D'Antona v. Hampton
Grinding Wheel Co., 225 Pa. Super. 120, 125, 310 A.2d 307, 310 (1973)). The court concluded that on the record presented, the issue of foreseeability was properly a jury question.
Id. at 46; see also Eck v: Powermatic Houdaille, 1986-7 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
11,440
(Pa. Super. Ct. June 1, 1987).
The court's reasoning was incorrect, however, because a "reasonable manufacturer" test is
clearly inconsistent with § 402A, which shifts the focus in a strict products liability action
from culpable "conduct" to culpable "product." See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In
fact, the manufacturers in Merriweatherand Eck made this very argument, but fell victim to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's notion of the manufacturer as indefinite guarantor of its
products. See Merriweather,636 F.2d at 46; Eck, 1986-7 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 11,440.
This willingness to impose absolute liability on manufacturers is underscored by a recent Third
Circuit decision which, applying Pennsylvania law, actually allowed an alcohol defect case to
proceed to the jury. See Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
336. Compare Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, discussed supra note 335,
with Rooney v. Federal Press Co., 751 F.2d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that employer's
material alterations were unforeseeable as a matter of law); see also infra notes 347-93 and
accompanying text (discussing two inconsistent Minnesota Supreme Court decisions decided
under a foreseeability standard).
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The Connecticut,3 37 South Dakota, 338 and Tennessee 3 9 legislatures have enacted this "duty-foreseeability" approach. The Connecticut statute, for example, provides that:
(a) A product seller shall not be liable for harm that would not
have occurred but for the fact that his product was altered or modified by a third party unless:... (3) The alteration or modification
was the result of conduct that
reasonably should have been antici340
pated by the product seller.
The South Dakota statute similarly provides:
No manufacturer, assembler or seller of a product may be held
liable for damages for personal injury, death or property damage
sustained by reason of the doctrine of strict liability in tort based
on a defect in a product, or failure to warn or protect against a
danger or hazard in the use or misuse of such product, where a
proximate cause of the injury, death or damage was an alteration
or modification of such product made under all of the following
circumstances:
(1) The alteration or modification was made subsequent to the
manufacture, assembly or sale of the product;
(2) The alteration or modification altered or modified the purpose, use, function, design or manner of use of the product from
that originally designed, tested or intended by the manufacturer,
assembler or seller; and
(3) It was not foreseeable by the manufacturer assembler or
seller of the product that the alteration or modification would be
made, and, ifmade, that it would render the product unsafe.34
337. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h-r (West Supp. 1988).
338. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-9 to -10 (1987).
339. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-101 to -108 (1980). The "Tennessee Products Liability
Act of 1978" provides that "[i]f a product is not unreasonably dangerous at the time it leaves
the control of the manufacturer or seller but was made unreasonably dangerous by subsequent
unforeseeable alteration, change, improper maintenance or abnormal use, the manufacturer or
seller is not liable." Id. § 29-28-108 (emphasis added). This statute appears to absolve manufacturers of liability only in cases where they sold a non-defective product which was made
defective by a "subsequent unforeseeable alteration." It does not, however, account for the
situation where a product may have been sold with a defect, yet the accident would not have
occurred but for the "unforeseeable" alteration. Even the defect-proximate cause approach
allows the manufacturer to be absolved of liability under such circumstances where the alteration supersedes the defect as the sole proximate cause of the accident.
340. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572p(a) (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
341. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-10 (1987) (emphasis added). This statute appears to have modified pre-existing South Dakota common law, which utilized the defect-proximate cause approach. See, e.g., Zacher v. Budd Co., 396 N.W.2d 122, 134-40 (S.D. 1986)
(applying South Dakota common law since plaintiff's cause of action arose prior to the effective date of the statute).
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Under these statutes, a court will absolve a manufacturer of a
duty, as a matter of law, only where its product undergoes an unforeseeable material alteration that is causally related to the accident. The manufacturer would not be absolved of a duty, however,
where the subsequent alteration was somehow "foreseeable."
While this approach appears to allow courts to adjudicate the
duty issue, it is, in reality, allowing only an adjudication of the foreseeability issue. If, for example, the court determines that the manufacturer should have foreseen the type of alteration that occurred,
then the case will proceed to the jury on the issues of defect (in
original design) and proximate cause.342 The court may, at its op43
tion, allow the foreseeability issue to proceed to the jury as well.
One should always bear in mind that "foreseeability" is a relative
concept that is factually based. Courts are generally reluctant to adjudicate foreseeability as a matter of law, and will do so only where
there is no room for a difference of opinion.344
The duty-foreseeability approach is, therefore, merely a slight
variant of the defect-proximate cause approach. It allows courts to
impose upon manufacturers a duty to foresee subsequent material
alterations in their products.345 The only difference between the two
approaches is that courts utilizing the duty-foreseeability approach
will take "first crack" at adjudicating the foreseeability issue before
allowing it to proceed to the jury as a question of fact. 4" In contrast,
courts that adhere to the defect-proximate cause approach will almost always decline to adjudicate "foreseeability" as a matter of
law. Thus, while courts utilizing this approach tend to resolve more
alteration cases as a matter of law than their defect-proximate cause
342.

See Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986) (en banc),

discussed infra notes 370-93 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 335 (discussing Merriweather and Eck).
344. See supra note 335 (discussing Merriweatherand Eck). In Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 665 P.2d 947, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1983), the court actually went so
far as to hold that a telephone company could be deemed negligent or strictly liable for con-

structing a telephone booth and placing it on a street corner, in light of the "foreseeability"
that a speeding intoxicated driver would careen off the road and injure persons inside the

booth. Id. at 58-59, 665 P.2d at 952, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 862. The Bigbee decision is a favorite
among tort reform advocates, as it presents a prime illustration of the extremes to which some

courts will go to designate the manufacturer as an insurer of its product.
345. In fact, one court has stated that the broadening of the material alteration defense
by the elimination of foreseeability "is inconsistent with the concept of the manufacturer as

the guarantor of his product ....
" See Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, 46 (3d
Cir. 1980).

346. See Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., discussed infra notes 370-93 and accompanying text.
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counterparts, this approach is similarly flawed because foreseeability
should play no role in the adjudication of alteration cases. The use of
a foreseeability standard in defining the manufacturer's duty in such
cases is not only unfair, but produces unpredictable results.
A.

An Illustration of the Approach

A comparison of two cases decided by the Minnesota Supreme
Court illustrates the shortcomings of the duty-foreseeability
approach.
1. Westerberg v. School District No. 792:311 The "Unforeseeable" Alteration.- The defendant in Westerberg manufactured a
laundry extractor which was purchased for use in the laundry room
of a high school. 348 The extractor consisted of a rotating basket balanced on a weighted bottom.3" 9 Its function was to extract water by
centifugal force from clothes placed in the basket.3 50 At top speed,
3 51
the basket spun at a rate of 1,725 revolutions per minute.
As originally designed and sold, the extractor had two separate
safety features. 52 The first safety feature consisted of an electrical
interlock which prevented the operator from moving the starting
lever into the "on" position (allowing the basket to spin) when the
top cover of the machine was open. 353 Once the cycle had begun,
however, a second "mechanical" safety feature prevented the operator from lifting the cover while the basket was spinning. 3 " This
mechanical feature consisted of a cable attached to a ball joint on
the hinge of the cover and to a safety lever on the inside of the machine.3 55 This feature prevented the operator from opening the cover
more than three-fourths of an inch to one inch, even after the power
was cut off to the machine, until the basket had completely stopped
spinning.3581
The extractor was also sold with maintenance instructions, and
it was the purchaser's responsibility to maintain the product in its
347.
348.
349.

276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d 312 (1967).
Id. at 2-3, 148 N.W.2d at 313.
Id. at 3, 148 N.W.2d at 313.

350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353.

Id. at 3, 148 N.W.2d at at 313-14.

354.

Id. at 3, 148 N.W.2d at 314.

355.

Id. at 3-4, 148 N.W.2d at 314.

356.

Id. at 4, 148 N.W.2d at 314.
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condition as designed.3 57 One to two years after sale, however, a custodian of the school discovered that the ball joint connecting the
safety lever cable to the cover had broken.3a5 This permitted the
cover to be opened while the basket was spinning.359 The custodian
proceeded to weld the ball joint, and subsequently installed a new
one.360 Four years later, the new ball joint broke, resulting in serious
injury to a student when he raised the cover of the extractor and
caught his arm in the spinning basket.361
The plaintiff's claim against the manufacturer was predicated
362
upon theories of negligent design and negligent failure to warn.
Specifically, plaintiff argued that given the foreseeability that the
ball joint would be broken through improper maintenance by the
school, the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the dangers that
would be attendant to using the extractor without the ball joint
safety feature.363 The jury found that while the extractor was not
negligently designed, the manufacturer had breached its duty to
warn of the dangers of the machine as altered.3 " The manufacturer
was denied a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and appealed.36 5
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the manufacturer should have been absolved of a duty to warn as a matter of
law. 86 The court reasoned that the extractor was properly designed
with safety features, and that the school district was responsible for
357. Id. at it,148 N.W.2d at 318.
358. Id. at 4, 148 N.W.2d at 314.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 5, 148 N.W.2d at 314.
362. Id. at 5, 148 N.W.2d at 315.
363.

Id. at 5-11, 148 N.W.2d at 315-18. Plaintiff's expert opined, inter alia, that the

manufacturer should have warned of the dangers that would exist if its maintenance instructions were not followed. Id. at 6, 148 N.W.2d at 315. The court noted that "[w]hile we seri-

ously doubt that this was a matter for expert opinion, even if it was, we think it goes too far."
Id.
364. Id. at 5, 148 N.W.2d at 315.
365. Id. at 2, 148 N.W.2d at 313.
366. Id. at 11, 148 N.W.2d at 318. The court utilized the duty-foreseeability approach,
and reasoned that the manufacturer's duty to warn in this case "rests on foreseeability." Id. at
9, 148 N.W.2d at 317. The court reasoned, however, that:

[i]f the chattel is safe when sold, a manufacturer is not required to anticipate or
foresee that a user will alter its condition so as to make it dangerous, or that he will

continue to use it after it becomes dangerous due to alteration in safety devices
intended to protect the user from harm.
Id. at 10, 148 N.W.2d at 317. Thus, the court imposed a rational limitation on the intent to
which foreseeability should apply.
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maintaining them in that condition. 87 The court further reasoned
that the school district's improper maintenance of the ball joint
safety feature, and its negligence in permitting the use of the extractor after the ball joint had broken, altered the extractor from its
condition as designed and sold.3 68 The court concluded that the
school district's alteration was not foreseeable to the manufacturer
and hence, the manufacturer had no duty to warn of the unforeseeable risk that the product would be used without its safety feature. 69
While this decision is correct in its result, it is fatally flawed in
its use of a foreseeability standard in evaluating the manufacturer's
duty with respect to product alteration. The fact that the alteration
was found to be unforeseeable was fortuitous. Under a foreseeability
standard, the court could just as easily have found the school district's material alteration to be "foreseeable", thereby imposing a
duty to design the extractor to be "alter-proof" and "accidentproof."
2. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Machine Co.: 370 The "Foreseeable"
Alteration.- The more recent Germann case presents a prime example of the dangers of using a "foreseeability" standard. Under
facts strikingly similar to those of Westerberg, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Germann opted to impose upon the manufacturer a
duty to warn of the dangers attendant to using the product in an
37
altered condition. 1
The manufacturer in Germann designed a programmable hydraulic press with a "removable" safety bar.37 2 When properly attached to the press, the safety bar would protect the operator from
coming in contact with the "pinch point" between the moving and
stationary parts of the press. 7 Because the safety bar was designed
to be placed between the moving and stationary parts, it had to be
removable so as to permit access to the press for maintenance and
3 4 There was no evidence that the safety bar
repairY.
was designed for
367. Id. at 11, 148 N.W.2d at 318.
368. Id.
369. Id. The court stated that while "[i]t is difficult to know where to draw the line on a
manufacturer's liability... [w]e think this case lies outside the area where liability exists." Id.
Thus, the court declined to adjudicate the alteration question from a defect-proximate cause
standpoint, and concluded that "[h]ere we are convinced there was no duty to warn of a use
[alteration] that could not be foreseen by the manufacturer .... " Id.
370. 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986) (en banc).
371. Id. at 925.
372. Id. at 923.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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the purpose of being removed for any reason other than to effect
servicing and maintenance of the press.
More than six years prior to the accident, the manufacturer sold
the press, unassembled, to the plaintiff's employer.37 5 Included with
the parts were instructions for assembly and maintenance.37 6 The
employer properly assembled the press with the safety bar attached,
and had temporarily removed it, for maintenance purposes, on only
one or two occasions.3 There was undisputed evidence, however,
that at some later point the safety bar had been permanently removed from the press by the employer, and was not in place at the
time of the accident.37 8 As a result, the plaintiff sustained severe injuries while operating the press when his left leg became caught in
the pinch point of the press. 79
The plaintiff commenced a strict products liability action
against the manufacturer of the press, alleging that the press was
defective in design and that the manufacturer failed to adequately
warn of the dangers of operating the press without the safety bar
attached.38 0 In fact, plaintiff testified that he had never even seen the
safety bar and did not learn of its existence until after the accident
occurred. 38 ' The manufacturer impleaded the employer in a third38
party action for contribution and indemnity.
The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff.383 The jury found that while the press was not defective in
design, it was defective because of the manufacturer's failure "to
provide adequate warnings for the safe use of the product. ' 38 4 The
manufacturer unsuccessfully moved for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and appealed, 8 5 relying on the court's decision in Westerberg.The manufacturer asserted that it had no duty to warn of an
unsafe condition attendant to the use of the press as altered when it
375. Id.
376.

Id.

377. Id.
378.

Id. at 923-24. In fact, the usual operator of the machine testified that the safety

bar had not been attached for months prior to the date of the accident. Id. at 924 n.2.
379.

Id. at 923.

380. Id. at 924.
381.

Id. at 924 n.2.

382. Id. at 924.
383. Id. The jury entered judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $100,000, and apportioned liability equally between the defendant manufacturer and the third-party defendant

employer. Id. at 924 n.3.
384.
385.

Id. at 924.
Id.
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did, in fact, equip the press with a safety bar which, if properly
maintained, would clearly have prevented the accident. 86 Conversely, the plaintiff asserted that because the press was designed
with a removable safety feature, the risk that a third-party might
permanently remove it was foreseeable to the manufacturer.3 87 Thus,
the manufacturer should "have warned operators, by the attachment
of a warning decal or by other appropriate means, that for the safe
operation of the machine, the safety bar should be properly installed
13 88
and functional.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, utilizing the duty-foreseeability
approach, stated that the threshold question of whether a duty to
warn should exist in this case "is a question of law for the court not one for jury resolution." 389 The court resolved this question by
use of a foreseeability standard. On the basis of the facts presented,
the court upheld the jury's verdict, reasoning that because the safety
bar had to be attached by the purchaser, and was designed to be
removed for maintenance purposes, the employer's failure to reattach it was foreseeable. 390 The court declined to follow Westerberg,
and concluded that the foreseeability of the employer's conduct gave
rise to a duty, on the part of the manufacturer, to warn operators of
the risks of using the press with the bar unattached.391
The court distinguished its decision in Westerberg solely on
foreseeability grounds. Its comparison of the facts of Germann to
those of Westerberg strike at the core of the duty-foreseeability approach. The court stated, for example, that:
In some respects the facts in Westerberg are indistinguishable from
those in the case at bar. Each case involves injury arising from the
use of a machine approximately six years old. Each machine was
heavily used. Both accidents occurred as a result of faulty maintenance by the purchaser-owner-employer which caused designed
safety mechanisms in each machine to fail. However, in our opinion, a distinguishing fact of significance exists. The safety lid device.., in Westerberg was installed by the manufacturer in such a
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. The court relied on Dean Green's theory of the "duty" concept, and distinguished the legal question of duty from factual questions of breach of duty and causation,
which should be determined by the jury. Id. at 924-25; see also Green, Foreseeabilityin Neglgence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1408 (1961); Green, supra note 255, at 45.
390. 395 N.W.2d at 925.
391. Id.
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manner [that] it was only remotely foreseeable that the safety feature would be altered ....To the contrary, in the case at bar, the
safety bar was designed to be attached by the purchaser ... [and]
was detachable as the result of the machine's design. In fact, it had

to be detached in order that the press might be serviced. Knowing
that, [the manufacturer] could have reasonably foreseen that on a
machine designed for extended and heavy use, it was almost inevi-

table that for maintenance purposes the safety bar would be removed, and that there was a risk it might not be properly
reattached. 92
The court imposed a duty in Germann because the employer's permanent removal of the safety feature was "more foreseeable" than
the alteration in Westerberg. In fact, the Germann court found the
employer's conduct so foreseeable that it did not even characterize it
as an alteration.3 93
The decisions in Westerberg and Germann illustrate both the
shortcomings and the unpredictability of the "duty-foreseeability"
approach. In both cases, it is clear that the employer's conduct altered the products from their condition as designed and sold. It is
also clear that the accidents would not have occurred had the products not been altered. While the Minnesota Supreme Court set out
to adjudicate the manufacturer's duty (Step One), it failed to depart
from a foreseeability standard (Step Two). As a result, these cases
were decided on the basis of the degree of the alteration's foreseeability, when they should have been decided under the rationale that
a manufacturer should owe no duty to foresee subsequent
alterations.
B. The Germann CharacterizationQuestion: Is the Permanent
Removal of a Safety Feature Designed to be Temporarily
Removed a "Misuse" or an "Alteration"?
The Germann decision is of particular significance because it
illustrates another serious problem with the duty-foreseeability approach. Courts utilizing a foreseeability standard have lost sight of
the "duty"9 distinctions between product "alteration" and product
"misuse." ' These courts, while recognizing at least the conceptual
distinctions, incorrectly apply foreseeability to both types of con392. Id.
393. See infra notes 394-405 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 54-58, 224-52 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
demonstrate the forseeability approach).
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duct.39 5 It is particularly troubling that the use of foreseeability has
impaired the ability of some courts to even recognize the conceptual
distinctions. 96 This is precisely what occured in Germann. The
Germann court failed to recognize that the employer's permanent removal of the safety bar altered the product from its condition as
designed. Instead, the court focused on the foreseeability of the
safety bar's permanent removal and mischaracterized it as a "misuse."397 The potential for such mischaracterization is inherent in the
use of the duty-foreseeability approach, and warrants careful
analysis.
Germann was not a typical removability case. Most removability cases involve safety features that can physically be removed, yet
were not designed to be removed. 98 These types of cases clearly involve alterations, where the issue becomes one of degree; that is,
whether or not the removal of the safety feature that was easy to
remove should constitute a "material" alteration.3 99 In contrast,
Germann involved a safety feature that was not merely easy to remove, but was purposefully designed to be removed, albeit temporarily, to effectuate maintenance and servicing of the machine. 00 The
court was, therefore, confronted with the "characterization" question
of whether the employer's permanent removal of the safety bar,
which was designed for the purpose of being temporarily removed,
should be deemed an "alteration" or a "misuse." What clouded the
court's resolution of this question was the fact that the "foreseeability" element in the case was greater than in the typical "removabil395. See supra notes 50-53, 216-242 and accompanying text (discussing cases that incorrectly apply the foreseeability standard to both product alteration and product misuse).
396. See, e.g., Miller v. Anetsberger Bros., 124 A.D.2d 1057, 508 N.Y.S.2d 954 (4th
Dep't 1986), discussed infra notes 424-49 and accompanying text.
397. 395 N.W.2d at 925.
398. See, e.g., Augenstine v. Dico Co., 135 I11.App. 3d 273, 481 N.E.2d 1225 (1985)
(plaintiff's employer replaced a non-conductive remote control on a boom-type crane with a
conductive remote control, causing plaintiff to be electrocuted); DeArmond v. Hoover Ball &
Bearing, 86 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 408 N.E.2d 771 (1980) (plaintiff's employer removed a safety
guard with interlocks on a bottle molding and trimming machine, which was designed to remain in place to prevent the operator's hands from entering its "point of operation"); Lovelace
v. Ametek, Inc., 111 A.D.2d 953, 490 N.Y.S.2d 49 (3d Dep't 1985) (third party removed
safety devices that were designed to prevent the operator from coming into contact with the
machine during operation), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); cf. Lopez v. Precision Papers,
Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 871, 492 N.E.2d 1214, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1986) (finding that the product
was purposefully designed to permit removal of the guard for the product's operation), discussed infra notes 573-609 and accompanying text.
399. See cases cited supra note 398.
400. 395 N.W.2d at 923, 925.
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ity" case. It may be moderately foreseeable that a third party may
consciously remove a safety feature that is somehow "removable,"
yet was not designed to be removed."' It is far more foreseeable,
however, that once a third party properly removes a temporarily removable safety feature to effectuate maintenance, the safety feature
may not be reattached as intended for the machine's safe
operation.4 02
By utilizing the duty-foreseeability approach, the Germann
court imposed upon the manufacturer a duty to warn press operators, based on the foreseeability that the safety bar would be removed.4 0 3 The court went further, however, and actually mischaracterized the employer's conduct as a "misuse. 40 4 Interestingly,
the court never even discussed the characterization question because
it decided the case solely on the basis of foreseeability. 0 5 The characterization of the employer's conduct as a "misuse" served only as a
vehicle for achieving the desired result.
The court's reasoning is characteristic of the duty-foreseeability
approach. By using foreseeability, the court isolated one aspect of a
multi-faceted design in a vacuum, focusing only upon the removability aspect of the safety bar's design. On that basis alone, it impliedly
concluded that if the bar was designed to be removed to effectuate
maintenance, and was so removed, the failure of the employer to
reattach it did not effectuate a change in the product as designed.
The product cannot, therefore, be said to have been altered from its
original condition. This reasoning completely disregarded a crucial
aspect of the design - that the press was to be operated only with
40 6
the safety bar attached.
401. Even those courts that utilize a foreseeability standard in "removability" cases have
required that plaintiff prove that the removal of the safety features was more than "moderately" foreseeable, but was "reasonably foreseeable." See cases cited supra note 398. These

courts have granted summary judgments or directed verdicts in favor of the manufacturer
where the foreseeability of removal was too remote as a matter of law. See cases cited supra
note 398.
402. See 395 N.W.2d at 925.
403. Id.
404. Id. The court stated that the employer's permanent removal of the safety bar constituted a "misuse [that] was foreseeable; it was not remote; and the danger of injury to a user
because of the misuse was likewise foreseeable." Id.
405. See id.

406. Id. at 923. The record indicated that "[a]s part of the assembly, a safety bar
needed to be attached to the machine ... [but] it had to be removed in order to permit access
to the machine for maintenance and repair." Id. (emphasis added). The record was devoid of
evidence that the press was purposefully designed to permit removal of the safety bar during
its operation. Indeed, plaintiff had to proceed on a limited theory that the manufacturer in-
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It is significant that the court itself acknowledged that the press
was not defective in design, despite the temporary removability of
the safety bar and the foreseeability that it may be permanently removed. 0 Indeed, the court stated "[t]he manufacturer properly
designed an industrial hydraulic press by equipping it with safety
devices. Had those devices as designed been properly attached to the
hydraulic press, an
operator of the machine would not have sus' 40
tained an injury.
The court further acknowledged that the permanent removal of
the safety bar exposed the operator to an "increased danger of injury
of the type the safety bar had been designed to prevent. '40 9 Thus,
one becomes hard-pressed to ascertain why the court concluded that
the permanent removal of the bar did not alter it from its condition
as designed. If a product is designed to be operated with a safety
feature, then the fact that the feature is "temporarily" removable for
an unrelated purpose does not render its permanent removal any less
an alteration than the removal of a so-called "permanent" feature.
In both instances, an integral aspect of the product's design is that
the product is to be operated only with the safety feature attached.
There exists no qualitative difference between the removal of a "permanent" guard and the permanent removal of a temporarily removable guard. Both should be characterized as alterations. The only difference may lie in the degree, or "materiality," of the alteration.
The permanent removal of the safety bar in Germann materially
altered the press from its condition as designed. Even under Soler
standards, the employer's conduct effectuated "not only a material
change in the design or function of the product, but also affect[ed]
the risk of danger in its use." 10 Furthermore, the plaintiff was injured while operatingthe press and not while servicing it.4" The actended removal of the bar during maintenance, and should have foreseen its permanent re-

moval during operation. Id. at 924.
407.

Id. at 923. This finding was also made by the jury at the conclusion of the trial. Id.

at 924.
408. Id. at 923 (emphasis added).
409. Id. at 925 (emphasis added).
410. Soler v. Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 148, 484 A.2d 1225, 123031 (1984), discussed supra note 104 and accompanying text.
411. If the accident had occurred while plaintiff was performing maintenance of the
press, rather than operating it, the manufacturer would have been hard-pressed, under a "foresecability" standard, to assert an alteration defense. See Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d
21, 22-24 (8th Cir. 1980). This results from the fact that the bar, which was designed to be
removed during maintenance, would have been removed as intended by its design even if the

employer had properly maintained it in place during operation. Hence, the employer's perma-
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cident would not have occurred had the press remained in its condition as designed.4 12
It is also important to note that like the press in Westerberg, the
press in Germann was sold unassembled, with adequate instructions
for its assembly.4 13 The purchaser was therefore delegated the responsibility of assembling the product in conformity with its design.4 14 The safety bar, while "removable," was a component of the
4 15
press, and the employer had a duty to attach it during assembly.
The court acknowledged that neither the "removability" of the
safety bar, nor the unassembled condition of the press as sold, rendered the product defective in design. 41 6' Given the employer's duty
to properly assemble the press, its conscious failure to attach the bar
during initial assembly would clearly have been deemed an alteration. This is because the press was designed with a safety feature to
be attached and maintained during its operation. The absence of the
bar would alter the design of the press and profoundly effect its safe
operation. If the employer's initial failure to attach the bar would
constitute an alteration, why then should a different conclusion be
reached where the employer initially attaches it, yet later decides to
permanently remove it knowing full well that it is crucial to the safe
operation of the press? Such a distinction would defy logic.
The reasoning of Germann illustrates the inability of courts
nent removal (alteration) would not be causally related to the accident. See, e.g., Briney v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 782 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1986); Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc, 67
N.Y.2d 871, 492 N.E.2d 1214, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1986), discussed infra notes 573-609 and

accompanying text. The court in Briney held that since the manufacturer of a power saw
designed its safety guard to be removable for the purpose of performing some cuts, then a user

that removed it to perform an unusual cut (with which the guard interfered) cannot be said to
have "altered" the saw. 782 F.2d at 588-90. Similarly, the Lopez court found that since the
forklift manufacturer designed its safety features to be removable for "operational" or "use"

purposes, then its subsequent removal for that purpose cannot constitute an alteration. 67
N.Y.2d 871, 492 N.E.2d 1214, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798. In both Briney and Lopez, the manufactur-

ers were found to have designed the safety features to be removed during operation of the
products, and the plaintiffs were injured while operating them. The facts of Germann, how-

ever, do not fall within the scope of Briney and Lopez because (I) the manufacturer designed
its safety bar for removal only during maintenance, (2) the employer permanently removed it
and allowed the operation of the press without the bar (which was outside the scope of the

manufacturer's design), and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result of operating the press
without the bar. For a comparison of Lopez and Germann, see infra notes of 606-09 and
accompanying text.
412. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
413. 395 N.W.2d 922, 923 (Minn. 1986) (en banc).
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. See supra notes 407-08 and accompanying text.
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utilizing the duty-foreseeability approach not only to recognize the
qualitative "duty" distinctions between product misuse and product
alteration, but to even recognize the conceptual distinctions between
the two. The ease of disabling a safety feature, and the foreseeability
of it occurring, are not relevant in ascertaining whether a product
has been altered. These factors may be relevant only in determining
whether the alteration was "material." The use of a foreseeability
standard makes it all too easy for duty-foreseeability courts to confuse the question of "materiality" with the initial question of
whether the product was "altered" from its condition as designed
and sold.
C.

The Role of Warnings Under the "Duty-Foreseeability"
Approach

The preceding discussions have shown that in the alteration context, plaintiffs will often assert alternative theories of design defect
and failure to warn. The plaintiff will contend that even if the product is not defective in design under a "foreseeability" standard, the
ease of altering the product and the foreseeability of the alteration
should give rise to a duty to warn of the risks attendant to the product as materially altered. Courts should be wary of such claims. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A recognizes that the imposition of strict products liability should be limited to cases where
the product "is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold."' 1
This limitation applies to design and warning cases alike. 18
It is fundamental that a manufacturer does not have the duty to
warn with respect to a product that is not dangerous as designed and
sold.4' 9 In many alteration cases, the product is not dangerous as
417. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(b) (1965).
418. See, e.g., Hansen v. Honda Motor Co., 104 A.D.2d 850, 480 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d
Dep't 1986), discussed infra notes 454-62 and accompanying text. A number of states have
enacted statutes to limit the manufacturer's duty in alteration cases, irrespective of the products liability theory asserted by a plaintiff. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.320 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-04
(Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-5 (1987) (declared unconstitutional in Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), because the legislation's statute of repose,
id. § 78-15-3, which could not be severed from the remaining statutory provisions, was held
violative of constitutional provision guaranteeing access to the courts).
419. See Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 8, 148 N.W.2d 312, 316
(1967). A comprehensive analysis of the factors relevant in determining a manufacturer's duty
to warn can be found in Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378
(1984),
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originally designed and becomes dangerous only through the material alteration of a third party. While most courts impose a duty to
warn with respect to risks attendant to foreseeable misuses of the
product,420 this rule cannot be applied rationally in cases where the
product is altered. For reasons previously discussed, an alteration
differs qualitatively from a misuse.421 Foreseeability principles
should not apply in alteration cases, regardless of the theory propounded by the plaintiff. When the product as altered contained
risks that did not inhere in the product as originally designed and
sold, the proper approach is to hold that such risks are not within the
ambit of a manufacturer's responsibility.
As illustrated by Germann, however, "duty-foreseeability"
courts have improperly imposed upon manufacturers the duty to
warn of the dangers of using a product in a materially altered
form.422 In fact, even some courts and statutes that adopt a "noduty" approach to alterations under a design defect theory, have
adopted a "duty-foreseeability" approach with respect to a warning
case.423 The courts appear to distinguish a warning case from a design case, reasoning that while "foreseeability" should not be used as
a design criteria, it should be used as a standard giving rise to a duty
to warn.
The case of Miller v. Anetsberger Bros.424 is illustrative. The
plaintiff in Miller was injured when her finger became caught between the rollers of a pizza dough rolling machine.425 As manufactured and sold by the defendant, the machine contained three protective panels. 426 These panels were designed to be removable in order
to permit access to the rollers during cleaning.427 Each panel was
designed with a safety interlock switch that would cause a break in
the electrical current to the machine when the panel was removed.428
Thus, as originally designed, the machine's safety interlock pre420.
421.

See cases cited supra note 226.
See supra notes 224-52 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between

product alteration and product misuse).
422.

See supra notes 370-93 and accompanying text (using Germann to illustrate the

shortcomings of the foreseeability standard).
423. See Miller v. Anetsberger Bros., 124 A.D.2d 1057, 508 N.Y.S.2d 954 (4th Dep't
1986); IDAHO CODE § 6-1405(4) (Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.915 (Supp. 1987); see

also

MODEL UNIFORM PRODUcTS LIABILITY

424.
425.
426.

AcT § 112(D) (1979).

124 A.D.2d 1057, 508 N.Y.S.2d 954 (4th Dep't 1986).
Id. at 1058, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
Id.

427. Id.
428.

Id.
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vented the rollers from operating during the cleaning process."2
Some time after the machine had left the manufacturer's hands,
the safety switch was disabled, probably by an employee of the purchaser.4 30 This was effectuated by depressing the pin and moving it
laterally so that it was held in a depressed position.4 3 1 At the time of
the incident, the plaintiff had been cleaning the rollers by reaching
her hand through the front panel.43 2 The plaintiff then activated the
machine, and her finger became caught between the moving
rollers.4 3
Plaintiff brought a strict products liability action against the
manufacturer on theories of design defect and failure to warn. 34
The trial judge instructed the jury that if it were to find that the
employee intentionally disabled the safety switch, then it would have
to find that the machine was not defectively designed. 3 5 On the failure to warn theory, however, the judge instructed the jury that it
may consider, in imposing a duty to warn "[1] the convenience afforded by cleaning the machine while it was operating, [2] [the]
knowledge [that] the manufacturer may have had that users of the
machine had cleaned it while it was operating, and [3] the 'ease of
disabling the safety switch.' ,436 The court, therefore, invited the
jury to impose upon the manufacturer the duty to warn because of
the foreseeability that the safety feature would be intentionally disabled. The jury accepted this invitation and returned a verdict for
the plaintiff.4 37 The jury found that while the machine was not defective in design, the manufacturer failed to warn users of the dangers of cleaning the machine while it was operating.
On appeal, the manufacturer asserted that it should be absolved
of a duty under the Robinson rule because the employee's deliberate
disabling of the safety switch materially altered the machine.4 3 9 The
court held, however, that:
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434,
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
Robinson

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the trial judge's charge to the jury).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1058-59, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 955-56. For a comprehensive discussion of the
rule, see infra notes 466-674 and accompanying text.
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[a]Ithough any modification that affects a safety device and is the
proximate cause of the injury is a "material" alteration, here the
machine had not been modified or altered. There was no change
made by cutting a hole in the safety gate, by cutting bolts which
held a safety guard over the feeding mechanism, or even by forcibly bending a safety pin out of shape. Here the safety interlock was
simply avoided by a slight change in its position.
Moreover, unlike in Robinson, the issue involved is not
whether the product was defectively designed, but whether the
manufacturer had a duty to warn. Although a manufacturer is
under no duty to design a product so that its safety devices may

not be disabled, it may, under certain circumstances, be liablefor
of using the machine when the
failing to warn of the consequences
440
safety devices are inoperative.

Thus, given the ease of avoiding the safety interlock, the manufacturer's knowledge that users were cleaning the machine while it was
operating, and the convenience of doing so, the jury was entitled to
find that the manufacturer had a duty to warn users "of dangers
inherent in its use or foreseeable misuse."441 The jury was also entitled to find that it breached this duty by failing to "attach appropriate warnings. 442
The Miller court's reasoning in imposing a duty to warn is
flawed in two regards. First, like the court in Germann, the Miller
court did not distinguish between product misuse and product alteration. The court mischaracterized the disabling of the interlock as a
"misuse" when it was clearly an alteration. 443 To reach this conclusion, the court distinguished the Robinson, Garcia,and Kinter cases,
440. 124 A.D.2d at 1059, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 956 (contrasting the facts of Miller from
those of Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d
440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980), Garcia v. Biro Mfg. Co., 101 A.D.2d 779, 475 N.Y.S.2d 863
(1st Dep't 1984), Kinter v. Emhart Corp., 99 A.D.2d 689 (4th Dep't 1984)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
441. Id. The court relied upon §§ 388 and 394 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
see 124 A.D.2d at 1059, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 956, which sets forth the duty to warn under a
negligence standard. Such a standard of that which the manufacturer "knew or should have
known" is inappropriate in a strict products liability action in which the court focuses on the
product itself, rather than the manufacturer's conduct. See Gallub, supra note 224, at 110208.
442. 124 A.D.2d at 1059, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 956. It should be noted that Miller is not a
"continuing duty to warn" case. Such cases involve a post-sale duty to warn, based upon
knowledge acquired by the manufacturer subsequent to the design and sale of the product. See
Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 275, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 385 (1984).
The Miller court, on the other hand, imposed a "pre-sale" duty to "attach appropriate warnings," based on the foreseeability that a safety device would be disabled.
443. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
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which involved "material" alterations wherein the safety features
were difficult to obviate. 44 The distinguishing characteristic in
Miller was the fact that the safety interlock was "simply avoided by
a slight change in its position."' 445 In so doing, the court mistakenly
equated the question of "materiality" with the threshold question of
what constitutes an "alteration." The fact that the safety feature in
Miller was easier to disable than those in other cases does not justify
a conclusion that the product was not altered. The critical fact in all
of these cases is that the products were designed and sold with safety
features that would have prevented the accident, and that third parties subsequently disabled or removed the safety features. The disabling of the safety features qualitatively altered the products from
their condition as designed. Thus, the disabling of the safety switch
in Miller was clearly an alteration. The Miller court's mischaracterization is similar to that of the Germann court, and is typical of the
use of the "duty-foreseeability" approach under any theory. The ease
by which safety features could be disabled should reflect only on the
degree, or "materiality", of the alteration. 46
The second problem, and one which transcends the characterization question, is the court's imposition of a duty to warn. The
court held that although the manufacturer does not have a duty to
design a product that cannot be altered, it may have a duty to warn
users of the dangers attendant to the product in its altered condition.447 In so doing, the court created an illogical exception to the
no-duty approach utilized by New York courts in adjudicating material alteration cases based on design defect. 48 Under the court's reasoning, foreseeability principles which would be inapplicable in design cases should apply in warning cases where the product was
altered.,49
The products liability statutes of Idaho and Oregon, as well as
MUPLA 4 50 utilize a similar "duty-foreseeability" rule with respect
444.

See supra text accompanying note 440.

445. See supra text accompanying note 440.
446.

See supra notes 394-416 and accompanying text.

447.

124 A.D.2d at 1059, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 956 (emphasis added).

448.

See infra notes 463-674 and accompanying text (discussing the New York Robin-

son approach).
449. See supra notes 434-36 and accompanying text. The court upheld the trial judge's

jury instructions which would absolve the manufacturer of a duty with respect to the design
defect claim, but would allow the jury to impose liability with respect to the failure to warn
claim. 124 A.D.2d at 1059, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 956.

450. See supra note 423.
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to warning cases. For example, the Oregon statute provides:
Defenses. It shall be a defense to a product liability civil action
that an alteration or modification of a product occurred under the
following circumstances:
(1) The alteration or modification was made without the consent of or was made not in accordance with the instructions or
specifications of the manufacturer, distributor, seller or lessor;
(2) The alteration or modification was a substantial contributing factor to the personal injury, death or property damage; and
(3) If the alteration or modification was reasonablyforeseeable, the manufacturer,distributor,seller or lessor gave adequate
45
warning. '
By its terms, the Oregon statute precludes the use of foreseeability
principles in design cases, yet allows their use in warning cases. 52
Like the conclusion of the Miller court, the statute imposes upon
manufacturers a duty to warn with respect to "reasonably foreseeOR. REV. STAT. § 30.915 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
See id. Alternatively, the Idaho statute provides:
When the product seller proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an
alteration or modification of the product by the claimant, or by a party other than
the claimant or the product seller has proximately caused the claimant's harm, the
claimant's damages shall be subject to reduction or apportionment to the extent that
the alteration or modification was a proximate cause of the harm.
This subsection shall not be applicable if:
1. The alteration or modification was in accord with the product seller's instructions or specifications;
2. The alteration or modification was made with the express or implied consent of
the product seller; or
3. The alteration or modification was reasonably anticipated conduct, and the
product was defective because of the product seller's failure to provide adequate
warnings or instructions with respect to the alteration or modification.
IDAHO CODE § 6-1405(5) (Supp. 1987). By its terms, the statute absolves the manufacturer of
liability for that percentage of plaintiff's injuries for which the alteration was a proximate
cause, irrespective of whether the alteration was foreseeable. This reduction would not apply,
however, with respect to foreseeable alterations under a warnings claim. The Idaho legislature
appeared to have recognized the unfairness of using the defect-proximate cause approach in
design defect cases without, at the very least, allowing manufacturers to reduce their liability
via a damage apportionment. It failed to recognize, however, that a manufacturer should not
owe a duty with respect to any accident causally related to a material alteration, regardless of
whether the theory asserted by plaintiff sounds in design defect or failure to warn.
Interestingly, MUPLA's alteration provision is substantially similar to the Idaho statute,
but adds:
Under this Subsection, subject to state and federal law regarding immunity in tort,
the trier of fact may determine that a party or parties who altered or modified the
product and thereby caused claimant's harm should bear partial or sole responsibility for harm caused by the product and are subject to liability to the claimant.
MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 112(D)(23) (1979).
451.
452.
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able" alterations.
The Oregon approach is not the proper approach in material
alteration cases based on a failure to warn, or inadequate warning
theory. A manufacturer should not have a duty to foresee the myriad
of ways that a third party may consciously and materially alter its
product. This holds true regardless of whether the plaintiff's action
sounds in design defect or failure to warn.
In the design defect context, the imposition of a duty to foresee
material alterations would designate the manufacturer as an insurer
of its products. This is evident when analyzing such cases as Soler
and Brown, which require manufacturers to design their products to
be either (1) alter-proof or (2) accident-proof by providing back-up
safety features that would ensure the product's safety in any altered
condition. 3 The duty imposed by the Miller court and by the Oregon state legislature is similar to the duty imposed in Soler and
Brown. The warning, in effect, becomes the written equivalent of a
back-up safety feature.
The use of foreseeability principles in warning cases would produce the same irrational results as it produces in design cases. It
would also undermine the important rationales for refusing to apply
such principles in design cases. Juries would be invited to evaluate
the safety of products as originally designed by evaluating their
risks as materially altered. The manufacturer must ultimately design its products with sufficient warnings to ensure their safety not
only as designed, but as materially altered as well. This clearly contravenes the policies underlying products liability law.
In Hansen v. Honda Motor Co. 454 another New York appellate
court recognized this and refused to apply foreseeability principles. 45 5 The plaintiff in Hansen was severely injured when he fell
from his motorcycle, which was manufactured by the defendant.45 6
The plaintiff alleged that defects in the rear wheel caused him to
lose control of the motorcycle.457 It was undisputed, however, that
subsequent to his purchase of the motorcycle, plaintiff customized it
by removing the original rear wheel and replacing it with a wheel
453. See supra notes 59-184 and accompanying text (examining the defect-proximate
cause approach of Soler and Brown).
454. 104 A.D.2d 850, 480 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1984).

455. Id. at 851, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
456. Id. at 850, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
457. Id.
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manufactured by a different company for aesthetic reasons."" Plaintiff commenced a strict products liability action alleging that the
manufacturer had a duty to warn motorcycle purchasers of the risks
attendant to its alteration 5 9 The court disagreed, and granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.4 60 The court held that:
Although a manufacturer is under a duty to design and manufacture a product which is safe at the time of sale, it is not responsible
for injuries caused by subsequent modifications by another however
foreseeable such modifications may have been to the manufacturer. Thus, we perceive no duty on the part of the manufacturer
. . . to have warned plaintiff purchaser of the dangers attendant
upon alteration or modification of the motorcycle."6
The reasoning of the Hansen court represents a fair and rational
limitation on a manufacturer's duty with regard to subsequent material alterations.4 62 The no-duty rule should apply regardless of
whether the theory of liability is design defect or failure to warn.
VII. THE DEMISE OF FORESEEABILITY UNDER NEw YORK'S
Robinson RULE: THE INTERPLAY OF STEPS Two AND THREE
The adjudication of the "duty" concept (Step One) and the
abandonment of "foreseeability" (Step Two) are essential to the formulation of a rational approach to product alterations. The defectproximate cause approach fails to take either step and, in effect, allows juries to retroactively impose absolute liability on manufacturers. 463 The duty-foreseeability approach takes the first step, and allows courts to adjudicate the manufacturer's duty as a matter of
law.464 It fails, however, to take the second step and depart from the
use of "foreseeability" as the standard for adjudicating that duty in
alteration cases.46 5 Cases like Germann and Miller illustrate that the
458. Id. at 850-51, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
459. Id. at 850, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
460. Id. at 851, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
461. Id. at 851, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
462. In a subsequent opinion, the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed Hansen's validity under the Robinson rule. See Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 579, 517
N.E.2d 1304, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987), discussed infra notes 627-74 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 59-223 and accompanying text (discussing the defect-proximate
cause approach and its failure to take the first step of the three-step approach).
464. See supra notes 334-461 and accompanying text (discussing the duty-foreseeability
approach and its ability to take Step One of the three-step approach).
465. See supra notes 334-461 and accompanying text (discussing the duty-foreseeability
approach and its failure to take Step Two of the three-step approach).
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use of a foreseeability standard virtually renders the court's adjudication of the "duty" concept a nullity.
In the landmark case of Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of
Package Machine Co.,466 the New York Court of Appeals recognized this difficulty and abolished the use of foreseeability in material alteration cases, reasoning that:
Principles of foreseeability ... are inapposite where a third party

affirmatively abuses a product by consciously bypassing built-in
safety features. While it may be foreseeable that an employer will
abuse a product to meet its own self-imposed production needs, responsibility for
that willful choice may not fall on the
4 17
manufacturer.
The Robinson court has been one of the few to recognize the
qualitative distinctions between product "alteration" and product
"misuse." It absolved the manufacturer of a duty to foresee the potential for material alterations when making a design choice. 68 The
court did not recognize, however, that absent a duty to foresee material alterations, a manufacturer cannot owe a duty with respect to
any accident causally related to a material alteration.469 While the
Robinson court took the first two steps, it did not take the third step
and sever the legal relationship between the original design and the
accident. 47 ' This was inconsistent with the rationale the court used in
abolishing foreseeability, and has also caused some confusion among
lower courts as to whether Robinson was a "no-duty" rule or merely
466. 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980). For a discussion of
Robinson, see Fischer, supra note 59, § 8.03 [4] [a], at 8-13 to -14; Suhr, Effect of User Modifications on a Manufacturer'sStrict Product Liability, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1987, at 44; Note,

supra note 3, at 432-38.
467.

49 N.Y.2d at 480, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (emphasis added).

468. Id.; see also Sage v. Fairchild-SwearingenCorp., 70 N.Y.2d 579, 517 N.E.2d
1304, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987); Magee v. E.W. Bliss Co., 120 A.D.2d 926, 927, 502
N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (4th Dep't 1986); Lovelace v. Ametek, Inc., 11l A.D.2d 953, 954-55, 490

N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (3d Dep't 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Baran v. Curtiss Wright
Corp., 115 A.D.2d 252, 253, 495 N.Y.S.2d 854, 855 (4th Dep't 1985); Hansen v. Honda
Motor Co., 104 A.D.2d 850, 851, 480 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (2d Dep't 1984); Nelson v. Garcia,
129 Misc. 2d 909, 911, 494 N.Y.S.2d 276, 278 (Sup. Ct. 1985). But cf. Landrine v. Mego

Corp., 95 A.D.2d 759, 760, 464 N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (Ist Dep't 1983) (stating that under
Robinson, "[a]ny unforeseen modification of the product after it leaves the manufacturer's
hands is not its responsibility.") (emphasis added). The Landrine court apparently misconstrued Robinson, since it contradicts the express language in Robinson absolving the manufacturer of a duty to foresee material alterations. See supra note 467 and accompanying text
(discussing Robinson's application of Step Two).

469. See infra notes 506-20 and accompanying text.
470. See infra notes 506-20 and accompanying text.
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a "modified" version of the "defect-proximate cause" approach."" A
careful analysis of the Robinson decision and its progeny will illustrate that even when a court declines to use foreseeability, the third
step is essential to a rational approach in alteration cases.
A.

The Robinson Decision Analyzed

The plaintiff in Robinson sustained severe injuries when his
hand was caught between the molds of a plastic molding machine.4 72
The machine was designed to melt pelletized plastic in a heating
chamber and to mold the liquified plastic into various shapes to be
sold as products.47 3 Its mold area was comprised of two rectangular
platens upon which the actual molds were attached. 474 One of the
platens remained stationary while the other moved horizontally back
and forth, thereby closing and opening the mold. 5 Thus, when the
operator commenced the cycle, hydraulic pressure would cause the
movable platen to meet the stationary platen, which created the
mold. 470 The liquified plastic would then be injected into the mold,
and when the plastic was cured, the movable platen would open the
mold.4 77 Once opened, the operator could manually remove the finished product.4 78
As originally designed and sold, the machine was equipped with
safety features that would prevent the operator from entering the
mold area while the machine was operating. 47 9 These features consisted of a safety gate mounted on rollers, with connecting interlocks. 480 The safety gate consisted of a plexiglass window which completely covered the mold area while allowing the operator to monitor
the molding process.48 1 The interlocks consisted of electrical circuits
that connected the safety gate to electrical switches which activate
the machine. 8 2 When the gate was closed, the interlocks completed
471.
472.

See infra notes 523-70 and accompanying text.
49 N.Y.2d 471, 476, 403 N.E.2d 440, 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (1980).

473. Id.
474.

Id.

475. Id.
476.

Id.

477.
478.
479.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 476, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19. According to the court, the

safety features met the requirements of the State Industrial Code. Id. at 476, 403 N.E.2d at
441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718.

480. Id. at 476, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
481.

Id.

482. Id. at 477, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
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an electrical circuit that allowed the machine to operate. 83 The machine could not be operated when the gate was open because the
interlocks would not be connected and, hence, the circuit would not
be complete. 84 Thus, only when the molding process was completed
could the operator roll open the safety gate and reach into the mold
area to remove the finished product. 485

The plaintiff's employer had purchased the machine six and
one-half years prior to the accident for the purpose of molding
plastic beads directly onto a nylon cord.486 The cord was stored in
spools and fed through the machine, where the beads were molded
onto it. 487 When each molding cycle was complete, the operator
would open the safety gate, pull the beaded cord out of the mold and
reset a new cord in the mold for the next cycle. 488 The employer,
however, wanted to speed up the production process by molding the
beads on a continuous line.48 9 Since the machine, as designed, did
not allow this, the employer cut a six inch by fourteen-inch hole in
the plexiglass safety gate.4 90 This allowed access to the mold area
without opening the gate and disconnecting the interlocks. 491 As altered, the string of beads could be pulled through the opening in the
gate without interrupting the production process and without breaking the continuous line of beads.492 Unfortunately, the operator's
arm could be pulled through as well. 493 Thus, "[w]hile modification
of the safety gate served [the employer's] production needs, it also
destroyed the practical utility of the safety features incorporated into
the design of the machine for it permitted access into the molding
area while the interlocking circuits were completed. 494 The plaintiff
was injured in precisely this manner,49 5 and brought suit against the
manufacturer
under theories of negligence and strict products liability. 498 The manufacturer impleaded the employer as a third-party
483.
484.
485.
486,
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.

Id. at 477, 403 N.E.2d at 441-42, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
Id. at 477, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
Id. at 476-77, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
Id. at 476-77, 403 N.E.2d at 441-42, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
Id. at 477, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 476, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718. The court noted that while
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defendant,497 and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
apportioning forty percent of the liability to the manufacturer. 98
On appeal, the manufacturer asserted that it could not be responsible since plaintiff's injuries arose not out of its product as originally designed, but out of the employer's subsequent material alteration. 99 Conversely, the plaintiff asserted that the foreseeability of
the employer's alteration should give rise to a duty to design the
machine to be alter-proof, or to be safe in its altered condition. 0
The New York Court of Appeals strongly disagreed, stating
that such a foreseeability standard "would expand the scope of a
manufacturer's duty beyond all reasonable bounds and would be tantamount to imposing absolute liability on manufacturers for all product-related injuries." °1 The court ruled that foreseeability principles
do not apply in cases where a third party materially alters a product
to suit his own subjective needs.5 °2 The court, therefore, undertook
the first two steps of the three-step approach, and adjudicated the
the record was unclear, "plaintiff's hand somehow went through the opening cut into the safety
gate and was drawn into the molding area while the interlocks were engaged." Id. at 477, 403
N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
497. New York is one of the few states that permit the defendant in a personal injury
action to implead a culpable employer as a third-party defendant. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co.,
30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972); see also supra note 19 (discussing
the states that permit a defendant in a personal injury action to implead a culpable employer).
498. 49 N.Y.2d at 476, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
499. Id. at 478, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
500. Id. at 478, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720. Apparently, there was evidence in the record indicating that the manufacturer not only could have foreseen this type of
alteration, but had actual notice that the identical alteration was performed by the employer
on two of its other machines. Id. at 477-78, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 719. The
manufacturer promptly notified the employer that these alterations did not comport with the
product's design. Id. at 478, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719. It was plaintiff's contention that:
[I]f a manufacturer knows or has reason to know that its product would be used in
an unreasonably dangerous manner, for example by cutting a hole in a legally required safety guard, it may not evade responsibility by simply maintaining that the
product was safe at the time of sale.
Id. at 478, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720 (emphasis added). The plaintiff was
therefore in effect requesting that the court categorize the employer's material alteration as a
form of product "misuse," thereby requiring foreseeability principles to apply. See id. This
contention, however, was rejected by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 479, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 720.
501. 49 N.Y.2d at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (emphasis added). The
Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed this view in Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 70
N.Y.2d 579, 517 N.E.2d 1304, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987), discussed infra notes 653-54 and
accompanying text.
502. 49 N.Y.2d at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721; see supra note 467
and accompanying text.
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manufacturer's duty without the use of foreseeability.5 0 3 The court
utilized significant "no duty" language, acknowledging that while
the manufacturer has a general duty to design "non-defective" products, that duty
does not extend to designing a product that is impossible to abuse
or one whose safety features may not be circumvented. A manufacturer need not incorporate safety features into its product so as to
guarantee that no harm will come to every user no matter how
careless or even reckless. Nor must he trace his product through
every link in the chain of distribution to insure that users will not
adapt the product to suit their own unique purposes. The duty of a
manufacturer, therefore, is not an open-ended one. It extends to the
design and manufacture of a finished product which is safe at the
time of sale. Material alterations at the hands of a third party
which work a substantial change in the condition in which the
product was sold by destroying the functional utility of a key safety
feature, however foreseeable that modification may have been, are
not within the ambit of a manufacturer's responsibility." 4
The court even went so far as to add:
Unfortunately, as this case bears out, it may often be that an in503. See supra notes 263-462 and accompanying text (discussing the three-step
approach).
504. 49 N.Y.2d at 480-81, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). This reasoning was monumental in that it absolved the manufacturer of a
duty to foresee subsequent material alterations even under a negligence standard, where foreseeability principles have traditionally been applied. See td.; see also Micallef v. Miehle Co.,
39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976). One commentator asserted that
this was "a retreat to the patent danger rule" and was inconsistent with the court's prior
decision in Micallef. See Note, supra note 3, at 436. Such an assertion is incorrect, as the
court in Micallef held that under a negligence theory, the manufacturer has a duty with respect to dangers incurred "when the product is used in the manner for which the product was
intended as well as unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use .... 39 N.Y.2d at 385-86, 348
N.E,2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The Micallef
court noted, however, that "[t]his does not compel a manufacturer to clothe himself in the
garb of an insurer ... nor to supply merchandise which is accident proof." 39 N.Y.2d at 386,
348 N.E.2d at 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121-22 (citations omitted). By abolishing foreseeability
principles in alteration cases under a negligence theory, the Robinson court impliedly acknowledged that while a manufacturer may have a duty to foresee variations in the use of its product, it should not have a duty to foresee the alterationof its product. See supra notes 224-52
and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between product alteration and product misuse). The Robinson court recognized the qualitative distinctions between product misuse and
product alteration. See supra notes 224-52 and accompanying text. Thus, as noted by the
commentator himself, the Robinson court merely limited the scope of Micallef insofar as material alterations are concerned. See Note, supra note 3, at 437 n.32. Under the Robinson rule,
"[u]nintended, though foreseeable uses do not include product modifications as a matter of
law." Id. (emphasis added).
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jured party, because of the exclusivity of workers' compensation, is
barred from commencing an action against the one who exposes
him to unreasonable peril by affirmatively rendering a safe product
dangerous. However, that an employee may have no remedy in tort
against his employer gives the courts no license to thrust upon a
third-party manufacturera duty to insure that its product will not
be abused or that its safety features will [not] callously be altered
by a purchaser.50 5

The significant rule emanating from the Robinson decision is
that a manufacturer does not owe a duty to foresee subsequent material alterations in its product.508 Since the accident in Robinson
would not have occurred in absence of the employer's material alteration, the court should have absolved the manufacturer of a duty as
a matter of law. Instead, since the record was devoid of evidence
indicating that the product's original design was "defective," the
court found that the manufacturer satisfied its general duty to design
products that are safe at the time of sale.50 7 Thus, the employer's
removal of the guards rendered the "safe" product "defective." 50 8
Accordingly, the court concluded that "[a]bsent any showing that
there was some defect in the design of the safety gate at the time the
machine left the practical control of Reed-Prentice (and there has
been none here), Reed-Prentice may not be cast in damages for
strict products liability."50 9
B.

The Robinson Decision Criticized

While Robinson was decided correctly, the court's focus on the
product's original design was unnecessary, and inconsistent with its
abolition of "foreseeability" and its excellent "no-duty" reasoning.
The court stated, for example, that the manufacturer's duty is
gauged as of the time the product leaves its possession and control.51 0
Liability must be predicated upon the manufacturer's design choice,
505. 49 N.Y.2d at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721-22 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
506. See supra note 468. As the court in Nelson v. Garcia, 129 Misc. 2d 909, 494
N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1985), succinctly stated, a manufacturer "is not responsible for injuries caused by subsequent modifications by another however foreseeable such modifications
may have been .... " Id. at 911, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 278 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
507. 49 N.Y.2d at 479-80, 403 N.E.2d at 443-44, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720-21.
508. Id.
509. 49 N.Y.2d at 480, 403 N.E.2d at 443-44, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
510. 49 N.Y.2d at 479, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720; see also supra note 56
(setting forth the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
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or the product in its condition as originally designed and sold.5 11 A
third party's subsequent material alteration of the product from that
condition exceeds the scope of the manufacturer's duty.5 12 Accordingly, the court ruled that i manufacturer has no duty to foresee the
potential for subsequent material alterations when making a design
choice. 13 If a manufacturer does not owe a duty to foresee material
alterations, then it cannot owe a duty with respect to any accident
arising out of such an alteration. This "no-duty" proposition applies
irrespective of whether some defect in the original design exists.
Fundamental notions of causation-in-fact tell us that if an accident would not have occurred "but-for" a subsequent material alteration, that accident would not have occurred had the product remained in its condition as designed and sold. 514 The manufacturer's
"unaltered" design choice should bear no legal relationship with respect to an accident which it would not have caused.5 15 Only through
the improper imposition of a duty to foresee the alteration can a
manufacturer be responsible for the safety of its product after it is
materially altered. 1 Without foreseeability, a court cannot link the
original design to an accident arising out of a material alteration in
the product.
The Robinson court's refusal to adopt such a foreseeability standard should have severed any legal relationship between the product's original design and the accident, which arose out of the employer's material alteration. Absent this legal relationship (a duty
owed), there is no justification for evaluating the original design
under the risk-utility test.51 The reason is that a defect in the product's original design, while significant in cases not involving alterations, is of no consequence with respect to any accident causally related to a material alteration, which the manufacturer has no duty to
foresee. Courts taking the first two steps must, logically, take the
third. A manufacturer cannot be held liable in cases where (1) its
product undergoes a subsequent material alteration at the hands of a
third party and (2) the accident was causally related to that altera511. 49 N.Y.2d at 479, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
512. See supra note 504 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 467-504 and accompanying text.
514. For a comprehensive discussion of the causation-in-fact concept, see generally IA
L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.25[1], at 2-1234 (1987); W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra note 8, § 41, at 263-72 (5th ed. 1984).
515. See sources cited supra note 514.
516. See infra notes 548-53 and accompanying text.
517. See cases cited supra note 142.
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tion. Thus, there was no need for the Robinson court to focus on the
product's original design because the manufacturer established that
the accident would not have occurred "but-for" the employer's material alteration. The fact that the manufacturer's product was not defectively designed need not have been the decisive factor in
Robinson.
By not taking this essential third step, the court created an inconsistency in the Robinson opinion. On the one hand, the court absolved the manufacturer of a duty to foresee material alterations
when making a design choice. On the other hand, the court absolved
the manufacturer of liability not because the accident arose out of
the material alteration, but because the product was not defective in
its original "unaltered" condition. 18 While the "non-defectiveness"
of a product should always preclude the imposition of strict products
liability,519 such a finding is unnecessary when a material alteration
is found to be a proximate cause of the accident. By focusing on the
original design, the Robinson court unnecessarily opened the door
for lower courts to create jury questions anytime there is a question
as to whether the original design is defective. 2
The court created an additional problem in the manner in which
it phrased its holding. In the very first paragraph of the opinion, the
court held that a manufacturer cannot be held liable where "there is
a subsequent modification which substantially alters the product and
is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries." 52' It is unclear
whether the use of the phrase "the proximate cause" was intended
by the court to limit the application of Robinson to material alterations that are the sole proximate cause of an accident. 22 It is doubtful that the court intended Robinson to be so construed, as it would
be inconsistent with the court's abolition of foreseeability. Absent a
duty to foresee subsequent material alterations, a manufacturer
should be absolved of liability whenever such an alteration is caus518. See supra notes 507-09 and accompanying text.
519. It is fundamental that in any strict products liability case, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving, inter alia, that the product in question was "defective" when it left the
defendant's hands. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON,

520.

supra note 8, § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984).
See infra notes 523-47 and accompanying text (discussing lower court interpreta-

tions of Robinson); see also supra notes 424-49 and accompanying text (discussing a related
view).

521.

See Robinson, 49 N.Y.2d at 475, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (em-

phasis added).
522. See cases cited infra note 524.
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ally related to the accident, let alone the sole proximate cause.
C.

Lower Court Interpretations

The inconsistencies in the Robinson opinion have caused much
confusion among lower courts. 23 This is especially true in cases
where there may exist a defect in the product's original design, yet
the accident would not have occurred "but-for" a subsequent material alteration. Some courts, faced with such a fact pattern, have
relied on the Robinson court's use of the phrase "the proximate
cause", and its focus on the design in its original "unaltered" condition, to construe Robinson as a "modified" version of the defectproximate cause approach. 2 4 These courts have held that the manufacturer can be absolved of liability under the Robinson rule only
where either (1) the product was not "defective" as originally
designed and sold or (2) the product was defective, but the material
alteration supersedes the defect as the sole proximate cause of the
accident. 525 This approach varies from the "defect-proximate cause"
approach in that under New York law, the foreseeability of the alteration is not attributed to the manufacturer. This difference, however, renders any defect-proximate cause interpretation of Robinson
theoretically unsound.
The cases of Bingham v. Godfrey526 and Powles v. Wean United
523. A split has evolved among lower courts as to the rule applied in Robinson. A number of courts have interpreted Robinson as a "no-duty" rule. See, e.g., Kneuer v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co., 126 A.D.2d 608, 511 N.Y.S.2d 46 (2d Dep't 1987); McGavin v. Herrick
& Cowell Co., 118 A.D.2d 982, 500 N.Y.S.2d 85 (3d Dep't 1986); Baran v. Curtiss Wright
Corp,, 115 A.D.2d 252, 495 N.Y.S.2d 854 (4th Dep't 1985); Lovelace v. Ametek, Inc., 111
A.D.2d 953, 490 N.Y.S.2d 49 (3d Dep't 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986); Hansen v.
Honda Motor Co., 104 A.D.2d 850, 480 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1984). Others have construed Robinson merely as a "proximate cause" rule without the foreseeability standard. See,
e.g., Powles v. Wean United Corp., 126 A.D.2d 624, 511 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dep't), appeal
dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 1016, 511 N.E.2d 80, 517 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1987); Magee v. E.W. Bliss
Co., 120 A.D.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 886 (4th Dep't 1986); Silverstein v. Walsh Press & Die
Co., 119 A.D.2d 658, 501 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1986); Bingham v. Godfrey, 114 A.D.2d
987, 495 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2d Dep't 1985), appeal dismissed, 67 N.Y.2d 753, 490 N.E.2d 1228,
500 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1986).
524. See Powles v. Wean United Corp., 126 A.D.2d 624, 511 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 1016, 511 N.E.2d 80, 517 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1987); Magee v. E.W.
Bliss Co., 120 A.D.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 886 (4th Dep't 1986); Silverstein v. Walsh Press &
Die Co., 119 A.D.2d 658, 501 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1986); Bingham v. Godfrey, 114 A.D.2d
987, 495 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2d Dep't 1985), appeal dismissed, 67 N.Y.2d 753, 490 N.E.2d 1228,
500 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1986).
525. See cases cited supra note 157; see also infra notes 533-53 and accompanying text
(illustrating this interpretation of Robinson).
526. 114 A.D.2d 987, 495 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2d Dep't 1985), appealdismissed, 67 N.Y.2d
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Corp.52 are illustrative. In each case, the manufacturer moved for
summary judgment upon expert proof that (1) the product underwent a subsequent material alteration at the hands of a third party
and (2) the material alteration was a proximate cause of the accident. 2 The Appellate Division, Second Department held, however,
that such evidence, while establishing a prima facie defense, does not
alone absolve the manufacturer of liability. 529 Rather, it merely
shifts the burden onto the plaintiff to establish a question of fact as
to whether the product was somehow defective in its condition as
originally designed.530 If plaintiff meets this burden, then summary
judgment will be denied unless the manufacturer proves that the material alteration superseded the defect as the sole proximate cause of
the accident.5 31 Fortuitously, summary judgment was granted in
both cases because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. 32
A similar approach was utilized by the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department in Magee v. E.W. Bliss Co.533 The plaintiff in
Magee was injured while operating a punch press manufactured in
1941, but later modified by plaintiff's employer. 534 As originally
designed and sold, the press was activated by a mechanical foot
treadle that required forty pounds of downward pressure to disengage the clutch and allow the press to make a complete cycle.5 35
Plaintiff's employer subsequently "radically changed" this activation
system by replacing it with a dual set of pneumatic controls.5 36
These controls allowed the press to be activated by hand, requiring
753, 490 N.E.2d 1228, 500 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1986).
527. 126 A.D.2d 624, 511 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 1016,
511 N.E.2d 80, 517 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1987).
528. See Powles v. Wean United Corp., 126 A.D.2d at 625, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 62 (removal of the manufacturer's "safety cord" by a third party caused the plaintiff's hand to be
caught between two moving rollers of a calendar press); Bingham v. Godfrey, 114 A.D.2d at
988, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (rewiring of a vacuum cleaner by changing a three-pronged ground
plug into a two-pronged standard plug and wrapping the ground and hot wires together caused
plaintiff's decedent to be electrocuted).
529. Powles, 126 A.D.2d at 625-26, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 62-63; Bingham, 114 A.D.2d at
988, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
530. See Powles, 126 A.D.2d at 625, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 62-63; Bingham, 114 A.D.2d at
988, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
531. Powles, 126 A.D.2d at 625-26, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 62-63; Bingham, 114 A.D.2d at
988, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
532. Powles, 126 A.D.2d at 625, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 63; Bingham, 114 A.D.2d at 988, 495
N.Y.S.2d at 429.
533. 120 A.D.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 886 (4th Dep't 1986).
534. 120 A.D.2d at 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
535. Id.
536. Id.
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only slight pressure on the lever.5 7 The accident occurred when
plaintiff inadvertently brushed the lever with his right arm.538
Plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer under theories
of negligence and strict products liability.5 3 9 Plaintiff's principal assertion was that the product was defective as originally designed because it was not equipped with a "point-of-operation" guard.5 4 The
defendant moved for summary judgment under the Robinson rule.54 1
The court determined that:
Clearly, the substitution of the faulty dual activation system, which
at the time of the accident allowed the press to be activated by
exerting only slight pressure on the lever, for the original mechanical treadle "removed a safeguard against accidental activation that
had been incorporated in the original structural design and would
have been adequate to prevent this accident."542
The court further stated that under Robinson, the manufacturer
does not have a duty to foresee such material alterations. 43 Based on
the foregoing, the court should have absolved the manufacturer of a
duty because the employer's material alteration was causally related
to the accident. The court, instead, followed the reasoning of the
Second Department and focused on the product as originally
designed without point-of-operation guards. 44 The court concluded
that the plaintiff failed to show that any defect in the original design
was a proximate cause of the accident.5 45 Thus, the manufacturer
was absolved of liability not on "duty" grounds, but because 46the material alteration was found to be the sole proximate cause.
537.
538.

120 A.D.2d at 926-27, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88.
120 A.D.2d at 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 887.

539. Id.
540.

120 A.D.2d at 927, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 888.

541.

Id.

542. 120 A.D.2d at 927, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88 (quoting Hanlon v. Cyril Bath Co.,
541 F.2d 343, 346 (3d Cir. 1975)) (emphasis added).
543. 120 A.D.2d at 927, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 888.

544. Id.
545. Id. The court found that the manufacturer's failure to design the machine with
point-of-operation guards was not a proximate cause of the accident. See id. The court also
dismissed plaintiff's claim that the clutch mechanism was defectively designed because
"[p]laintiff failed to submit any proof as to how a different clutch would have prevented his
injury ... ." Id.
546. Id. Another case that utilizes this interpretation of Robinson is Garcia v. Biro Mfg.
Co., 101 A.D.2d 779, 475 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Ist Dep't 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 63 N.Y.2d
751, 469 N.E.2d 834, 480 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1984). The plaintiff in Garcia was a meat market
worker who sustained serious injuries when his right hand was pulled into a meat grinder
manufactured by the defendant. 101 A.D.2d at 779, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 864. The meat grinder
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This "modified" defect-proximate cause construction is unsound
because the defect-proximate cause approach could never exist without its essential "foreseeability" standard. 4" Only through the imposition of a "duty to foresee" can defect-proximate cause courts link
the manufacturer's original design to an accident arising out of a
subsequent material alteration. 48 It is foreseeability alone that allows courts to attribute to the manufacturer a duty which extends
subsequent to the time that it designs and sells its products. Thus, in
material alteration cases, foreseeability principles allow defect-proximate cause courts to focus on whether the product's original design
was "defective," and whether that defect was, in any way, a contributing proximate cause of the accident." 9 Absent a duty to foresee
material alterations, however, the manufacturer does not owe a duty
with respect to any danger attendant to its product in a materially
altered condition. Hence, even in cases where the product may have
been defectively designed, the proper interpretation of Robinson is
that there can exist no legal relationship between a product in its
condition as designed and sold, and any accident arising out of a
subsequent material alteration. In such cases, the abolition of foreseeability (Step Two) should logically sever the manufacturer's duty
as a matter of law (Step Three).
Defect-proximate cause cases like Soler have reasoned that
since the manufacturer has a duty to foresee alterations, it is therefore responsible for the safety of its product after it has been materially altered. 550 Foreseeability therefore allows both the alteration
and a "defect" in the original design to be contributing causes of an
was manufactured and sold 21 years prior to the accident. Id. Subsequent to its sale, "some
unknown third party modified it by cutting bolts holding a safety guard over the feeding mechanism, enabling the safety guard to be swiveled out of the way." Id. Notwithstanding its finding that the accident would not have occurred had the guard remained in place, the court
concluded that "the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was the absence of the safety

guard, a substantial modification for which the manufacturer was not responsible." 101
A.D.2d at 780, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (citation omitted); see also Kingsland v. Industrial

Brown Hoist Co., 136 A.D.2d 901, 524 N.Y.S.2d 929 (4th Dep't 1988). The court's finding of
"sole" proximate cause was unnecessary because under Robinson a manufacturer should be

absolved of liability where a subsequent material alteration is in any way causally related to
the accident.
547. In fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98
N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234, 1240 (1984), had to distinguish Robinson for this very reason. For a
detailed discussion of the role of foresecability under the defect-proximate cause approach, see
supra notes 59-223 and accompanying text.

548. See supra notes 510-22 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 59-103 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1988

93

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:361

accident. 55' For example, where there may be some defect in the
product's original design, some courts reason that while the accident
would not have occurred "but-for" the alteration, it also would not
have occurred "but-for" the defect.5 52 Absent a duty to foresee alterations, however, the causation question cannot cut both ways. Without foreseeability, the questions of whether the product was defective
as originally designed, and whether such defect was itself causally
related to the accident, are rendered completely moot in cases where
a subsequent alteration is causally related to the accident. A manufacturer cannot owe a duty with respect to an accident that would
not have occurred "but-for" a material alteration which it had no
duty to foresee. 5 3 Any defect in the product's original design would
be irrelevant because, absent the alteration, it would not have caused
the accident. Thus, despite Robinson's confusing language, its refusal to adopt a foreseeability standard theoretically precludes the
use of any version of the defect-proximate cause approach. Manufacturers must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon proving
that a subsequent material alteration was a proximate cause of the
accident. 54 To even imply that the manufacturer's design is at all
551. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
552. See supra text accompanying notes 149-90.
553. Without the aid of a foreseeability standard, any subsequent material alteration is
outside the scope of a manufacturer's responsibility. The manufacturer's duty must be evaluated as of the time the product leaves its possession and control. If the product as originally
designed would not have caused the accident, the manufacturer must be absolved of liability.
Only where a subsequent intervening act or event falls within the scope of a defendant's duty
can that act or event be a contributing proximate cause of the accident. See, e.g., Derdiarian v.
Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 414 N.E.2d 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1980) (finding
that where defendant contractor had a duty to barricade a roadway excavation site, given the
probability that a vehicle may careen into it as a result of intervening driver negligence, the
defendant cannot be fully absolved of liability). Thus, if a manufacturer has a duty to foresee
certain misuses of its product, then both a defect in the design of the product and the intervening foreseeable misuse can be the contributing proximate causes of an accident. See Micallef
v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976). This
reasoning cannot apply in the context of product alteration under the Robinson rule. The abolition of a duty to foresee subsequent material alterations prevents the alteration from being
regarded as a contributing proximate cause. It is for this reason that the defect-proximate
cause approach cannot exist without its essential foreseeability standard.
554. See, e.g., Ayala v. V & 0 Press Co., 126 A.D.2d 229, 233, 512 N.Y.S.2d 704, 70607 (2d Dep't 1987); McGavin v. Herrick & Cowell Co., 118 A.D.2d 982, 983, 500 N.Y.S.2d
85, 87 (3d Dep't 1986); Lovelace v. Ametek, Inc., 111 A.D.2d 953, 954, 490 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51
(3d Dep't 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986). These courts have acknowledged that the
correct interpretation of Robinson requires that a manufacturer be absolved of liability where
the accident would not have occurred but-for a subsequent material alteration. See Ayala, 126
A.D.2d at 233, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 706; McGavin, 118 A.D.2d at 983, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 87;
Lovelace, Ill A.D.2d at 954, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
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legally responsible under such circumstances would be tantamount to
resurrecting foreseeability as the standard for adjudicating material
alteration cases.
Other lower courts have recognized this, and have properly construed Robinson as a "no-duty" rule. In Lovelace v. Ametek, Inc.,555
for example, the Appellate Division, Third Department took the essential third step and absolved the manufacturer of a duty where a
third-party's material alteration was a proximate cause of the accident.5 56 The plaintiff in Lovelace was severely injured while placing
wet fabric into an extractor. 5 The extractor operated in a manner
similar to a top-loading washing machine in its spin cycle. 58 Wet
fabric is loaded into its drum which rotates at high speeds, forcing
the moisture out by centrifugal force.559
As originally designed and sold, the extractor was equipped with
three safety devices: (1) two hinged, interlocking covers which completely overlaid the large opening at the top of the drum, (2) a device which prevented the machine from starting when the covers
were left open, and (3) a locking mechanism which prevented the
covers from later being opened while the drum was spinning. 6 '
These safety features were subsequently bypassed by a third
party.561 As altered, the extractor was fully operable without the
protective cover.562 The plaintiff was injured while placing a wet
fabric into the unprotected spinning drum, when a piece of fabric
wrapped around his arm and dragged him into the drum. 63
The plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer under
theories of negligence and strict products liability." The trial court
granted the manufacturer's summary judgment motion. 5 The Third
Department affirmed, holding that the manufacturer was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because (1) the subsequent bypassing of
the machine's safety devices constituted a material alteration,566 and
555.

111 A.D.2d 953, 490 N.Y.S.2d 49 (3d Dep't 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170

(1986).
556. Id. at 954-55, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
557. Id. at 954, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
558. Id.
559. Id.

560. Id. at 953-54, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.

Id. at 954, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
Id.
Id. at 954, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
Id.
Id.

566. See id. at 954-55, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51. The court found that "someone other than
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(2) "but for want of those devices the accident would not have occurred. '56 7 The court reasoned that even if the material alteration
"was foreseeable during the 60-year interval between its manufacture and the accident, the responsibility for injuries resulting therefrom would not fall on defendant." 568
A similar no-duty interpretation of Robinson was utilized in
McGavin v. Herrick & Cowell Co.569 The McGavin court stated that
the appropriate test under Robinson is whether the third party's alteration was "material" and whether it was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.57 0 This interpretation is the correct one. The reasoning in Lovelace and McGavin is fully consistent with the Robinson court's refusal to utilize foreseeability principles in material alteration cases. It also takes the essential third step, thereby
extending the Robinson rule to its logical conclusion. The fact that
there may exist some factual question as to whether there was a defect in the original design need not defeat a manufacturer's sumdefendant removed the protective covers, rotated the mechanical interference rod 180 degrees
out of position, thereby forestalling the workability of the safety feature .
"d.
I...
at 954, 490

N.Y.S.2d at 51. As if the removal of the protective covers was not enough, defendant's expert
testified that the mispositioning of the interference rod was "not an easy feat." Id. Accordingly, the court found these alterations to be material. See id. at 954-55, 40 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
567. Id. at 954, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51 (emphasis added).
568.

Id. at 954, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51. The court "flat-out" rejected any defect-proximate

cause interpretation of Robinson, reasoning that the "plaintiff's objections to the extractor's
design are premised on his expert's opinion that the manufacturer was duty bound to make the
machine fail-safe, a thesis squarely rejected in Robinson .... Id. at 955, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
569. 118 A.D.2d 982, 500 N.Y.S.2d 85 (3d Dep't 1986).
570. Id. at 982-83, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87. The plaintiff in McGavin was seriously injured when his right hand came in contact with the blade of a rung sawing and chucking
machine. Id. at 982, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 86. The machine was manufactured and sold to plaintiff's employer approximately 30 years prior to the accident. Id. In plaintiff's products liability
action against the manufacturer, evidence adduced during discovery revealed that the employer (third-party defendant) altered the machine by (1) removing the loading magazine,
thereby causing operators to come in close proximity to the blade, and (2) converting the
machine from a "Geneva" gear mechanism movement to an air-operated pneumatic movement. Id. at 982-83, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87. With respect to the first alteration, the court
found that "there is evidence in the record that defendant did not consider the loading magazine to be an integral safety feature of its machine, the removal of which would render the
product unsafe." Id. at 983, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 86. As to the second alteration, the court determined that the manufacturer similarly failed to establish that it rendered the product unsafe
and that it had any causal relation to the accident. Id. at 983, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 87. Accordingly, the court concluded that there existed "sufficient questions of fact as to whether these
two modifications were substantial and a proximate cause of the injury so as to preclude summary judgment." Id. (emphasis added). The McGavin court properly construed Robinson to
absolve a manufacturer of liability where a subsequent material alteration is causally related
to the accident. Had the manufacturer made a sufficient showing of "materiality" and "but
for" causation, summary judgment undoubtedly would have been granted.
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mary judgment or directed verdict motion.
D.

Problem Areas Under the Robinson Rule

While foreseeability is not utilized in adjudicating alteration
cases in New York, two scenarios have arisen which stretch the
Robinson doctrine to its limits. The first type is the "removability"
scenario.57 1 These cases involve accidents arising from a third party's
subsequent removal of a safety feature which was designed in such a
way as to render it easily removable. The second type is the "substitution" or "replacement" scenario,57 2 in which accidents arise out of
a third party's substitution of a component part of the product with
a similar part not manufactured by the defendant. The New York
Court of Appeals recently confronted these scenarios, and its opinions raise important questions regarding the parameters of a manufacturer's duties under Robinson. It is significant, however, that
these opinions reaffirm the demise of foreseeability in New York.
They also illustrate that Robinson is a flexible doctrine, capable of
application across the spectrum of alteration cases.
1. Removability of Safety Features: Lopez v. Precision Papers,
Inc.- Removability cases typically involve products manufactured
with safety features that are capable of being removed, but were not
purposefully designed to be removed.5 73 In these cases, it may be
highly foreseeable that a third party might remove the safety feature, especially when the removal increases the product's versatility.5 7 4 Some products are equipped with safety features that are so,
easily removable that their subsequent removal is almost inevitable. 5 Despite the degree of foreseeability, however, a third party's
removal of a safety feature alters the product from its condition as
designed and sold. The key question is really one of degree, that is,
whether the product was so easy to alter that the alteration cannot
571. See infra notes 572-627 and accompanying text (discussing the removability of
safety features).
572. See infra notes 627-74 and accompanying text (discussing the replacement of component parts).
573. See cases cited supra note 398.
574. See, e.g., Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986) (en

banc), discussed supra notes 370-93 and accompanying text; Miller v. Anetsberger Bros., 124
A.D.2d 1057, 508 N.Y.S.2d 954 (4th Dep't 1986), discussed supra notes 424-49 and accompanying text. The courts in Germann and Miller were so preoccupied with the foreseeability of
the alterations that they actually mischaracterized them as "misuses." See also Briney v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 782 F.2d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 1986), discussed infra note 605.

575. See, e.g., Briney, 782 F.2d at 590; Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 924; Miller, 124 A.2d
at 1054, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
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be deemed "material."
Removability cases have not presented a problem under the defect-proximate cause 57 8 and duty-foreseeability approaches. 77 Both
approaches incorrectly rely on the foreseeability of the alteration to
shape the manufacturer's duty. This foreseeability standard does not
exist under the Robinson approach. The Robinson court clearly
stated that a "manufacturer's duty ... does not extend to designing
'7
a product ...whose safety features may not be circumvented."
Nevertheless, plaintiffs have questioned whether the Robinson rule
was intended to apply with respect to products with removable safety
features.579 If Robinson were not to apply, then foreseeability principles would be relevant in determining whether the product was "defective" due to the removability of its safety features. The New York
Court of Appeals confronted these issues in Lopez v. PrecisionPapers, Inc.580 Its opinion in Lopez clarified what was previously one of
the most controversial and frequently misunderstood of all New
York alteration cases.
Lopez involved a forklift manufactured with a "removable"
overhead guard. 581 Eight such forklifts were purchased by plaintiff's
employer for the purpose of transporting objects in and out of its
warehouse.582 The overhead guard was affixed to the forklift to protect the operator while lifting pallets above head level in high clearance areas. 58 3 Due to the size of the guard, however, the forklift
could not be operated in low clearance areas, such as inside
trucks.58 4 Thus, with the overhead guard attached, the forklift could
not be used to load and unload trucks. 85
576.
discussed
577.
578.
579.

See, e.g., Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.D.2d 1234 (1984),
supra notes 149-84 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 572.
Robinson, 49 N.Y.2d at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
See, e.g., Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 871, 492 N.E.2d 1214, 501

N.Y.S.2d 798 (1986), aff'g 107 A.D.2d at 667-68, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87 (2d Dep't 1985);
Ayala v. V & 0 Press Co., 126 A.D.2d 229, 512 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2d Dep't 1987); McAvoy v.
Outboard Marine Co., 134 A.D.2d 245, 520 N.Y.S.2d 586 (2d Dep't 1987).
580. 67 N.Y.2d 871,492 N.E.2d 1214, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1986), aff'g 107 A.D.2d 667,
484 N.Y.S.2d 585 (2d Dep't 1985). The Appellate Division, Second Department's majority

opinion and the dissenting opinion of Judge Rubin will be referred to for the purpose of summarizing the underlying facts of Lopez. Most of the facts are set forth in the dissenting
opinion.
581.

107 A.D.2d 667, 668, 484 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (2d Dep't 1985).

582. Id. at 669, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
583. Id.

584. Id. at 669, 673, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 588-90 (Rubin, J.,dissenting).
585. Id.
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To adapt the forklift for use inside trucks, plaintiff's employer
removed the guard on two of its eight forklifts. 588The employer then
established a "safety" rule which required the two forklifts without
guards to be used only to load and unload trucks in low clearance
areas. 587 Any movement of objects inside the warehouse was to be
made only by those six forklifts that had the overhead guards. 88
At the time of the accident, plaintiff, an experienced forklift operator, was unloading a pallet of paper rolls from a "high clearance"
area inside the warehouse. 5819 "In derogation of his employer's rule,
but in accordance with his shipping clerk's instructions," plaintiff
used one of the forklifts whose overhead guard had been removed. 9 '
"After raising the fork blades over his head and inserting them inside the wooden pallet, plaintiff was591injured by a roll of paper which
fell from the pallet onto his head.
Plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer under theories of strict products liability, breach of warranty and negligence.5 92 Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the forklift was defective in
design because it was manufactured with a non-welded, easily removable overhead guard.59 a The trial court granted partial summary
5 94
judgment in favor of the manufacturer on the removability issue.
The court reasoned that under Robinson, "a manufacturer may not
of the product by a user,
be held liable for the negligent alteration
595
even if the alteration is foreseeable."
The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed, holding
that Robinson does not, as a matter of law, preclude a finding of
design defect under plaintiff's removability theory.596 In a controversial opinion, the court distinguished Robinson on the ground that the
modification in Robinson was substantial and was not intended to
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

669, 484 N.Y.S.2d at
668, 484 N.Y.S.2d at
669, 484 N.Y.S.2d at
667-68, 484 N.Y.S.2d
670, 484 N.Y.S.2d at

588 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
587.
588 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
at 586-87.
588 (Rubin, J., dissenting).

591. Id. at 669, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
592. Id. at 667, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 586.

593. Id. at 667-68, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87. The plaintiff also alleged that the forklift
was defective in design because it lacked a warning device for excessive loads and guidelines

for the design, construction and loading of pallets. Id. at 668, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 587. Since the
Lopez appeal involved only the trial court's granting of partial summary judgment on the

"removability" claim, the court did not have to address these additional defect claims. See id.
594. Id. at 668, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
595.

Id.

596. Id.
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increase the versatility of the product. Conversely, the employer in
Lopez removed the guard to make the forklift more versatile.5 98 On
this basis, the court concluded that:

[t]he facts here simply do not approach those of Robinson. Because
of the ease with which the overhead guard could be removed and
the forklift's added versatility when operated without the guard,
there is a legitimate jury question as to the scope of the forklift's
intended purposes. 9
Thus, the jury could consider whether the manufacturer breached its
duty by designing its forklifts with a guard capable of being
removed.600
Plaintiff's attorneys applauded the Second Department's decision in Lopez as a major victory in limiting the scope of Robinson
and expanding the manufacturer's duty for subsequent alterations.601
Indeed, the court's reasoning did raise some important questions.
Did the court create a jury issue simply because the guard's removal
was foreseeable, or did it merely conclude that the removal was an
alteration not sufficiently "material" to trigger the Robinson rule?
Are alterations that render a product more versatile outside the
scope of Robinson? Should a manufacturer have a duty to design
products with "non-removable" safety features?
These questions were quickly put to rest by the New York
Court of Appeals. 0 2 The court affirmed the Second Department's
holding not because the removal was "foreseeable," or that it was
not "material," but solely because there was evidence "that the forklift was purposefully manufactured to permit its use without the
safety guard. 60 3 Since the court found that the manufacturer had
designed the safety feature to be removable for the purpose of allowing the forklift to be used without it, the employer's removal did
not "alter" the forklift from its condition as designed. At most, the
use of the "guardless" forklift in a high, rather than low, clearance
597. See id. The court acknowledged that "Robinson represents a sensible limitation on
the scope of manufacturer liability lest [sic] a manufacturer be made an insurer against all
injuries that might arise from the use or misuse of a product" Id.
598. Id. at 669, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
599. Id. (citations omitted).
600. Id. at 669, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
601. See. e.g., Lipsig, Tort Trends - Manufacturer's Duty for Safety Features,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 27, 1986, at 1, col. 1, 28, col. I (discussing Lopez as reaffirming the foreseeability concepts set forth in Micallef).
602. 67 N.Y.2d 871, 492 N.E.2d 1214, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1986).
603. Id. at 873, 492 N.E.2d at 1215, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
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area constituted a "misuse" of the product. Thus, the Court of Appeals in Lopez allowed the removability/defect question to proceed
to the jury because it found no intervening "alteration" that would
warrant summary judgment under Robinson. 04 What is most significant, however, is that the court declined the invitation to resurrect
foreseeability in alteration cases. A manufacturer can be held liable
in removability cases only where it is proven to have purposely
designed the product to be operated without the safety feature. 5
a. Distinguished from Germann.- Lopez was a "misuse" case
because the court found something more than the mere foreseeability
of removal. The court found that the manufacturer actually intended
that the safety guards be removed, and that its products be used
without the guards. 606 The removal of a safety feature cannot be said
to "alter" a product purposefully designed to be used without it. This
should be distinguished from Germann, which involved a press
designed with a safety bar to be removed only for maintenance, and
604. Id.
605. Id.; see also Briney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 782 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1986). The
plaintiff in Briney injured his left hand while working on a 10-inch electric table saw. Id. at
586. The saw contained a blade guard, which was designed to be removable for some cuts. Id.
at 586, 590. Plaintiff attempted to make a complex cut, which required the removal of the
blade guard. Id. at 586. The removal of the guard allowed the plaintiff's hand to come in
contact with the rotary blade. Id. at 586-87. The court upheld plaintiff's "removability" defect
claim not because removal of the guard was foreseeable, but because "the table saw was
designed so that the guard could be removed for some cuts." Id. at 590. Like the court in
Lopez, the Briney court held that the manufacturer could be liable because the saw was purposefully manufactured to permit its use without the guard. See id. Thus, "[tlo hold that
removing the guard assembly was a substantial change ignores plaintiffs' claim altogether." Id.
606. See supra note 603 and accompanying text. It is interesting to compare the court's
reasoning in Lopez with that of Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1980),
which was decided under the defect-proximate cause approach. The plaintiff in Steinmetz was
injured while working at a "rigidizer" machine. Id. at 22. A "rigidizer" has sheet metal fed
into a slot located in the front of the machine which is pulled along and flattened by rollers. Id.
at 23. The original manufacturer's design permitted the removability of a top safety plate for
the purpose of exposing the rollers for cleaning. Id. The operator could then activate the machine to "jog the rollers around little by little, stopping repeatedly for inspection or adjustment." Id. The accident occurred during this cleaning process. While performing maintenance
on the rollers, plaintiff activated the drive mechanism and left it on, wherein his hands were
crushed between the rollers. Id. In a products liability suit brought by the plaintiff, the manufacturer asserted that it should be absolved of liability because the accident arose out of the
removal of the safety plate. Id. at 22. The court held, however, that "[blecause it was foreseeable that an operator would be injured under the circumstances in which [plaintiff] actually
was injured, these circumstances do not support a claim of misuse or alteration of the product." Id. at 23. Thus, the Steinmetz court utilized "foreseeability" as the predicate for liability. The Lopez court, on the other hand, declined to use foreseeability and imposed a duty on
the manufacturer only because the removal of the safety features was consistent with the manufacturer's design objectives.
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to be reattached during operation. °7 There was no evidence that the
manufacturer in Germann purposefully designed the press to be operated while the safety bar was removed. 08 Thus, the employer's
permanent removal of this "temporarily" removable feature, and its
use of the press without the feature, clearly "altered" that press
from its condition as originally designed and sold. 0 9
b. The Second Department Strikes Back.- The Court of Appeals substantially limited the Second Department's opinion in Lopez. A recent removability case decided after Lopez does, however,
indicate an intention on the part of the Second Department to construe Lopez in the broadest manner possible.
In Ayala v. V & 0 Press Co., 610 the plaintiff was injured while
operating an incline press. 61 ' The press was manufactured in 1947
with a sweep guard which prevented entry of the operator's hands
into the machine's point of operation. 12 Plaintiff's employer subsequently altered the press by removing the guard. 1 3 In 1967, the em6 14
ployer hired a company ("Humm") to replace the missing guard.
Prior to the accident, however, the employer again altered the press
by removing the new guard and wiring certain "side safety gates" so
as to render the gates ineffective. 15 The accident occurred when
plaintiff's hand entered the unguarded point of operation and was
crushed by the ram of the press, which descended without
warning. 1 6
The plaintiff commenced a products liability action against the
manufacturer. 6 According to the proof adduced, the sweep guard
installed by Humm was made removable "so that it could be adjusted to allow for the different sizes of various dies."618 Plaintiff's
expert testified that the manufacturer's original guard was virtually
the same and was, therefore, defective because of its removability.619
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufac607. See supra notes 394-416 and accompanying text (discussing Germann).
608. See supra note 406.
609. See supra notes 409-12 and accompanying text.
610.

126 A.D.2d 229, 512 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2d Dep't 1987).

611.

Id. at 231, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 705.

612.

Id. at 231-32, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 705.

613. Id. at 232, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
614. Id. at 232, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
615. Id. at 232, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
616.

Id.

617. Id. at 231, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
618. Id. at 232, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
619.

Id. at 232-33, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
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turer under Robinson.6 20
The Second Department reversed, holding that Lopez compels a
different result.6 2 Interestingly, the court deviated from its prior
reasoning in Bingham and Powles.2 2 The court declared that the
proper interpretation of Robinson is that a manufacturer cannot be
held liable "where it is shown that the accident would not have occurred but for the subsequent modification."2 3 The court then correctly acknowledged that Lopez allows a removability/defect claim
"provided that the product 'was purposefully manufactured to permit its use without the safety guard.' ",624 The court held, however,
that summary judgment should have been denied because "the plaintiffs submitted certain evidence from which it could be inferred that
the press was purposefully designed so as to allow removal of the

sweep guard

...

"625

Since the guard in Ayala was designed to be removed only for
the purpose of adjusting the dies, the case should not have fallen
within the scope of the Lopez rule. The Court of Appeals in Lopez
intended to uphold only those removability claims in which the manufacturer intended that the product be operated without the safety
feature. It was not intended to apply in cases where the safety feature is merely designed to be removable for maintenance or adjustment purposes. There was nothing in the Ayala opinion to indicate
that the manufacturer designed the guard to be removable for operational purposes. Thus, the facts of Ayala are more analogous to
Germann, and did not fall within the limited class of cases to which
Lopez should apply. In allowing the removability claim to proceed to
the jury, the Second Department construed Lopez too broadly, which
was precisely what the Court of Appeals had sought to avoid. 2
620. Id. at 231, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
621. Id. at 233, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
622. See supra notes 526-32 and accompanying text (discussing Bingham and Powles).
623. 126 A.D.2d at 233, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 706 (emphasis added). This interpretation is
fully consistent with Robinson as well as other appellate decisions properly construing Robinson as a no-duty rule. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Ametek, Inc., 111 A.D.2d 953, 490 N.Y.S.2d 49
(3d Dep't 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986), discussed supra notes 555-68 and accompanying text; McGavin v. Herrick & Cowell Co., 118 A.D.2d 982, 500 N.Y.S.2d 85 (3d Dep't
1986), discussed supra notes 569-70 and accompanying text.
624. 126 A.D.2d at 233, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 706 (quoting Lopez, 67 N.Y.2d at 873, 492
N.E.2d at 1215, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 799) (emphasis added).
625. Id. at 233-34, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 706-07 (emphasis added).
626. The objective of the Appellate Division, Second Department in broadly construing
Lopez is all too apparent in the more recent case of McAvoy v. Outboard Marine Corp., 134
A.D.2d 245, 520 N.Y.S.2d 586 (2d Dep't 1987). In McAvoy, the Second Department denied
the manufacturer's summary judgment motion based upon the removal of a "chute" that
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2. Substitution or Replacement of Component Parts: Sage v.
Fairchild-SwearingenCorp.1627- - One of the most complex issues to
arise under the Robinson rule is the extent to which a manufacturer
can be held liable for injuries arising from the replacement of a component of the product with a "substantially similar" part manufactured by a different entity. The New York Court of Appeals recently
confronted this scenario in Sage v. Fairchild-SwearingenCorp. Its
decision reaches the outer limits of the Robinson rule, and raises
monumental questions of product identification and causation.
The product involved in Sage was a Metro II nineteen-seat
Commuter Aircraft manufactured by defendant and owned by plaintiff's employer.6 28 The plaintiff worked as a station agent responsible
for unloading the passengers' baggage from the plane's cargo compartment. 29 When the plane landed, plaintiff entered the aft hatch
of the cargo compartment and unloaded the baggage onto a cart located on the ground below.6 30 The door to the compartment was five
feet wide and was located at the rear of the passenger section. 31
To allow the access of baggage handlers, the manufacturer supplied its planes with a free-standing ladder of approximately six feet
in length. 32 The manufacturer designed the ladder to be stored inside the cargo compartment by hanging it across the doorway, parallel to the ground.633 The ladder would be suspended by two aft hangers (hooks), placed on opposite sides of the door frame.6 34 The
hanger/hooks were "u"or "v"shaped with a 1.3 inch opening at the
top.6 35 They were riveted onto each side of the door frame.6 36 Some
time after sale, however, for reasons unclear in the opinion, the employer replaced one of these hangers with its own substitute, which it
would have prevented the lawnmower blades from being exposed to plaintiff. Id. at 245, 520
N.YS.2d 586. In so doing, the court reverted to its prior reasoning in Lopez and held that
"[g]iven the ease with which the safety feature could be removed and the lawnmower's added
versatility with the optional grass catcher assembly, questions of fact exist as to the scope of
the lawnmower's intended purposes and whether [it] was reasonably safe without the removable parts." Id. at 246, 520 N.Y.S.2d 587. It is precisely this reasoning that was limited by the
Court of Appeals in Lopez. See supra note 603 and accompanying text.
627. 70 N.Y.2d 579, 517 N.E.2d 1304, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987).
628. Id. at 582-83, 517 N.E.2d at 1305, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Id.
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made by duplicating the manufacturer's original design. 37 The employer attached the replacement hook to the doorway of the cargo
compartment. e8
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was unloading the baggage
from the cargo compartment.689 When plaintiff completed her work,
she sat on the floor of the doorway opening "with her legs dangling
preparatory to jumping to the ground some 4 to 5 feet below." °
Plaintiff grasped the aft side of the door frame, and when she attempted to jump, her finger became caught on one of the hanger/
hooks.641 Plaintiff sustained serious injuries eventually necessitating
6 42
amputation of her finger.
In a products liability action against the manufacturer, plaintiff
alleged a defect in the design of the entire doorway to the cargo
compartment, as well as the design of the hanger/hook itself.643
Plaintiff's expert testified as to three specific design defects:
[1] the hanger presented a 'very serious hazard to any personnel
who are coming anywhere near it' because it protrudes into the
space where personnel have to be, 'right at the edge of the compartment' where people are getting in and out of the cargo area;

[2] [t]he 'placement of that hook [made] it a very inadequate solution to its function'; [and] [3] the hook itself was dangerous ...
because it was only 1/16 inch thick and because its "u" or v"
shape guided whatever came in contact with it - in this case
plaintiff's finger - to the narrowed space at the bottom of the
hook's opening.6 4
The opinions of plaintiff's expert were corroborated by the employer's chief of maintenance. 45 The manufacturer itself acknowl637. Id. at 583-84, 517 N.E.2d at 1306, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420. The employer achieved
this by "flattening the [manufacturer's] original part with a roller and then cutting a new part
to duplicate the original design." Id.
638. Id. at 584, 517 N.E.2d at 1306, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
639. Id. at 583, 517 N.E.2d at 1305, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
640. Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 126 A.D.2d 914, 915, 511 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433
(3d Dep't), rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 579, 517 N.E.2d 1304, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987).
641. 70 N.Y.2d at 583, 517 N.E.2d at 1305, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 419. The court noted,
however, that "[t]here was conflicting evidence on whether the hanger which injured plaintiff's
hand was the original part made by defendant or was a replacement part made by Commuter's
employees." Id. at 583, 517 N.E.2d at 1306, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420. The jury found that plaintiff caught her finger on the replacement hook. Id.
642. Id. at 582, 517 N.E.2d at 1305, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
643. Id. at 584, 517 N.E.2d at 1306, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
644. Id.
645. Id.
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edged that once a hanger/hook broke, it was not expected that the
purchaser would buy a new one because he could easily fabricate a
new part. 6
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the manufacturer moved to
dismiss on the ground that the hook that caused plaintiff's injuries
was a replacement part, the substitution of which constituted a material alteration under Robinson. 47 The court denied the motion
since the plaintiff's theory of liability sounded in design defect,
rather than in manufacturing defect in the hanger/hook itself. 8
The court reasoned that if the jury found that the manufacturer's
hook and doorway were defective in design and that the replacement
part was "substantially the same as the original," then the manufacturer can be held liable if the design defect was causally related to
the accident. 6491 The court then submitted interrogatories to the jury
asking three questions: (1) On the date of the accident, was the
hanger/hook a replacement part? (2) Did it have the same design
and substantially the same characteristics as the hanger/hook manufactured by the defendant? (3) Was the manufacturer's hanger/
hook defective as originally designed and was it a proximate cause
of the accident? 650 The jury answered all three questions in the affirmative, and rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff, holding the
manufacturer seventy-five percent responsible for plaintiff's
injuries. 651
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling,
reasoning that the unique facts of Sage do not warrant dismissal
under the Robinson rule. 52 The court summarized that under
Robinson, a manufacturer is not responsible for accidents arising out
of the subsequent material alteration of its product. 653 The court further confirmed that notwithstanding the foreseeability of the alteration, the manufacturer simply has no opportunity to avoid material
alterations once the product leaves its hands.6 54
646, Id.
647. Id.
648, Id.
649, Id. at 584-85, 517 N.E.2d at 1306, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
650, Id. at 584, 585, 517 N.E.2d at 1306, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
651. Id. at 582, 517 N.E.2d at 1305, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
652. Id. at 586-88, 517 N.E.2d at 1307-09, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
653. Id. at 586, 517 N.E.2d at 1307, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 421. The court reasoned that "[a]
manufacturer has no control over the use of a product after it leaves its hands ... so its
liability is normally 'gauged' as of the time the product was marketed." Id. (citations omitted).
654. Id. The court reaffirmed the validity of the Robinson rule, stating that "[e]ven
though the manufacturer could have foreseen that others would change the product and in-
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The Sage court upheld the application of the Robinson "noduty" rule in "substitution" cases such as Hansen v. Honda Motors
Co. and Mazzola v. Chrysler France, S.A.6 55 In Hansen, for example, the plaintiff removed the manufacturer's original motorcycle
wheel and replaced it with a custom wheel of a different design. 56
Similarly, in Mazzola, 57 a "molded hose" was removed and replaced with a "flexible hot water hose!' of a lesser quality. 5 8 The
court found that the facts of Sage do not approach those of Hansen
and Mazzola,659 since those cases involved something more than a
physical change in the component part itself. The design of the part
was actually altered, and the accidents arose out of the
alterations.660
In Sage, however, the employer's "physical" replacement of the
manufacturer's original hanger/hook did not alter the manufacturer's design. 66 1 The replacement hook was merely a copy of the
manufacturer's design dimensions, and it was placed in the exact location of the original hook. There was no evidence that the replacement hook had any qualities or dangers that did not exist in the
manufacturer's original. More importantly, plaintiff's theory of defect pertained to the dimensions of the hook and its placement on
the cargo doorway.6 2 The hook was not defective in and of itself,
but was defective only in relation to the overall design of the compartment doorway and the manufacturer's choice of the hook's location on that doorway.66 3 The accident, therefore, arose not out of the
actual "replacement" of the part, but out of the manufacturer's
overall defective design. Thus, the fact that "the hanger [hook] actually involved in the accident was a replacement and not the original
is not dispositive because in fabricating and installing a new part
crease its potential for causing injury, we said [in Robinson] the manufacturer had no opportunity to ... avoid the purchaser's modification of the product's design." Id.
655. Id. at 586, 517 N.E.2d at 1307, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
656. 104 A.D.2d 850, 850-51, 480 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (2d Dep't 1984), discussed supra
notes 454-62 and accompanying text.
657. 470 F. Supp. 24 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
658. Id. at 25-26; cf Sage, 70 N.Y.2d at 586, 517 N.E.2d at 1307-08, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
422. (distinguishing the Sage replacement part from the inferior replacement part in
Mazzola).
659. 70 N.Y.2d at 586-87, 517 N.E.2d at 1307-08, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
660. Id.
661. Id. at 586-87, 517 N.E.2d at 1307-08, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
662. Id. at 586, 517 N.E.2d at 1307, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 421; see supra note 644 and
accompanying text (discussing testimony of plaintiff's expert).
663. 70 N.Y.2d at 586, 517 N.E.2d at 1307, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
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[the employer], as the jury found, did no more than perpetuate defendant's bad design ....
The court reasoned that under these circumstances, the manufacturer should bear the loss because it sold a defectively designed
product "knowing that if the part broke it might be copied and re' The manplaced by the purchaser relying on the original design." 665
ufacturer should not be encouraged to design "flimsy parts secure in
the knowledge that once the part breaks and is replaced, it will no
longer be liable."6 "
The court's opinion in Sage represents a fair and rational application of Robinson to a unique fact pattern. Unlike other "substitution" cases where the replacement of a part changes the product's
design, the jury in Sage found that the employer's replacement of
the hanger/hook did not change the manufacturer's design. What is
most important is that the Sage court based its decision on the fact
that the component part in question was only incidentally related to
the manufacturer's overall defective design. The Sage court made it
clear that the defect at issue was not the physical characteristics of
the hanger/hook as an isolated part.66 Rather, the defect alleged
was the design of the hanger/hook as placed in the opening of the
cargo compartment of the aircraft.6 8 As the court noted, "the
hanger was replaced[,] but, as the jury found, the hanger design was
not altered and it was the manufacturer's defective design - both of
the hanger and of the compartment doorway - which caused injury." 6 9 In essence, the injury causing aspect of the product was the
overall design of the doorway, which necessarily included the dimensions and placement of the hook. The replacement of the manufacturer's hook with a hook of the same dimensions, and its placement
in the exact some location as the original, did nothing to alter that
design. The fact that plaintiff caught her finger on the replacement
hanger/hook and not the original was fortuitous. Her injuries did not
664. Id. at 587, 517 N.E.2d at 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
665. Id.
666. Id.
667. A superficial reading of Sage may lead one to conclude that the specific defect
alleged was the design of the hook itself. The court, however, noted that "[allthough the verdict sheet referred only to the defective hanger, the [trial] court explained to the jury in its
charge that the question of whether the hanger was defective referred not only to the design of
the hanger itself but also to its location in the opening of the cargo compartment." Id. at 585,
517 N.E.2d at 1306-07, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21 (emphasis added).
668. Id. at 584-86, 517 N.E.2d at 1306-07, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21.
669. Id. at 586-87, 517 N.E.2d at 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (emphasis added).
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arise out of the "replacement" of the hook or even the "replacement
hook" itself. They arose out of the manufacturer's defective design
of the doorway.
The facts of Sage are to be distinguished from those "substitution" cases where the replacement part itself causes injury, and not
any other feature or component of the product.670 It should also be
distinguished from cases in which the only defect alleged was in the
specific component of the manufacturer.67 ' In such cases, even if the
manufacturer's part is replaced with a part "substantially similar" in
design, the manufacturer should be absolved of liability. To hold a
manufacturer liable for injuries caused by someone else's product
would violate fundamental principles of product identification and
causation. 7 2
It is perhaps unfortunate that in dictum, the Sage court spoke
of deterring manufacturers from designing "flimsy parts."617 Sage
was not a "flimsy parts" case because the replacement part at issue
was not defective per se, but was merely one component of an overall
poor design. A careful reading of Sage reveals that its reasoning is
intended to apply only in rare "substitution" cases where the replacement of the part, as well as the part itself, are not the injurycausing aspects of the product. As one commentator notes:
[t]he Sage opinion, unfortunately, is likely to be misconstrued by
some claimants and defendants' counsel and perhaps even by some
judges. There is indeed some superficial "shock potential" to a casual reader's observation that a product manufacturer might be held
liable for bad design when a replacement part plainly not of the
manufacturer's making nevertheless results in liability ....Some

will undoubtedly read Sage as signifying an erosion of the Robinson rule. Such a reading, however, would be erroneous. The Robinson rule is alive and well.

674

CONCLUSION

To hold a manufacturer responsible for accidents arising out of
a third party's subsequent material alteration of its product contravenes the fundamental notions of products liability. A manufacturer
670.
671.
672.

App. 3d 273, 481 N.E.2d 1225 (1985).
See Augustine v. Dico Co., 135 I11.
See supra notes 454-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.

673.

70 N.Y.2d at 587, 517 N.E.2d at 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422.

674. Hoenig, Product Liability, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1988, at 1, col. 1, 33, col. 2 (emphasis added).
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is not an insurer against all injuries that may arise out of a product.
Its duty is gauged as of the time the product leaves its possession
and control. A third party's subsequent material alteration exceeds
that duty.
The three-step approach proposed in this Article provides a
workable solution whereby a manufacturer's liability can be rationally limited, consistent with the policies underlying products liability
law. A manufacturer cannot, as a matter law, owe a duty with respect to any accident arising out of a subsequent material alteration.
When faced with an alteration case, the trial judge should (1) adjudicate the question of "duty" as a matter of law, consistent with the
court's lawmaking function; 7 5 (2) abstain from using foreseeability
principles when adjudicating that duty; 78 and thus (3) absolve the
manufacturer of responsibility where the evidence establishes that
the product underwent a subsequent material alteration which was
causally related to the accident. 6
The defect-proximate cause approach, utilized by a majority of
courts, fails to take either step and allows the threshold question of
duty to proceed to the jury under a foreseeability standard. This, in
effect, designates the manufacturer as an insurer with a duty to design "accident-proof" products. 78 The duty-foreseeability approach
takes the first step in purporting to adjudicate as a matter of law the
manufacturer's duty with respect to product alteration. It fails, however, to take the essential step and abstain from using foreseeability
principles in adjudicating that duty.679 Foreseeability, while applied
with respect to the "misuse" of a product in its condition as originally designed, cannot apply where the product is subsequently "altered" from that condition. 80 As illustrated by a comparison of
Westerberg and Germann, the use of a foreseeability standard yields
inconsistent and inequitable results. 81
The New York Robinson approach recognizes this, and allows
courts to perform the first two steps in adjudicating the duty question without the use of foreseeability principles. 82 In this respect,
the Robinson rule had a monumental effect in creating a rational
675.

See supra notes 263-333 and accompanying text.

676. See supra notes 334-509 and accompanying text.
677.

See supra notes 510-674 and accompanying text.

678.
679.
680.
681.

See
See
See
See

682.

See supra notes 466-509 and accompanying text.

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

59-223 and accompanying text.
334-462 and accompanying text.
224-52 and accompanying text.
347-416 and accompanying text.
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limitation on what the other approaches deemed absolute liability.
What the Robinson rule did not emphasize was that the use of the
first two steps necessitates the use of the third. 8 3 If a manufacturer
has no duty to foresee the myriad of ways that a product could be
subsequently and materially altered, then it cannot, as a mater of
law, be responsible for any accident arising out of the alteration. The
duty of the manufacturer inheres in the product so long as it remained substantially in the same condition as designed and sold.
Thus, any causal relationship between a material alteration and the
accident must sever the relationship between the manufacturer's design choice and the accident, and must absolve the manufacturer of
liability.
While some appellate courts have recognized this, other courts
should utilize the three-step approach proposed in this Article. The
approach is grounded upon sound notions of public policy and provides a fair means of adjudicating material alteration cases.

683.

See supra notes 510-70 and accompanying text.
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